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The long-overdue surge of public and congressional senti-
ment for reform of the federal income tax laws that culminated_ 
in the Tax Reform Act of 19691 had the unintended consequence 
of dram~ticallv increasing the overall complexity of the reformed 
Internal Reve~ue Code.2 Critics of the resulting Code have ques-
tioned whether, on balance, meaningful reform can be achieved 
within the framework of such a complex law. It has been sug-
gested that the sheer complexity of the Code is undermining the 
voluntary compliance system upon which the administration of 
the tax iaws is based while at the same time rendering the laws 
substantially unenforceable. 3 This criticism has resulted in focus." 
ing for the first time the attention of the draftsmen of our tax laws 
on complexity as a separate factor to be considered in the drafting 
of addit\ons to and revisions of the Code.~ 
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 599 [hereinafter referred to as the 1969 
Act]. 
2. Compare the pre-1969 sections 170 (charitable contributions) and 
1201(b) (alternative tax on capital gains applicable to individuals) with their 
post-1969 counterparts. Ali references herein to the Code are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated. 
3. Committee on Tax Policy of New York Bar Association, A Report on 
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REv. 325, 329-30 (1972). 
4. Section 507 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 
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The results of this attention to complexity have been some-
what mixed. Title V of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, "Tax Simpli-
fication in the Individual Income Ta,"~ amended six provisions 
of the Code, with changes ranging from reducing the distance that 
a taxpayer must move before becoming eligible to deduct his 
moving expenses• to replacing the child care deduction with a 
credit.7 The twenty other, generally more lengthy titles of the 
1976 Act, however, contained few, if any, changes related to sim-
plification. 
· The following year Congress passed the Tax Reduction and 
Simplification Act of 1977,8 which contained a series of minor 
technical amendments related to changes made by the 1976 Act. 
The "simplification" of the 1977 legislation was limited to repeal-
ing the standard deduction and incorporating its relief into the 
tax rate tables.' No doubt these changes have simplified the tax 
laws for many low-income taxpayers-particularly those elimi-
nated from the t"ax rolls-whose problems were never very com-
plex in the first place. But the unquestionable effect of the 
changes made by the 1976 and 1977 Acts on businesses and 
upper-income bracket taxpayers was to complicate significantly 
the preparation of their tax returns. 10 
Perhaps the continued, even increased, substantive complex-
ity of the tax laws applicable to such taxpayers is unavoidable 
and even desirable. Given the complexity of the wide variety of 
transactions entered into by taxpayers, a vastly simplified code 
would not be adequate to allocate equitably the burden of taxa-
tion. Furthermore, much of the Code's complexity is a result of 
1520, 1569 [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act] required the Joint Commit. 
tee on Taxation to make a "full and complete study" with respect to simplifying 
the tax Jaws. 
5. Title V of the 1976 Act might just as well have been entitled, and in 
past years would have been, "Miscellaneous Changes Affecting Individuals." 
6. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 506, 90 Stat. 1568 (amending LR.C. § 217(c) 
(1969)). 
7. ld. § 504, 90 Stat. 1563 (codified at I.R.C. § 44A). 
8. Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 [hereinafter referred to as the 1977 
Act). 
9. I d. § 101, 91 Stat. 127-30. 
10. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat. 
1531 (adding the "at risk" provisions to LR.C. § 465); id. § 602, 90 Stat. 1572 
(adding the foreign conventions rules to LR.C. § 274). 
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its use by Congress to achieve a variety of social and fiscal objec-
tives, often through the deliberate grant of tax concessions. While 
such provisions themselves may not be unduly complex, subse-
quent congressional refinement, perceived as necessary to prevent 
taxpayer abuse of the concession, often eclipses in length and 
complexity the original provision. 11 Halting this cycle would ob-
viously require that Congress abandon the use of the Code as a 
tool for social engineering. While there may be merit to such a 
course of action, it is unlikely that Congress would so limit itself. 
Nevertheless, the complex nature of the Code exists on sev-
eral levels, and the probability of continued substantive complex-
ity does not mean that improvement cannot be sought and 
achieved on other levels. Below the basic structure of the Code· 
and its substantive policies, lies the mechanical detail employed 
by the draftsmen in the execution of those policies. 12 In contrast 
to the ·substantive tax law, there is no offsetting benefit or social 
justification for the overwhelming complexity of this mechanical 
detail. A major improvement in consistency and ease of under-
standing and application of the Code could be achieved by reform 
on this level. Because such revisions would, by their nature, have 
a relatively minor impact on the application of the substantive 
provisions of the tax law to any given taxpayer, resistance to such 
changes should be minimal. Therefore, the attainment of me-
chanical simplification is far more feasible than is enactment of 
the substantive, structural reforms more commonly suggested in 
the name of simplification. 
As an illustration of the need for simplification at the me-
chanical level and as an indication of the improvements that 
11. See Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem 
of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 673, 686 (1969). 
12. While the line between questions of policy and "mechanical detail" is 
not always sharp, the distinction is more than a matter of degree. Altering the 
details of a statute may affect a small proportion of the taxpayers subject to the 
provision but will not significantly alter its overall impact. Thus, for Congress 
to require that a single tax benefit be shared by a taxpayer and his family is 
clearly a question of policy. Whether the family definition for this purpose is to 
be broad or narrow may or may not be a matter of congressional policy. But 
whether the family is to include the brothers and sisters of the taxpayer or the 
spouses of his lineal descendents is not likely to be more than mechanical de-
tail-reflecting more the preferences of the draftsmen than any question of 
policy. 
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could be achieved, the following study has been undertaken of a 
single class of provisions-herein referred to as the affinity provi-
sions-that appear throughout the Code. 
II. AFFINITY PROVISIONS IN GENERAL 
Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 193413 it has been 
recognized that in certain circumstances to maintain the integ-
rity of the tax laws it will be necessary to treat two or more 
otherwise independent taxpayers as a single entity or to accord 
different consequences to transactions among taxpayers standing 
in a specified relationship to each other than would be the case 
if the transactions were between totally unrelated taxpayers. Ac-
cordingly, the substantive law contains hundreds of exceptions 
and limitations addressed to related taxpayers. Each such provi-
sion, either directly or by way of a cross-reference to another 
provision of the Code, must define those family, economic, or 
other interests that for the purpose of the particular provision will 
be regarded as sufficiently close to warrant application of the 
exception or limitation. These definitions constitute the affinity 
provisions of the Code. 
A. Classification 
Affinity provisions are used throughout the Code in a variety 
of ways and for a variety of purposes. Substantially all of these 
provisions, however, fall within the two major categories that are 
of present concern: relationship provisions and attribution provi-
swns. 
The relationship provisions constitute definitional adjuncts 
to specific substantive law provisions that require for their opera-
tion a defined relationship among two or more taxpayers. The 
attribution rules, on the other hand, are used for the purpose of 
expanding the scope of the relationship provisions. 
The relationship provisions are used in the Code to define a 
class of persons, each member of which constitutes a separate 
taxpayer for most purposes under the Code but shares a relation-
ship that must be taken into account for a specific substantive 
law purpose. The most common uses of relationship provisions in 
13. Ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680. 
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the Code occur in substantive sections that either require persons 
in the prescribed relationship to share a single tax benefit other-
wise available to each such taxpayer individually or alter the 
income tax consequences of transactions among members of the 
group relative to the tax effect of such transactions among unre-
lated taxpayers. Within this second category are a large number 
of relationship provisions governing the income tax consequences 
of changes in corporate structure, particularly reorganization and 
liquidation. These provisions generally require a close relation-
ship, generally referred to as "control," among a class of corpora-
tions or between a corporation and a class of its shareholders. 
The second type of affinity provision might properly be re-
ferred to as secondary relationship provisions, since the function 
of these provisions is to supplement the definition of the primary 
relationship by reference to the secondary relationships existing 
among the parties. The most common form of such provisions are 
the attribution rules. If, for example, a particular substantive law 
provision defines the relevant relationship as that existing be-
tween a corporation and an individual owning fifty percent of its 
stock, the Code may not merely take account only of stock ac-
tually owned by the individual because a relationship so narrowly 
defined might easily be avoided. Rather, the individual may be 
deemed to own stock that is actually owned by another if such 
treatment is justified by the relationship existing between the 
individual and that other person. The attribution provisions de-
fine the scope of this secondary relationship and the circumstan-
ces under which attribution is to be made. 
In more general terms, because of a secondary relationship 
between two taxpayers (marriage, for example), their interests in 
a third party (the corporation) are combined for the purpose of 
determining the existence of the primary relationship (fifty per-
cent stock ownership) between them and the third party. These 
objectives can be achieved through methods other than attribu-
tion. For example, the Code could first define the secondary rela-
tionship and then define the primary relationship by reference to 
the secondary. Thus, the Code could specify that the primary 
relationship existed if a husband and wife together owned fifty 
percent of the corporate stock. Such a provision would read very 
differently from a traditional attribution provision, particularly 
if a complete set of relationships were used, but would accomplish 
precisely the same substantive result. This technique is in fact 
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used in the Code, particularly in more recently enacted sections. u 
While such provisions have the appearance of relationship sec-
tions, they are functionally equivalent to attribution sections and 
are referred to herein as aggregation forms of attribution. 15 Be-
cause of the manner in which the aggregation forms of attribution 
have been drafted in practice, the secondary relationships defined 
by such provisions differ from the secondary relationships defined 
by the traditional attribution rules. 1' 
Normally the attribution rules have the effect of lowering the 
relationship threshold because of the existence of other indirect 
relationships among the taxpayers in question. We have used the 
example of a substantive law provision that requires for its opera-
tion the ownership of fifty percent of a corporation's outstanding 
stock. However, by attributing to a husband the thirty percent 
interest held by his wife, for example, the husband will be 
deemed to fall within the prescribed relationship even though he 
actually owns, for example, only twenty-five percent of the out-
standing stock. This result is thought to be justifiable because of 
the taxpayer's indirect relationship, through his wife, to the cor-
poration. 
There is no inherent reason that the persons included in a 
relationship provision must be the same persons from whom attri-
bution is to be made for the purpose of expanding the relationship 
provision. For example, it might be concluded that an individ-
ual's siblings should not be included in the defined relationship 
for the purpose of a given transactional provision of the Code on 
the ground that these persons normally lack a sufficient economic 
identity of interest. Nevertheless, in measuring the individual's 
relationship with a corporation for the purpose of the same provi-
sion, it might quite consistently be concluded that stock owned 
by a sibling should be attributed to the individual. Arguably, that 
14. See, e.g., LR.C. §§ 163(d)(7)(B), 613A(c)(8)(B). 
15. The attribution rules have been defined in general terms. However, in 
the overwhelming majority of uses of the attribution rules, the interest being 
attributed is corporate stock because the corporate relationship is far more 
commonly used in the Code than is the partner-partnership relationship. How-
ever, the primary section of the Code defining the partnership relationship 
(section 707(b)) employs the same attribution rules for defining ownership of a 
partnership interest that are applicable to sections defining corporate relation-
ships (section 267(c)). 
16. See Part XTI infra. 
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is, a lesser identity of interest may be required for attribution 
than for relationship inclusion. The Code rarely draws such dis-
tinctions, however, and generally, for the purposes of a given 
substantive law provision, the taxpayers included in the defined 
relationship are the same ones from whom attribution is made for 
the purpose of expanding the defined relationship. 
B. Historical Development 
Before examining the current Code, it will be useful to review 
briefly the historical development of the affinity provisions. This 
history provides valuable insight into how the existing complexity 
and irrationality of the Code evolved and, it is to be hoped, how 
further aggravation of the situation may be avoided. 
Not surprisingly, the early internal revenue laws contained 
few provisions designed to prevent taxpayers from reducing their 
share of the income tax burden through advance planning. How-
ever, even the draftsmen of the first internal revenue law17 en-
acted after the adoption of the sixteenth amendment recognized 
the avoidance potential inherent in the different tax rates applic-
able to individuals and corporations. While the one percent nor-
mal tax was applicable to both, only individual taxpayers were 
subject to the "additional" tax on net incomes in excess of 
$20,000, ranging from one percent to what was undoubtedly re-
garded as an outrageous six percent. Accordingly, the draftsmen 
provided that for the purpose of the additional tax, an individ-
ual's taxable income would include his allocable share of the 
undistributed income of a corporation "formed or fraudulently 
availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax 
through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accu-
mulate instead of being divided or distributed. "u Further, the 
fact that such a corporation had accumulated income beyond the 
reasonable needs of its business or was "a mere holding company" 
constituted uprima facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to es-
cape such tax,"" This provision is the direct ancestor of both the 
present accumulated earnings tax 20 and the personal holding 
17. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
18. /d. § ll.A. Subdivision 2, 38 Stat. 166. 
19. /d. 38 Stat. 166-67. 
20. I.R.C. § 531. 
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company provisions21 of the Code. 
Although the Collector actively litigated a wide variety of tax 
avoidance devices during the subsequent two decades, Congress 
paid relatively little attention to tax avoidance techniques until 
the Revenue Act of 1934. 22 Experience with a tax avoidance provi-
sion based upon a reasonableness test had demonstrated the in-
adequacy of such an approach and the need to enact self-
executing provisions. 23 The solution adopted by the 1934 Act was 
to retain the predecessor of the accumulated earnings tax24 while 
carving out a specific type of corporation-the personal holding 
company-that would automatically be subject to an additional 
surtax on its income. This new provision, geared to status rather 
than conduct, required the adoption of precise definitional tests. 
In addition to a test relating to the nature of the corporate in-
come, section 351(b)(1) of the 1934 Act adopted a relationship 
provision defining personal holding companies in terms of owner-
ship by not more than five individuals of more than fifty percent 
in value of the outstanding· stock of the corporation. This preci-
sion in definition raised the possibility that the impact of the new 
provision could be negated, without significantly changing the 
economic benefits from the use of a personal holding company, 
by causing the stock of such a corporation to be dispersed among 
a number of legally distinct but economically related individuals 
or business entities.· To prevent that result, the first attribution 
provision of the Code was adopted. Section 351 provided that 
[f]or the purpose of determining the ownership of stock in a 
personal holding company ... (C) stock owned, directly or in-
directly, by a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust shall be 
consid~red as being owned proportionately by its shareholders, 
partners, or beneficiaries; (0) an individual shall be considered 
as owning, to the exclusion of any other individual, the stock 
owned, directly or indirectly, by his family, and this rule shall 
be applied in such manner as to produce the smallest possible 
number of individuals owning, directly or indirectly, more than 
50 per centum in value of the outstanding stock; and (E) the 
21. I.R.C. §§ 541-547. 
22. Ch. 277, 48 Stat. 705. 
23. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 
C.B. (pt. 2) 554, 562. 
24. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 852, § 104, 45 Stat. 814-15. 
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family of an individual shall include only his brothers and sis-
ters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and 
lineal descendants. u 
Congress had also become concerned that tax losses were 
being artificially created by the purported sale of property among 
members of an integrated economic group, particularly among 
family members and between an individual and a controlled, 
closely held corporation. Thus, the 1934 Act added paragraph 6 
to section 24(a) disallowing a deduction for a 
llloss from sales or exchanges of property, directly or indi-
rectly, {A) between members of a family, or (B) except in the 
case of distributions in liquidation, between an individual and 
a corporation in which such individual owns, directly or indi-
rectly, more than 50 per centum in value of the outstanding 
stock. For the purposes of this paragraph-(C) an individual 
shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or indi-
rectly, by his family; and (D) the family of an individual shall 
include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or 
half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. 26 
The affinity provisions of section 351 were primarily attribu-
tion rules applicable to the most elementary relationship-stock 
ownership. Section 24(a)(6), on the other hand, was the earliest 
relationship provision of appreciable scope. Section 24 supple-
mented its relationship definition with farpily attribution rules 
that were identical to those contained in section 351. Interest-
ingly, however, the entity attribution rules contained in section 
351 were not incorporated into section 24. Thus, for example, an 
individual could not escape personal holding company classifica-
tion of a corporation by causing a material portion of the stock 
of the corporation to be held by another controlled corporation or 
in trust for the individual. Had the individual chosen to so struc-
ture his ownership of the personal holding company, however, 
losses on transactions between the individual ·and the personal 
holding company would not be disallowed. The committee re-
ports to the 1934 Act do not disclose the reason for this disparity 
in treatment; from their very inception, inconsistency has been 
the rule, not the exception, in the affinity provisions of the Code. 
25. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 451-52. 
26. ld. § 24(a), 48 Stat. 691. 
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A further characteristic of the attribution rules in these ini-
tial affinity provisions should be noted. Both of the substantive 
law provisions contained relatively high threshold requirements 
for their application. That is, more than fifty percent of the stock 
of a corporation must be controlled by five or fewer persons in the 
case of section 351 or by the individual and his family in the case 
of section 24 for personal holding company status to arise or for 
losses to be disallowed, respectively. Thus, the proscribed tax-
payer relationships were relatively narrowly defined. On the other 
hand, the attribution rules adopted in 1934 were very broad. 
Under section 351 stock was attributed from a corporation, part-
nership, trust, or estate proportionately to shareholders, partners, 
or beneficiaries regardless of how nominal the interest of the indi-
vidual may have been in the entity. Furthermore, except for cer-
tain unusual provisions discussed below, 27 the definition of family 
is the broadest ever adopted in the income tax laws. 
The affinity provisions of both the personal holding company 
section and the disallowance of loss section were significantly 
expanded in the Revenue Act of 1937, 2~ which, in these and other 
areas, largely implemented the recommendations made by the 
Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance.Z» The attribu-
tion rules contained in the personal holding company provisions 
were expanded in two major respects. Partners were to be treated 
in the same manner as family members because of the "close 
business relationship existing between members of a partner-
ship. " 30 Second, ownership of stock was to be attributed to the 
holders of options to acquire the stock and to holders of securities 
convertible into stock.31 
27. See text accompanying notes 52-53 & 229-31 infra. 
28. Pub. L. No. 75-815, 50 Stat. 813. 
29. See JoiNT CoMMITTEE ON TAX EvASION AND AvOIDANCE, H.R. Doc. No. 
337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). 
30. S. REP. No. 1242, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 
C.B. (pt. 2) 703, 709. 
31. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 354, 50 Stat. 815. The Revenue Act of 
1937 also added the foreign personal holding company provisions to the law. The 
substantive tax avoidance problem attacked by the foreign personal holding 
company provisions was essentially identical to that which occasioned the adop-
tion of the personal holding company rules: the shifting of income to an incorpo-
rated entity that was subject to a lower tax rate or no tax at all. Accordingly, 
Congress adopted a similar substantive law vehicle to attack the problem and, 
further, employed identical attribution of stock ownership rules. 
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The loss-disallowance provision of section 24 of the 1934 Act 
could have been expanded in several ways. For example, Congress 
could have enumerated the entities subject to the provision and 
disallowed losses with respect to transactions among any persons 
so enumerated. The Joint Committee, however, had focused on 
specific transactions and, presumably as a consequence, section 
24 was expanded by listing the pairs of individuals or entities 
between which transactions establishing losses would not be per-
mitted. Furthermore, the attribution provisions of section 24 were 
expanded to include the provisions governing attribution from 
entities that in 1934 had been added to the personal holding 
company section but not to section 24. Direct attribution from a 
partner was also added to section 24 but with a novel and impor-
tant qualification: such attribution was not to be permitted un-
less the individual to whom the stock was to be attributed other-
wise owned stock in the corporation either directly or by attribu-
tion. Further, for this purpose, only attribution from entities 
would be counted; attributed ownership from family members 
would not suffice to permit attribution from an individual's part-
ner. As this provision illustrates and other provisions discussed 
below confirm, the Revenue Act of 1937 originated the trend that 
has continued to the present day of establishing highly complex 
attribution rules varying in minor particulars from section to sec-
tion. 
The 1937 Act also added a new substantive provision disal-
lowing deductions under certain circumstances for interest or 
other expenses incurred but not paid within two and one-half 
months following the close of a taxable year. This new section 
24(c) was to be applicable if "both the taxpayer and the person 
to whom the payment is to be made are persons between whom 
losses would be disallowed under section 24(b)." 32 Thus, the 1937 
Act also introduced the concept of applying attribution rules by 
cross-reference to other Code provisions. 
The next major development of the attribution rules came 
with the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Prior to 
that time, the corporate distributions and reorganization provi-
sions had not been subject to these statutory attribution rules 
permitting tax results that in certain circumstances were unjusti-
32. Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-815, § 24(c), 50 Stat. 813. 
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fiably favorable to taxpayers. Accordingly, the 1954 Code added 
section 318 to provide for attribution of stock ownership under a 
limited number of designated sections of the Code (principally 
within Subchapter C) governing corporate distributions and ad-
justments. Much of section 318 constituted a distinct improve-
ment over the attribution rules previously contained in the Code, 
but unfortunately the preexisting rules were not conformed to the 
changes contained in section 318.33 
33. In one respect, however, section 318 contained a provision resulting in 
overly broad attribution. Section 318 introduced the concept of "back-
attribution" whereby stock owned by a shareholder, partner, or beneficiary 
could be attributed to the corporation, partnership, trust, or estate if certain 
threshold requirements were met. While back-attribution itself was, and is, 
controversial, as section 318 was originally adopted, back-attribution brought 
with it so-called "sidewise" attribution. Stock held by a shareholder (or partner 
or beneficiary) could thus be attributed back to the corporation and then re-
attributed from the corporation to any other shareholder. Sidewise attribution 
commonly had the effect of treating individuals who were only incidentally 
fellow partners or shareholders in a business activity as owning stock in the 
taxpayer's personal and wholly unrelated ventures. 
Back-attribution remains in section 318, but sidewise attribution under 
section 318 was eliminated in 1964 by Pub. L. No. 88-554, § 4, 78 Stat. 762. After 
ten years of struggling with sidewise attribution, Congress realized that the tax 
avoidance prevented by this section was indeed marginal and that general appli-
cation of the provision was improper since it had "the effect of attributing one 
person's stockholding to another even though there is neither an economic nor 
a family connection between the two persons." S. REP. No. 1240, 88th Cong., 
2d Sess. 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964-2 C.B. 701, 705. 
Nevertheless, sidewise attributio'l had existed, to a limited extent, under 
the Code since 1937 when attribution from partners was added to both the 
personal holding company provision, section 544, and to the predecessor of 
section 267(c). Moreover, such attribution was directly between these persons 
and not indirectly through the partnership. Thus, the result of attribution pur-
suant to these earlier provisions was far more extensive since all of a partner's 
stock would be attributed to the taxpayer and not merely an amount equal to 
the taxpayer's proportional interest in the partnership. Consistent with the 
normal inconsistency in this area, when section 318 was modified in 1964 to 
eliminate sidewise attribution, the more Draconian provisions of sections 267(c) 
and 544 were not changed. 
As noted previously, many of the attribution rules of section 318 are not 
applicable unless there is a certain threshold relationship between the entities 
subject to attribution. For example, in the case of corporations, there was to be 
no attribution in either direction unless the shareholder owned actually or con-
structively 50% of the stock of the corporation. The threshold requirements for 
other entities, however, were substantially lower. 
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The only major addition to the affinity provisions since 1954 
occurred in the Revenue Act of 1964, which added sections 1561 
through 1564 in substantially their present form.:U Section 
1563(a) provided for the first time in the Code a complete defini-
tion of a controlled group of corporations, including not only ver-
tical chains but also horizontally related corporations. For the 
purposes of determining stock ownership under section 1563, the 
section provided its own set of attribution rules in subsections 
(d) and (e). The attribution rules contained in section 1563 drew 
heavily upon the criticism that had been leveled against section 
318 and thus in many respects constituted a considerable advance 
in draftsmanship. Nevertheless, as in 1954 the adoption of this 
new set of attribution rules was not accompanied by improve-
ments in existing provisions.M 
In one particular, the attribution rules of section 1563 are not 
appropriate for general use. The purpose of these rules is to define 
a related group of corporations for the purpose of limiting all such 
corporations to a single surtax exemption and certain other cred-
its. In a surprisingly early recognition of the independence of 
women, however, Congress concluded that it would be inappro-
priate to require that separate businesses run by a husband and 
wife share a single exemption.3• Accordingly, attribution from 
family members under section 1563(e), particularly from spouses, 
is highly limited. 
While section 1563 is the only basic addition to the 1954 
Code, in the sense that it is widely used by cross-reference, every 
piece of tax legislation of any significance has included additions 
to or modifications of the affinity provisions, and the Tax Reform 
Acts of 1969 and 1976 were no exceptions. The 1976 Act is particu-
larly worthy of mention in this historical summary since by that 
year the need for simplification apparently had been accepted by 
those responsible for the drafting of tax legislation. Nevertheless, 
the 1976 Act developed the "double cross-reference." For exam-
34. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116. 
35. Section 1563 did not adopt back-attribution but rather employed a 
sufficiently extensive definition of the intercorporate relationships that were to 
be subject to the substantive law restriction, so that back-attribution became 
unnecessary. 
36. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 
C.B. (pt. 2) 123, 244. 
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ple, section 999, the new provision governing international boy-
cotts, defines a controlled group of corporations by a cross-
reference to section 993(a)(3), one of the domestic international 
sales corporation (DISC) sections37 that does not itself define a 
controlled group of corporations but rather refers, with certain 
modifications, to the definition in section 1563(a). In addition, 
section 464(c)(2)(E), also added by the 1976 Act, provides the 
most unusual definition of family in the Code. The definition is 
extraordinarily broad and includes not only aunts and uncles and 
all of the descendants of aunts and uncles, but also great-aunts 
and great-uncles. However, the definition appears to exclude the 
individual's own spouse (presumably through a drafting error). 
C. Sections Involved 
The result of all of the foregoing legislative developments has 
been considerable diversity, inconsistency, and confusion. Sec-
tion 267(b) contains the only general relationship provision focus-
ing on individuals. A single provision governing partnership rela-
tionships is contained in section 707(b). There are two principal 
provisions describing corporate relationships, contained in sec-
tion 1504 and section 1563(a), which are used throughout the 
Code by a cross-reference; but similarly complete definitions are 
also contained in section 368 and section 1551. There are three 
commonly used, relatively complete attribution sections: sections 
267(c), 318, and 1563(e). There are also three complete attribu-
tion provisions used to a lesser extent throughout the Code: sec-
tions 544, 554, and 958. In addition to these provisions, there are 
a large number of sections that prescribe relationships for the 
purposes of a single section that may or may not vary in signifi-
cant degree from the sections of broader application; a smaller 
number of sections supply attribution provisions for only a single 
section. In all, over eighty sections employ either the relationship 
provisions or the attribution provisions contained in these sec-
tions, ranging from a mere cross-reference to the definition of 
family to a full incorporation of both the relationship and attribu-
37. I.R.C. §§ 991-997. A domestic international sales corporation or DISC 
is a domestic corporation, substantially all of whose income is derived from 
export sales. In general effect, through the DISC device the income from such 
sales is taxed at a reduced rate. 
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tion rules of a provision. As shall be seen, most of these sections 
also modify the relationships or attributions specified in the basic 
sections. The lack of uniformity is staggering indeed. 
The statutory inconsistency can be better appreciated if the 
various types of commonly used relationships and attributions 
are considered as a unit rather than on a section-by-section basis. 
There is necessarily a degree of artificiality in such classifications. 
Nevertheless, the general pattern of the relationship and attribu-
tion sections should become apparent. 
Ill AFFINITY BY FAMILY CoNNECTION 
A. The Family Relationship 
The family relationship is the one most commonly used in 
the affinity provisions of the Code. In view of the constant modifi-
cations that have been made in other areas, it is noteworthy that 
the definition of family relationships contained in section 267(b) 
remains unchanged and is the only definition used with any fre-
quency throughout the affinity provisions of the Code. That defi-
nition, which has remained unchanged since 1934,38 includes the 
taxpayer, his or her spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and 
br9thers and sisters by the whole or half blood. 
Neither the Code nor the regulations thereto modify the ref-
erence to a spouse, and thus the term presumably must be given 
a broad interpretation.30 More recently enacted affinity provi-
sions, however, exclude from the definition of "spouse" individu-
als legally separated under a decree of separate maintenance or 
divorce. A similar rule prevails under other major Code provi-
sions.~0 Since the different statutory language of section 267 may 
be either deliberate or unintended, the absence of regulatory clar-
ification is regrettable. 
The regulations to the section 267 definition of family pro-
vide that "the term 'ancestors' includes parents and grandpar-
38. The apparent consistency of the family definition is somewhat mis-
leading. The principal use of the section 267(c)(4) definition is by cross-
references from other Code sections and a great number of such sections modify 
the definition of family. See Part X infra. 
39. See Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1977). 
40. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 152 (defining a dependent); I.R.C. § 6013(d)(2) 
(defining eligibility for filing joint returns). 
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ents, and the term 'lineal descendants' includes children and 
grandchildren."41 The use of the word "includes" in this regula-
tion is obviously ambiguous, and it is not at all clear whether the 
regulation suggests a limitation on the normal definition of those 
terms or is merely, and pointlessly, illustrative. The regulation 
further provides that in determining the existence of these rela-
tionships, full effect shall be given to a legal adoption. This con-
struction is consistent with the express statutory language of 
more recently enacted affinity rules and finds strong factual sup-
port in contemporary society. The statutory basis for this expan-
sion of the family definition is weak, however, since the term 
"lineal descendant" suggests biological issue and may be con-
trasted with the broader word "children," which is used elsewhere 
in the Coden and which more appropriately would include 
adopted children. While it is not being suggested that the regula-
tions are invalid, it is interesting to compare the more aggressive 
construction of "lineal descendants," used to expand section 267, 
with the absence of any definition of "spouse," any narrowing of 
which would be favorable to taxpayers. 
Section 544 (and the virtually identical section 554), added 
to the law at the same time as section 267, contains the identical 
statutory definition of family. However, there are no regulations 
under the personal holding company definition. Given the histori-
cal relationship of these definitions, a forceful argument can be 
made that they should be interpreted similarly and that the regu-
latory modification of section 267 should be equally applicable to 
section 544. Nevertheless, in the absence of any authority, the 
status of great-grandparents, great-grandchildren, and adopted 
children for personal holding company purposes is uncertain. 
Section 704(e) also contains a definition of family for rela-
tionship purposes, but that section has application only to section 
704(e) itself, which pertains to family partnerships, and to section 
1375(c), which pertains to family stockholders of Subchapter S 
corporations. The definition of family contained in section 704(e) 
is identical to the section 267 definition except that section 704(e) 
does not include brothers and sisters. As in the case of section 544, 
there are no regulations concerning this definition of family. For 
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.267(c)-l(a)(4) (1960). 
42. E.g., I.R.C. § 318(a)(l). 
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certain purposes of the collapsible ·corporations provision, section 
341(e)(8)(A)(i) also contains a definition of family. This provi-
sion, not used elsewhere in the Code, is also identical to section 
267 except that it does not include brothers and sisters. 
A small number of sections contain even more limited defini-
tions of family. Section 613A, which limits the quantity of oil 
subject to percentage depletion, requires that the allowance be 
allocated among members of the same family, which is defined 
in subsection (c)(8)(D)(iii) as including only an individual's 
spouse and minor children. 43 
Section 1239, which treats gain on the sale of certain depreci-
able property as ordinary income rather than capital gain, also 
contains a family definition for relationship purposes that is lim-
ited to a husband and wife. This extreme limitation on the family 
definition is particularly striking when contrasted with the broad 
definition in the somewhat related section 267.H Section 1313(c), 
which defines related taxpayers for purposes of the complex miti-
gation of the statute of limitation provisions, also limits the defi-
nition to a husband and wife. 
Section 672(c) defines a "related or subordinate party" for 
the purposes of the grantor trust rules. Presumably under the 
influence of the estate planning purposes of a grantor trust, this 
section defines "family" to include a spouse who is living with the 
grantor and the grantor's parents, issue, and brothers and sisters. 
Grandparents, but not grandchildren, are thus excluded from the 
definition. 
Section 152 defines "dependents," rather than "family," for 
the purpose of the personal exemption and for certain similar 
purposes, such as the designation of persons related to the tax-
payer who may be included in a medical reimbursement plan 
under section 105(b) or the cost of whose medical care is deducti-
43. The inclusion of only minor children in an affinity provision was first 
introduced as a drafting technique in section 1239 and later much expanded in 
section 1563. These are both attribution sections and are discussed in the follow-
ing text. Section 613A is the first use of the minor children limitation in a 
relationship section. 
44. Sections 1239 and 267 both attack techniques of obtaining a tax bene-
fit through artificial dispositions of property although the techniques are quite 
different (the substantial provisions of section 267(a) disallow losses on the sale 
of property). 
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ble under section 213. On rare occasions when Congress has in-
tended a very broad definition of family, reference has been made 
to the definition in section 152. For example, section 50B, which 
defines the wages for which a work incentive program credit is 
allowed, excludes wages paid to most of the individuals enumer-
ated in section 152. 
In addition to the above provisions, two Code sections con-
tain a definition of family relationships for the purpose of defining 
"prohibited" transactions with various types of exempt organiza-
tions. The definition of "disqualified persons" with respect to 
private foundations in section 4946(d) contains its own definition 
of family, which is identical to the language of section 267 but 
eliminates references to brothers and sisters and includes spouses 
of lineal descendants. This same definition of family was adopted 
in the prohibited transaction provision of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974~~ (ERISA) and is contained in 
section 4975(e)(6). 
B. Family Attribution 
In contrast to the single, widely applied family relationship 
definition of section 267, there are several frequently used family 
attribution rules, each of which has been the subject of considera-
ble modification. As a result, these provisions are the most incon-
sistent of the Code's affinity rules. 
The definition of family for attribution purposes contained 
in section 267(c), the oldest of the affinity rules, is identical to the 
definition used for relationship purposes. 
Section 318 was added to the Code in 1954 to serve as a 
uniform rule, at least for the purposes of Subchapter C, govern-
ing the attribution of stock ownership. The section provides 
somewhat more precise definitions than are contained in the 
earlier provisions. The members of an individual's family are 
defined in section 318 to include his spouse, children, grand-
children, and parents. Deviating from sections 267 and 544, sec-
tion 318 excludes from the definition of a spouse an individual 
who is legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate 
maintenance. In addition, this section specifically provides that 
45. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3, 88 Stat. 879. 
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a legally adopted child shall be treated as a biological child. 
Thus, by 1954, brothers and sisters were no longer included in 
the family affinity group, and recognition had been extended to 
the realities of separation agreements and adoption. A grand-
parent continued to be regarded as possessing economic control 
or identity of purpose with his grandchildren, although grand-
children were no longer regarded as dominating their grand-
parents. 
The most recently enacted of the basic attribution rules is 
contained in section 1563(e) and marks a considerable departure 
in the definition of family. In part, these rules reflect an attempt 
to limit attribution to circumstances having the strongest factual 
basis. The resulting statutory distinctions have produced an inor-
dinately complex set of attribution rules. To some extent, how-
ever, these rules reflect policy considerations that are unique to 
section 1561, and therefore certain of the limitations on attribu-
tion contained in section 1563(e) are not suitable for general ap-
plication. Nevertheless, as discussed in greater detail below, sec-
tion 1563 is applied by cross-reference to a significant number of 
unrelated sections. 
Congress wished to exclude from the definition of corpora-
tions under common control the separate businesses of a husband 
and wife. Accordingly, attribution between spouses is subject to 
special limitations. This policy seems to have influenced the limi-
tations on attribution among other family members as well. 
Under section 1563(e)(5), stock is generally attributed from a 
spouse unless the parties are legally separated under a decree of 
divorce or separate maintenance. This section, however, specifies 
that the decree of divorce may be either interlocutory or final and 
thus extends the limitations added by section 318. This general 
rule is subject to the exceptions that stock is not to be attributed 
to an individual from his or her spouse if (1) the individual does 
not directly own stock in the corporation and is not a director or 
employee of the corporation and does not participate in the man-
agement of its business, (2) not more than fifty percent of the 
corporation's gross income was derived from passive sources, and 
(3) the stock owned by the spouse is not subject to any restrictions 
on his or her right to dispose of the stock that run in favor of the 
individual or his or her minor children. 48 In other words, under 
46. These requirements must be met not only at the time of the transac-
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1563(e) the stock of a corporation actively engaged in business is 
not attributed between spouses if the attributee spouse has no 
actual contact with the business or ownership rights in the stock. 
Whatever the merits of such a rule for the purposes of section 
1563, it appears to be too restrictive for general application. 
Attribution under section 1563(e) involving parents and chil-
dren is more limited and far more complex than under prior attri-
bution rules. Stock is universally attributed to an individual from 
his children only if the children have not attained the age of 
twenty-one years. However, if the individual owns more than fifty 
percent of the stock of the corporation in question (measured 
either by value or by vote) stock owned by adult children is also 
attributed to him.47 For the purpose of determining whether the 
individual owns more than fifty percent of the corporation's 
stock, his ownership is determined after the application of all of 
the other attribution rules provided by section 1563(e) except the 
rules attributing stock owned by an individual's ancestors, grand-
children, or adult children. Thus, in computing this fifty percent, 
stock attributed to an individual from his or her spouse and minor 
children is taken into account. This "domination" test is, of 
course, far more restrictive of attribution than is the limitation 
on attribution from spouses and is unique to this section. 
Stock owned by an individual's parents is attributed to him 
only if he has not attained the age of twenty-one years or if he 
has met the fifty percent test referred to above. Stock owned by 
an individual's grandparents and grandchildren is only attrib-
uted to him if he has met the fifty percent test. As in the case of 
tion in question but throughout the entire taxable year of the corporation in 
which the transaction occurs. 
47. This provision is the first use of the domination test in family attribu-
tion. The test, however, resembles, and may have been derived from the thresh-
old requirements for attribution from corporations introduced by section :ns. 
See text accompanying note 135 infra. In connection with corporate attribution, 
however, the test serves a somewhat different purpose of defining whether the 
relationship between the corporate-attributor and its shareholder-attributee is 
sufficiently close to justify attribution, and under section 318 the relationship 
is not deemed sufficiently close unless the shareholder owns 50% of the stock of 
the corporation. In family attribution, the family relationship itself between the 
attributor and the attributee has been regarded as sufficient to support attribu-
tion. The domination test imposes the further requirement that the attributee 
also have a close relationship with the corporation, the stock of which is to be 
attributed. 
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section 318, a legally adopted child is included within the defini-
tion of child. 
Thus, under section 1563, brothers and sisters remain e~ 
eluded from the family group, and grandparents have reap-
peared, albeit in limited circumstances. A domination test for 
family attribution has been introduced; and a distinction first 
drawn in section 1239, between adult and minor children, has 
been expanded and joined with the precondition introduced in 
se~tion 267(c)(3) that the attributee otherwise own stock. 
Section 1563 is a classic example of the tension between sub-
stantial justice and undue complexity that faces the draftsmen 
of tax legislation. The factual basis for family attribution under 
the highly refined section 1563(e) doubtlessly is far greater than 
under other attribution sections, but the price for such precision 
in terms of mechanical complexity is obviously very high, partic-
ularly in view of the position of section 1563(e) as only one of 
several different family attribution provisions. 
In addition to these basic provisions, other sections define 
the family for particular attribution purposes. Section 544 pre-
scribes the attribution rules that are to be applied for certain 
purposes under the personal holding company provisions. The use 
of this section has been limited to these provisions with only rare 
exceptions. At present, section 341(d) is the only unrelated sec-
tion that adopts, by cross-reference, the family attribution rules 
of section 544.4~ The definition of family in section 544 has re-
mained unchanged since the enactment of the predecessor to that 
section in 19344• and is identical to the definition contained in 
section 267(c). This definition also appears in section 425(d). 110 
The 1976 Act, for no apparent reason, relied heavily on the 
aggregation form of attribution; 51 and, in the course of prescribing 
these rather awkward new rules, it introduced two definitions of 
family, one quite narrow and the other uniquely broad. Section 
163(d)(7)(B) provides an aggregation type of attribution rule for 
the purpose of determining whether fifty percent or more of the 
48. Prior to its amendment by the Revenue Act of 1964, section 1551 also 
employed such a cross-reference. 
49. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 751-52. 
50. These attribution rules are used only for the substantive purposes of 
the statutory stock option sections. See I.R.C. §§ 421-425. 
51. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
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stock in a corporation is owned by members of the same family. 
Consistent with the current trend, family is defined relatively 
narrowly to include only the taxpayer, his spouse, and his chil-
dren. None of these terms are elaborated upon in the statute. 
Section 447 and the related section 464 form part of a series 
of provisions that were added to the Code in 1976 and designed 
to limit the availability of several popular types of tax shelters. 
Both sections seek to reduce the attractiveness of farming opera-
tions as a tax shelter by changing the tax accounting rules that 
previously had applied to such ventures. However, neither section 
was designed to change the tax accounting rules available to 
family-owned farms, even when most of the family interest was 
held by individuals not actively engaged in farming. For the pur-
poses of these exclusions, Congress evidently thought it desirable 
to adopt an extraordinarily broad definition of family. 
Section 447 is only applicable to incorporated farms and ex-
cludes farms in which fifty percent of the stock is owned by mem-
bers of the same family. In this section, family is defined as 
including the individual, his brothers and sisters, the brothers 
and sisters of both his parents and grandparents, the ancestors 
and lineal descendants of all of the foregoing, and the spouses of 
all of the foregoing (apparently including the spouses of ancestors 
and lineal descendants). The section specifically provides that 
legally adopted individuals shall be treated as though they were 
biologically related, but it does not define the word "spouse." In 
view of the number of spouses that the definition includes, this 
omission is most regrettable. The general effect of this provision 
is to include all of the descendants (and their spouses) of each of 
an average individual's four pairs of great-grandparents. In a typ-
ical family, the number of persons so described will be in the 
hundreds, and the degree of identity of economic interest among 
them will be far less than is the mutuality of interest with one's 
neighbors.52 In any event, section 447 has added a new and per-
haps unfortunate dimension to the definition of family. 
The related section 464, applicable only to unincorporated 
52. In any such family group, one might suppose, there would be several 
individuals who may think that their farming tax shelter is no longer attractive. 
One can conceive of an entire new line of business for the nation's genealogists: 
locating wealthy members of the same section 447 family so they can join to-
gether in a farming tax shelter. 
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farms, also exempts from its application family-owned farms and 
employs a broad definition of family. Interestingly, however, the 
family definition here employed is not only different in substance 
from section 447 but is also different in form. Rather than provid-
ing its own definition, section 464 proceeds by way of a highly 
modified cross· reference to section 267. Because the problems 
presented by section 464 are characteristic of the "affinity by 
cross-reference" provisions, section 464 is considered in detail 
be-low in connection with the other cross-referencing provisions.53 
IV. TRUST AND ESTATE AFFINITY 
Although there are numerous inconsistencies throughout the 
Code in the definition of family for attribution and relationship 
purposes, with minor exceptions the various rules are relatively 
clear and unambiguous. By contrast, the provisions governing 
relationships among and attribution to and from entities are more 
uniform throughout the Code but are subject to considerably 
greater interpretive difficulties. 
A. Trust and Estate Relationships 
As in the case of family affinity rules, section 267(b) is the 
primary provision setting forth relationships between trusts and 
various taxpayers that is employed through cross-reference by 
various substantive provisions throughout the Code. Section 
267(b) lists the following specific pairs of relationships: 
(a) a grantor and a fiduciary of a trust; 
(b) different fiduciaries of different trusts having the 
same grantor; 
(c) a fiduciary and a beneficiary of the same trust; 
(d) a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of a different 
trust if both trusts have the same grantor; and 
(e) a fiduciary of a trust and a corporation more than 
53. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra. Prior to 1976, section 1239 
also contained a highly limited aggregation form of attribution rule that served 
a purpose similar to the present section 163(d){7)(B). The 1976 Act replaced this 
special rule with a cross-reference to section 318. The former version of section 
1239 is of historical interest because the scope of the family was limited to minor 
children and minor grandchildren, the first distinction in the Code between 
adult and minor descendants. 
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fifty percent in value of the outstanding stock of 
which is owned by either the trust or the grantor of 
the trust. 
581 
Section 267(b) makes no reference to estates or executors of 
estates in its enumerationof related taxpayers.u This omission is 
one of several substantial defects in section 267 that have under-
mined its usefulness as a generally applied relationship provision. 
The Commissioner has taken steps through litigation to remedy 
this omission, but after an initial hint of success55 it is now appar-
ently established that section 267(b) cannot be expanded to en-
compass estates. In Estate of Hanna56 the taxpayer's estate had 
sold stock to a corporation more than fifty percent of which was 
owned by the beneficiaries of the estate. The Commissioner 
argued that since under the attribution rules of section 267(c) the 
beneficiaries of an estate are treated as owning stock owned by 
the estate, the sale should be regarded as a transaction between 
such individual beneficiaries and the corporation. The court re-
jected this analysis on the ground that the sale was in fact be-
tween the estate and the corporation, rather than between indi-
viduals and the corporation and that sales by estates were not 
included in section 267.57 The Commissioner has only recently 
conceded the existence of this omission in section 267. sM 
The only other provision of the Code containing a compre-
hensive list of trust-oriented relationships is section 1313, which 
provides rules that are applicable to the mitigation provisions. In 
somewhat more concise language, section 1313(c) lists the follow-
ing categories: 
54. It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service, however, that if the 
administration of an estate is unduly prolonged, the estate will be regarded as 
a trust for all income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3 (1960). 
55. See Estate of Ingalls, 45 B.T.A. 787 (1941), aff'd on other grounds. 43· 
1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9276 (6th Cir. 1943), nonacq. 1942-1 C.B. 24. 
56. 320 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1963). 
57. Minor variation of this argument succeeded in expanding the scope of 
section 267 fo partnerships. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra. On the 
other hand, the Commissioner was not permitted to expand the application of 
section 267 to transactions between trusts and corporations prior to the amend-
ment of section 267(b) to specifically include those relationships. See John A. 
Snively, Sr., 20 T.C. 136 (1953); Lexmont Corp., 20 T.C. 185 (1953). But see 
Wisconsin Memorial Park Co., 20 T.C. 390 (1957) (trust was regarded as a mere 
conduit). 
58. Rev. Rul. 77-439, 1977-2 C.B. 230. 
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(a) grantor and fiduciary; 
(b) grantor and beneficiaries; 
(c) fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir; and 
(d) decedent and decedent's estate. 
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While common sense suggests that certain limitations on these 
categories must be made, the regulations have not addressed the 
issue. Presumably, the grantor, fiduciary, and beneficiary must 
be of the same trust. 
A few sections create limited trust or estate relationships. 
Section 704(e), which establishes special rules for family partner-
ships, includes rather vaguely in its definition of members of a 
family any "trusts for the primary benefit of such person."~• The 
prohibited transaction provisions applicable to private founda-
tions include as a disqualified person the owner of a twenty per-
cent or greater beneficial interest in a trust that is a substantial 
contributor to the charity80 as well as trusts or estates in which 
persons who are otherwise disqualified persons in the aggregate 
hold more than thirty-five percent of the beneficial interest. 81 The 
similar prohibitions enacted by ERISN2 include trusts or estates 
in which disqualified persons hold more than fifty percent of the 
beneficial interest. 83 
The most flagrant omission from the Code relationship provi-
sions is the absence of a generally applicable definition of related 
entities of all types. As discussed below in connection with cross-
referencing to relationship provisions,64 most sections imposing a 
broader scope on the defined relationship rely on cross-references 
to several different relationship provisions: generally section 
267(b) for family and trust relationships, section 707(b) for part-
nership relationships, and section 1563(a) for corporate relation-
ships. These separate cross-references, however, do not result in 
59. Section 704(e)(3) reads in pertinent part: "The 'family' of any individ-
ual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and any 
trust for the primary benefit of such persons." This definition also applies, by 
cross-reference, to section 1375(c), which deals with distributions of electing 
small business corporations. 
60. LR.C. § 4946(a)( 1 )(C)(iii). 
61. I.R.C. § 4946(a)( 1 )(G). 
62. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 978 (1974). 
63. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(E)(iii). 
64. See Part X infra. 
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the inclusion of relationships between the different types of enti-
ties (for example, between trusts and partnerships). 
Beginning in 1969, the draftsmen of tax legislation began 
experimenting with new forms of all-inclusive relationship provi-
sions, each of which is used only by a single Code section. While 
each such section is different, two basic approaches have been 
taken. The initial approach is contained in section 613A, which 
disallows, with several exceptions, the use of percentage depletion 
with respect to oil and gas production. One exception is for a 
specified quantity of production by so-called independent produ-
cers. The independent-producer allocation must be shared by 
specified related persons, and for this purpose section 
613A(c)(8)(B) provides that any two or more trusts and estates, 
together with corporations, that are under common control must 
share a single allocation. The distinguishing feature of this ap-
proach is that common control is defined by an aggregation fotm 
of attribution rule.65 Common control exists if fifty percent or 
more of the beneficial interest in two or more entities is owned 
by the same or related persons. However, only the holdings of 
persons owning a five percent or greater interest in the entity are 
counted. The required secondary relationship among the benefi-
cial owners is defined by the traditional cross-reference with cer-
tain modifications to the relationship provisions contained in sec-
tions 267, 707, and 1563. 
Section 613A contains two additional trust and estate rela-
tionship provisions. Section 613A(c)(9) creates an exception to 
the independent-producer exception for production derived from 
proven property acquired by the taxpayer after December 31, 
1974. This exception does not apply to acquisitions from certain 
related persons as defined in section 613A(c)(9)(B). Trusts, es-
tates, and corporations that are related for the purpose of para-
graph (8)(B) are also regarded as related for the purpose of para-
graph (9)(B). Paragraph (8)(B), however, does not regard individ-
uals as related to entities. The draftsmen of paragraph (9)(8), on 
the other hand, desired to exempt acquisitions between individu-
als and related trusts, although evidently not acquisitions be-
tween individuals and related estates or corporations. Thus, sec-
tion 613A(c)(9)(B) provides, in effect, that a trust is related to 
65. The aggregation formula is criticized below. ld. 
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individuals to the extent that the individuals are beneficiaries of 
the trust. 
Finally, the entire independent-producer exception is not 
applicable, with several exceptions, if the taxpayer either directly 
or through a related person sells oil or gas products at retail. For 
this purpose, an extremely broad definition of related person was 
desired, and therefore section 613A(d)(3) provides that a trust or 
estate (or partnership or corporation) will be regarded as related 
to the taxpayer if the taxpayer owns five percent or more of the 
beneficial interest in the trust, the trust owns a five percent inter-
est in the taxpayer, or a third party owns a five percent interest 
in each. For the purpose of computing this five percent interest, 
the subsection prescribes limited rules of attribution.66 
In 1976 the section 613A(c)(8) form of relationship provision 
was adopted in section 48(k), which governs the investment tax 
credit on motion picture film and video tapes. Section 48(k), an 
all-inclusive relationship provision, expanded the list of related 
business entities to include not only trusts, estates, and corpora-
tions but also partnerships, proprietorships, and "other entities." 
As under section 613A, section 48(k)(3)(D) provides that two or 
more trusts or estates or other entities will be regarded as related 
if fifty percent or more of the beneficial interest in each entity is 
owned by the same or related persons. Related persons are de-
fined by the same cross-reference to sections 267, 707, and 1563. 
The five percent de minimis rule is increased to ten percent in 
section 48(k). 
Draftsmen of the 1974 ERISA amendments adopted a differ-
ent approach to the drafting of an all-inclusive relationship provi-
sion. The approach taken in section 414 was to adopt by cross-
reference the rules of section 1563, which defines a group of com-
monly controlled corporations, and to require the adaptation by 
regulation of those rules to ·trusts, estates, and other entities. 
While this provision, along with the similar section 52 that was 
added in 1977, creates new trust and estate relationship provi-
sions, they can better be understood after the corporate relation-
ship provisions of section 1563 are consideredY 
66. I.R.C. § 613(A)(d)(3) (flush language). 
67. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3, 88 Stat. 879. 
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B. Definitions 
The Code does not provide a definition of a trust, an estate, 
or a beneficiary for use in connection with the affinity rules. 
These terms are defined, however, in substantially identical lan-
guage in the regulations to sections 318"" and 1563.6j Under these 
sections, property is considered to be owned by an estate if the 
property is subject to administration for the purpose of paying 
claims against the estate and expenses of administration regard-
less of whether under local law title to the property vested in the 
decedent's heirs immediately upon his death. The property that 
is subject to these attribution rules, therefore, is essentially the 
property included within the probate estate and not the property 
included in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. For 
the most part, this regulatory definition is adequate, and there is 
little ambiguity concerning commencement or termination dates 
of a trust or estate. 
On the other hand, there has been somewhat greater diffi-
culty in determining the beneficiaries of an estate or trust and 
their proportionate interest in the assets. Regulations to both 
section 318 and section 1563 provide that with respect to an estate 
a "beneficiary" includes any person entitled to receive property 
pursuant to a will or the laws of descent and distribution. A 
person ceases to be considered a beneficiary when (1) he has 
received all the property to which he is entitled, (2) he no longer 
has a claim against the estate attributable to his having been a 
beneficiary, and (3) there is only a remote possibility that it will 
be necessary for the estate to seek payment from him to satisfy 
claims against the estate or the expenses of administration. The 
Service has ruled that this definition of a beneficiary is equally 
applicable to the attribution rules contained in section 544.70 
While a definition of beneficiary for the purposes of section 267 
has never been provided, the statutory language of section 267(c) 
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 129. 
69. Id. § 1.1563-3(b)(3)(ii), T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291. 
70. Rev. Rul. 71-353, 1971-2 C.B. 243. Technically, this ruling was limited 
to construing the definition of "beneficiary" in section 544 for the purposes of 
applying that section by a cross-reference from section 341. However, it is un-
likely that a different definition would be used for any other purpose unless the 
deviation were clearly mandated in order to prevent avoidance of the substan-
tive law provision. 
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with respect to the beneficiary of an estate is identical to the 
language contained in section 544. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that a definition of "beneficiary" similar to that of sec-
tions 318, 544, and 1563 would be used. 
It is not clear whether a residuary legatee may cease to be 
regarded as a beneficiary prior to the formal closing of an estate. 
The Service has ruled that the regulatory language governing 
when a person ceases to be a beneficiary pertains only to a specific 
legatee and is not applicable to a residuary legatee whose interest 
cannot be determined prior to the closing of the estate. 71 In a prior 
case, Renton Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 77 the Third Circuit 
held that if an estate were insolvent and no assets would be dis-
tributed to a residuary legatee, the legatee would not constitute 
a beneficiary for the purposes of the attribu~ion rules contained 
in the predecessor to section 544.73 Although the later ruling did 
not refer to Renton Investment, it hypothesized that the assets 
of the estate were insufficient to make any payment to the 
residuary legatee but nevertheless required attribution, thereby 
clearly indicating disagreement with the earlier decision. 
The conflict between these authorities raises the more gen-
eral problem of the extent to which these rules must be applied 
solely on the basis of technical definitions rather than with regard 
to underlying realities. While the position of the Service is doubt-
lessly based in part upon a desire to protect revenues, it also 
evidences an understandable disinclination to permit affinity def. 
initions to be controlled by difficult questions of valuation and 
legitimacy of claims. Traditionally, affinity definitions have not 
turned on such factual inquiries. Recently, however, the Treasury 
Department has adopted flexible rules of attribution involving 
trusts74 that seem more consistent with Renton Investment than 
with the conflicting ruling of the Service. The rule of Renton 
Investment, with its stronger factual basis, is the preferred ap· 
proach and, given substantial proof of the estate's insolvency, 
should be followed. 75 
71. Rev. Rul. 60-18, 1960-1 C.B. 145. 
72. 131 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1942). 
73. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 354, 50 Stat. 815. 
74. See the discussion of the regulations to sections 958 and 1563 at text 
following notes 94 & 257 infra. 
75. The adoption of the Renton Investment rule with respect to estates 
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Clearly, the assets held by an estate may vary from time to 
time by virtue of interim distributions or for other reasons. Under 
the regulatory definition of a beneficiary, the identity of the bene-
ficiaries of an estate and the extent of their proportional interest 
may also change occasionally. In Revenue Ruling 58-111,78 the 
Service acknowledged this fluctuation and required that attribu-
tion be made as of the date of the transaction subject to the 
attribution provision. 
In at least one context, the Service has ruled that a trust that 
was not in existence nevertheless constituted a trust. Stock 
owned by the decedent passed under his will to a residuary trust 
that was not to be formed until the conclusion of the estate. The 
question presented was whether the stock held by the estate could 
be attributed to the beneficiaries of the trust under the attribu-
tion rules of section 318. Literally, attribution from the estate 
would be limited to the trust, and there would be no attribution 
from the trust to its beneficiaries since the trust did not exist. 
However, under Revenue Ruling 67-24, 71 a residuary testamen-
tary trust is to be treated as if it were in existence even if no assets 
have been transferred to the trustee. 
C. Trust and Estate Attribution 
The same three Code sections that provide the basic family 
attribution rules also provide the trust and estate attribution 
rules that are used in most sections of the Code. 
Section 267(c), the oldest of the attribution rules, provides 
only for attribution from entities to their owners. Thus, section 
267(c)(1) provides that stock owned by an estate or trust shall be 
considered owned proportionately by the beneficiaries. For years 
it was unclear whether the beneficiaries to which the section re-
ferred were the present beneficiaries of a trust or whether remain-
could open similar avenues of inquiry with respect to other entities, although 
there does not appear to have been any litigation in analogous areas in the 30· 
plus years that have elapsed since the decision. For example, should stock 
owned by a corporation be attributed to the corporation's shareholders at a time 
when the corporation has a negative net worth? Presumably, attribution should 
be made at least until such time as the corporation has formally entered bank-
ruptcy or receivership. 
76. 1958-1 C.B. 173. 
77. 1967-1 C.B. 75. 
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dermen, either vested or contingent, were also included. In 
Steuben Securities Corp., 1" a case arising under the predecessor 
to section 544 (which made applicable for the purposes of the 
personal holding company provisions an attribution rule identical 
to section 267(c)(l)), the Tax Court was faced with a factual 
setting in which the corporate taxpayer would escape classifica-
tion as a personal holding company if its stock were regarded as 
owned by the remaindermen constructively through a trust as 
well as by the holders of a present interest in the trust. The court 
concluded that to give full effect to congressional basis intent, it 
was required to hold that the term "beneficiary" was limited to 
those having a ''direct present interest" in the trust and excluding 
those whose interest "will or may become effective at a later 
time." 71 After fifteen years of silence, the Service issued a ruling 
adopting the Steuben Securities rule, apparently settling the 
question. 110 
Within a year following this ruling, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Phinney v. Tuboscope Co., 81 
reviewed the definition of beneficiary contained in the predeces-
sor to section 544 in connection with the application of an obscure 
provision of the Excess Profits Act of 1950.~2 The trust involved 
was a spendthrift trust for the benefit of an individual's children. 
While the children were the sole beneficiaries of the trust, the 
trust income was being currently accumulated, and the father 
argued that the children did not have a present interest under the 
Steuben Securities rule. On these facts the court held for the 
government without expressly overruling Steuben Securities. 83 
78. 1 T.C. 395 (1943). 
79. /d. at 399. 
80. Rev. Rul. 58·325, 1958-1 C.B. 212 (issued under section 421(d)(l)(C), 
now repealed but substantially replaced by section 425(d), which contains an 
attribution provision identical to sections 267(c)(1) and 544). 
81. 268 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1959). 
82. Pub. L. No. 909, 64 Stat. 1137. 
83. The holdings of the trust could have been attributed to the children 
without disturbing the application of the Steuben Securities rule to trusts pur-
suant to which the income was not being accumulated for the benefit of the 
remaindermen. 
Judge Brown summarized his decision in Tuboscope as follows: 
As we struggle through this intricate web of definitions, exclusions, 
provisions, exceptions, cross references, limitations, provisos and a 
general but unavoidable obscurity, it is our conclusion that § 430(e) 
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Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service determined that its 
interests would be better served by the Tuboscope rule and ac-
cordingly announced its intention to follow the rule of the Fifth 
Circuit, thereby revoking its earlier adoption of the Steuben 
Securities formula. This new ruling provided that henceforth 
stock held in trust would be considered as owned by "its present 
or future beneficiaries in proportion to their actuarial interests."84 
Curiously, both Steuben Securities and Tuboscope involved 
an interpretation of the predecessor to section 544. ~ Both rulings 
involved an interpretation of section 421(d) (now section 425(d)), 
although Revenue Ruling 62-155 stated that its holding was also 
applicable to section 544.~ None of these authorities, however, 
made any reference to the identical attribution provision con-
tained in the much more frequently applied section 267(c), nor 
has there been any authority arising under that provision inter-
preting the word beneficiary. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
presume that the rule applicable to section 267, whatever its cur-
rent form may be, would be the same as the rule applicable to 
identical provisions found elsewhere in the Code. Indeed, the 
trend has favored the actuarial rule currently applicable to sec-
tion 544, and it would be safe to assume that section 267 would 
be similarly interpreted, at least with respect to attribution from 
trusts. 87 
In an attempt to avoid the interpretive problems arising with 
respect to beneficiaries of trusts under prior laws, section 318 
adopted explicit provisions governing the determination of pro-
(2)(B)(i), expressly incorporating § 445(g)(2)(B), impliedly carries 
with it § 445(g)(3), though not necessarily that portion of § 461 im· 
pliedly incorporated by reference to § 462(g) in § 445(g)(l), so that 
the attribution rules of § 503(a)(1)(2)(5) make ownership of the 
corporate stock by the minor beneficiaries of a trust the ownership of 
the father, and thus pushes the stock ownership beyond the critical 50 
per cent to make thereby a new corporation an old one. 
Perhaps this needs some elaboration. 
268 F.2d at 234. 
84. Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 132. 
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 503, 53 Stat. 106. 
86. Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 133. It is difficult to evaluate the signifi· 
cance of the fact that all four authorities held against the taxpayer. 
87. It is difficult to predict on what basis stock would be attributed under 
section 267 from an estate to its beneficiaries. See text accompanying notes 90· 
92 infra. 
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portional ownership. Thus, section 318(a)(2)(D) provides that 
stock owned by a trust shall be considered owned by its benefici-
aries in proportion to their actuarial interest in the trust. This 
rule is subject to two exceptions: (1) there is no attribution from 
an exempt trust described in section 401(a), and (2) stock owned 
by a grantor or Clifford trustM is treated as owned by the person 
who is considered the owner of the trust under sections 671-678.K9 
Shortly before the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue 
Ruling 58-325 adopting the Steuben Securities rule for trusts, 
regulations were issued under section 318.90 By way of an example 
in these regulations, and without textual discussion, the Treasury 
adopted the Steuben Securities rule for estates. 91 The example 
provided that the interest of an individual to whom a remainder 
interest in property passed under a will shoul_d be disregarded in 
determining the proportionate interest of other beneficiaries in 
stock held by the estate since the remainderman had "no direct 
present interest" in the estate assets.j2 Although the Internal Rev-
enue Service has now reversed its endorsement of Steuben 
Securities with respect to trusts under other provisions of the 
Code, the regulatory provision under section 318 remains with 
respect to estates. 
Section 318 also provides for "back-attribution"-attri-
bution to entities from their owners. Thus, stock owned by the 
beneficiary of a trust or estate is considered owned by the trust 
88. If the grantor or another retains or acquires greater than a defined 
interest in, or powers over, a trust, all or the affected portion of the items of· 
income and expense incurred by the trust are taxed directly to such person. The 
trust is in general effect disregarded. 
89. It is not clear whether the general rule attributing stock to beneficiar-
ies is applicable to a grantor trust so that stock held by the trust may be 
attributed both to grantors and beneficiaries. In general, the attribution rules 
permit stock held by one person to be attributed to various other persons de-
pending upon which attribution would result in the greatest attributed owner-
ship. Presumably, therefore, stock held by a grantor trust may be attributed 
either to the deemed owner or to the actuarially determined beneficiaries. 
90. T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61. 
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), ex. (2), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 129. As noted 
above, this situation renders it somewhat unclear how attribution from estates 
is to be made under section 267 and similar provisions in which express author-
ity is lacking and the analogies are in conflict. 
92. Id. This was the same language employed in the Steuben Securities 
opinion. 
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or estate. However, back-attribution is not made from a bene-
ficiary holding only a remote contingent interest, defined a·s in-
cluding a value (computed actuarially and assuming a maximum 
exercise of discretion in favor of the beneficiary) of five percent 
or less of the value of the trust property.13 Similarly, stock 
owned by the grantor (or other person considered the owner) of 
a grantor trust is considered as owned by the trust.14 
Section 1563(e) substantially modified the rules governing 
attribution from trusts and estates applied by section 318. Attri-
bution on an actuarial basis was extended to include estates as 
well as trusts, thus eliminating the Steuben Securities rule from 
this provision altogether. Furthermore, section 1563 introduced a 
five percent threshold requirement for attribution from all enti-
ties including trusts and estates. 
The most significant change introduced by section 1563 was 
an attempt to limit attribution to those beneficiaries of a trust 
or estate who actually held a beneficial interest in the stock being 
attributed. It had long been recognized that ownership interests 
in entities are not always of the same quality. The dissimilarity 
is most acute in the case of a trust or estate where quite com-
monly either the remainder interest in a particular asset or the 
income attributable thereto would be the exclusive property of 
less than all of the beneficiaries. Under the prior attribution rules, 
if an estate consisted of only two items, land and stock, and A 
held a present interest in the stock, B held a remainder interest 
in the stock, and C was entitled to the entire interest in the land, 
ownership of the stock would be attributed to A, B, and C in 
accordance with their actuarial interest in the trust or estate. 
Even less justifiably, under the Steuben Securities rule, owner-
ship of the 'stock would be allocated between only A and C even 
though the interest of B in such stock was clearly superior to the 
interest of C. 
Under section 1563, attribution of the ownership of stock 
held by trust or estate is made on the basis of the acuarial interest 
of each beneficiary in the stock alone and not in accordance with 
93. The five percent threshold requirement was added to the back-
attribution provision of section 318 in order to blunt the criticism that back-
attribution did not accord with economic reality to the same extent as did the 
normal attribution rule. 
94. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B)(ii)_ 
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his interest in the trust or estate assets generally .'s The interest 
of a beneficiary who cannot under any circumstances obtain an 
interest in the stock, including income attributable to the stock 
or the proceeds of any disposition, is ignored. Thus, in the illus-
tration above, no interest in the stock would be attributed to C. 
The interests of A and B would depend upon their actuarial inter-
est in the stock as if the stock were the only asset of the trust or 
estate. 
As noted, sections 544 and 425(d) contain estate and trust 
attribution rules identical to those contained in section 267(c).18 
On the other hand, section 447 is unique in several respects, in-
cluding the combination of the aggregation with the traditional 
form of attribution. The primary relationship subject to this sec-
tion, a family-owned incorporated farm, is defined as a farm in 
which fifty percent of the stock is owned by members of the same 
family-the aggregation form of attribution. Stock owned by 
trusts, partnerships, and corporations is attributed in the tradi-
tional manner to the individual family members, but stock owned 
by estates is not. Instead, the members of the family are uniquely 
defined as including estates of deceased family members. Thus, 
all stock owned by an estate is taken into account in establishing 
the primary relationship, regardless of whether any of the surviv-
ing members of the family are beneficiaries of the estate and 
regardless of the extent of their interest. This treatment of an 
entity as an individual and attributing the entire amount of its 
holdings is most uncommon. Assuming that this breadth of attri-
bution was deliberate, it seems peculiar that traditional attribu-
tion from estates was omitted. By virtue of that omission, stock 
held by the estate of an individual who was not a member of the 
defined family is not taken into account even though a member 
of the family is a principal beneficiary of the estate. The differing 
treatment of trusts and estates can produce questionable results. 
If stock passes from the estate of a nonfamily member to a trust, 
attribution commences. If stock passes from the estate of a family 
member to a trust having nonfamily beneficiaries, attribution is 
reduced-even if the family interest in the trust is greater than 
their interest in the estate as a whole. 
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-3(b)(3}, T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 300. 
96. Compare I.R.C. § 267(c)(l) with I.R.C. §§ 544(a)(1) and 425(d)(2). 
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V. PARTNERSHIP AFFINITY 
A. Partnership Relationships 
593 
Neither section 267(a), pertaining to the disallowance of 
losses incurred on transactions between related taxpayers, nor 
section 1239, which characterizes gain on the sale of depreciable 
property as ordinary income in similar although more restricted 
situations, directly applies to partnership transactions. However, 
section 707(b) provides rules analogous to both such sections and 
establishes its own definition of the relevant relationship for each 
provision. Thus, paragraph (1) disallows losses on transactions 
between a partnership and a partner owning more than fifty per-
cent of the interest in the partnership or between two partner-
ships in which the same persons own more than fifty percent of 
the interest in each partnership.87 Paragraph (2) of section 707(b), 
which characterizes gain as ordinary income, contains the same 
definition of relationship except that, consistent with the nar-
rower section 1239, the partner or partners must own eighty per-
cent of the capital or profits interest. For all purposes under sec-
tion 707(b), a partnership interest is defined as either an interest 
in capital or an interest in profits, and satisfaction of the fifty 
percent or eighty percent requirement with respect to either inter-
est is sufficient to invoke disallowance or recbaracterization 
under this section. The relationship definition contained in sec-
tion 707(b)(l) is commonly used throughout the Code in defining 
partnership relationships.uR 
Section 707(b)(3) provides that for the purposes of both para-
graphs (1) and (2) of this section, ownership of a capital or profits 
interest is to be determined by the attribution rules contained in 
section 267(c), excepting the provisions of section 267(c) provid-
ing for direct attribution from one partner to another. This re-
quirement conforms the disallowance-of-losses provisions of sec-
tion 707 to the similar provision contained in section 267. 
While the Code does not establish partnership relationship 
provisions under section 267 (the 1954 Code appeared to leave 
this area exclusively to section 707), the omission of partnerships 
97. In the latter respect, section 707(b)(l) is broader than section 267(b), 
which lacks a general brother-sister corporation relationship definition. 
98. See Part X infra. 
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from the enumeration of related taxpayers opened an obvious 
avenue for tax avoidance. In Commissioner v. Whitney•• the 
Commissioner challenged, pursuant to section 267(a)(1), the al-
lowance of losses incurred in connection with the sale by a part-
nership of all of its assets to a corporation, 78.2% of the outstand-
ing stock of which was owned by the partners and members of 
their family. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the prede-
cessor to section 267(b) 1110 did not encompass transactions involv-
ing partnerships but undertook to determine whether the transac-
tion in question could be characterized as occurring between the 
corporation and the partners in their individual capacity. After a 
lengthy review of the conflicting characterization of partnerships 
under the tax laws as entities or as mere aggregations of individu-
als, the court held that for the purposes of section 267, a partner-
ship should be treated as an association of individual co-owners 
and the partnership entity disregarded. Since each partner con-
structively owned over fifty percent of the stock of the corporation 
by virtue of the direct attribution from partners permitted by 
section 267(c) and its predecessor, the court disallowed the losses 
taken on each of the partner's individual tax returns. Although 
the validity of the characterization of partnerships by the court 
under the 1954 Code may be questioned, regulations to section 
267, adopted in 1958, incorporated the aggregation concept used 
in Whitney. 101 
The regulations to section 267 concede that transactions be-
tween partnerships and the members of the partnership are not 
within the scope of section 267 but rather are governed by section 
707. However, the regulations provide that transactions between 
a partnership and a nonpartner shall be. deemed as occuring be-
tween the nonpartner and each member of the partnership sepa-
rately. Accordingly, if a partner and the nonpartner, after appli-
cation of the attribution rules (which includes direct attribution 
from a partner), fall within a section 267(b) relationship, a por-
tion of the loss or deduction subject to section 267(a) shall be 
disallowed. Specifically, if the transaction results in a loss or 
deduction to the partnership, the portion thereof allocable to the 
99. 169 F .2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948). 
100. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(b)(l)(B), 53 Stat. 16. 
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(b)-l(b)(l) (1958). 
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related partner under the partnership agreement is disallowed. 
When the transaction results in a loss or deduction to the non-
partner, a portion of such loss or deduction equal to the interest 
of related partners in the partnership is to be disallowed. 
Pr.escribing a proportion.al application of a substantive law 
provision when the prescribed relationship exists is extremely 
rare in the Code. Presumably, this position ·was adopted in the 
regulations because of the case support provided by Whitney and 
because· a greater extension of section 267 to partnership transac-
tions clearly would constitute an impermissible construction of 
the statutory provision. Viewed in isolation, the compromise 
adopted in the regulations is not necessarily an unsatisfactory 
approach for substantive law provisions based upon taxpayer re-
lationships. In some contexts, at least, its effect may be more 
precise and tailored to the abuse under attack than the complete 
disallowance otherwise provided by the Code if the prescribed 
relationship, which may involve a low threshold definition, exists. 
Nevertheless, it is totally inappropriate for a single provision of 
the Code to provide for a proportionate disallowance with respect 
to one entity while prescribing a different rule in all other circum-
stances. Indeed, the results obtained through the application of 
this regulatory rule for partnerships is completely inconsistent 
with all other Code affinity provisions. Thus, for example, if a 
sixty percent partner sells property at a loss to his partnership, 
section 707(b)(l)(A) disallows the loss entirely. Similarly, if a 
sixty percent shareholder sells property to his corporation at a 
loss, section 267(a)(l) and (b)(2) completely disallow the loss. 
Furthermore, if an individual owns one hundred percent of each 
of two corporations and property is sold at a loss from one to 
another, the entire loss is allowed because of the omission of a 
general brother-sister corporation relationship in section 267, 102 
However, under the above regulations, if A is a sixty percent 
partner in a partnership that sells property to a corporation 
wholly owned by A, sixty percent of the loss is disallowed. While 
the need to close an obvious gap in the statutory pattern is clear, 
the approach of the regulations to section 267 is not satisfactory. 
Rather, the regulations evidence the need for a complete congres-
sional overhaul of section 267. 
102. Fort Walton Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 653, 658 (1970). 
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In Liflans Corp. v. United States1n3 a court considered the 
other side of the partnership relationship question-the situation 
in which the other entity, not the partnership, is the taxpayer in 
question. This decision, arising under the 1954 Code, expressly 
approved the analysis of the Whitney case and reached the result 
prescribed by the regulations to section 267 but without referring 
to those regulations. In Liflans a partnership owned debentures 
issued by a corporation, sixty-seven percent of the stock of which 
was actually and constructively owned by one of the partners and 
twenty-eight percent of the stock of which was constructively 
owned by the other partner. The Commissioner disallowed a de-
duction to the corporation for interest accrued but unpaid on the 
debentures under section 267(a). The court sustained that dis-
allowance with respect to the fifty percent of the interest deduc-
tion attributable to the debentures proportionately owned by the 
partner owning sixty-seven percent of the stock but permitted a 
deduction for the fifty percent of the interest apportioned to the 
partner who owned less than fifty percent of the stock of the 
corporation. In view of the judicial adoption of this approach, the 
proportional relationship prescribed by the regulations to section 
267(b) is probably beyond challenge. Legislative action, there-
fore, will be required to correct this inconsistent application of 
section 267. 
Solely for the purposes of section 267, the regulatory provi-
sion, while undesirable because of its inconsistency, appears 
workable. As discussed below, however, the sections of the Code 
that cross-reference the relationships established under section 
267(b) presumably incorporate the regulatory elaboration of that 
subsection, including the special partnership rule. It is not at all 
clear how the partnership rule is intended to operate for the var-
ious purposes of these cross-references. Consider, for example, 
section 179, which excludes from the definition of a "purchase," 
for the purpose of that section, acquisitions of property from a 
person whose relationship to the person acquiring the property 
would result in the disallowance of a loss under section 267. An 
acquisition of property by a corporation from a partnership in 
which a partner owns over fifty percent of the stock of the corpo-
ration would, under section 267, result in a partial disallowance 
103. 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
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of a loss. But there is no suggestion in either section 179 or the 
regulations thereto that an acquisition can be treated as a pur-
chase in part, and it would seem unlikely that such an assertion 
by the Service would be upheld. Yet it is not at all clear whether 
the transactions described would fall within the exception to the 
definition of purchase provided under section 179. The interac-
tion between the general relationship provisions and the sections 
cross-referencing to these provisions is perhaps the best argument 
against the sort of ad hoc patching of inadequate relationship 
provisions exemplified by the section 267 partnership regulations. 
The need for legislative clarification is apparent. 
Of the three complex relationship provisions of section 613A, 
only the related retailer provision of section 613A(d)(3) includes 
partnership relationships. 104 The provision is analogous to the 
trust provision described previously105 and requires ownership of 
a five percent interest in "profits or capital." As seen in connec-
tion with trusts, HHI section 48(k) was drafted along the general 
lines of section 613A(c)(8)(B). While the earlier section does not 
include partnerships, such entities are included as business enti-
ties under section 48(k) in the same manner as trusts. Again, the 
primary relationship is established by reference to the relation-
ship among the owners of fifty percent of the beneficial interest 
in the partnership. As under section 613A(d)(3), ownership of a 
beneficial interest is defined as ownership of an interest in profits 
or capital. However, the application of this "either/or" test to 
section 48(k), in which control can be found in a large number of 
related (aggregated) persons, is somewhat more complex than 
under section 613A(d)(3), in which normal attribution is used and 
ownership of a five percent interest must be found in one person. 
Presumably, under section 48(k) only like interests may be 
added. For example, if there were only two related partners, one 
owning a thirty percent interest in profits and a fifteen percent 
interest in capital and the other owning a fifteen percent interest 
in profits and a thirty percent interest in capital, control should 
be lacking since the related persons only own a forty-five percent 
104. For the purposes served by the other relationship provisions, partner-
ships are "looked through" under the aggregate conception and thus the sub-
stantive law operates at the partner level. Set? LR.C. § 613A(c)(7)(D). 
105. See text preceding note 66 supra. 
106. See text following note 66 supra. 
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interest in profits and a forty-five percent interest in capital. 
Section 163(d)(7), also added by the 1976 Act, contains a 
similar but far simpler entity-owner relationship provision. As in 
the case of sections 613A and 48(k), the substantive law operates 
with respect to a fifty percent owned partnership or corporation, 
and the ownership must be held by a defined group of related 
persons. Under section 163(d)(7)(B), however, the only related 
persons are the taxpayer, his spouse, and his children. Also, in 
contrast with the other two sections, ownership under this provi-
sion is defined solely in terms of capital interest-different owner-
ship interests in profits are ignored. 
Partnerships are included in both section 414 and section 52, 
the all-inclusive provisions that rely upon an adaptation of sec-
tion 1563. These sections are considered below .107 
Section 1313 provides that a partner is a related taxpayer for 
the pu-rpose of the mitigation provisions. Since a partnership is 
not a taxpaying entity, it was not necessary to define a partner 
and a partnership as related taxpayers. 
The prohibited-transaction provisions108 also include part-
nership relationships. For purposes of the private foundation rule, 
a disqualified person includes (1) the owner of a twenty percent 
interest in profits of a partnership (interest in capital is ignored) 
if the partnership is a substantial contributor to the private foun-
dation10~ and (2) a partnership in which disqualified persons own, 
in the aggregate, more than a thirty-five percent interest in the 
profits. 110 On the other hand, the usually similar section 4975(e), 
defining a disqualified person for ERISA purposes, includes a 
partnership if over fifty percent of the interest in profits or capital 
is owned by a disqualified person. 111 In addition, section 4975(e) 
includes a partner of specified disqualified persons provided that 
the partner owns a ten percent or greater interest in capital or 
profits. 112 
107. See text accompanying note 267 infra. 
108. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
109. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(ii). 
110. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(l)(F). 
111. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G). 
112. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(1) .. 
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B. Partnership Attribution 
Although section 267 does not include partners and partner-
ships within its enumeration of relationships, section 267(c) at-
tributes stock owned by a partnership to its partners under the 
entity attribution rules of paragraph (1). ~n addition, section 267, 
together with the similar and historically related section 544, dis-
cussed below, are unique in requiring so-called sidewise attribu-
tion from one partner in a partnership to another. 113 Such attri-
bution can be quite broad. For example, stock owned by a part-
nership and attributed to each of its partners may again be reat-
tributed, under the sidewise rules, to each of the partners. The 
result is that each partner is not merely treated as owning an 
interest in the stock that corresponds to his proportionate interest 
in the partnership but is treated as owning all of the stock owned 
by the partnership. In the case of section 267, this rule is limited 
by requiring as a precondition to sidewise partner attribution that 
the attributee partner otherwise own stock in the corporation. For 
this purpose, an individual is treated as owning the stock that he 
actually owns and stock that is attributed to him from entities 
in which he owns an interest. However, stock may not be attrib-
uted to an individual from his partner merely because a member 
of the individual's family owns such stock. It has been observed 
above that this precondition, while not common under the var-
ious attribution provisions of the Code, has been used by Con-
gress as a device to limit the normal reach of attribution. As a 
technique of avoiding the arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of a 
person whose relationship to the taxpayer is marginal, the con-
cept is deserving of additional attention. 
The attribution from partnerships rule contained in section 
318 is identical to that used in section 267. In addition, section 
318 requires back-attribution114 from a partner to his partnership. 
In neither situation are there threshold requirements. Section 318 
does not permit attribution from one partner to another as is 
permitted under section 267, sidewise attribution having been 
eliminated from this section in 1964. 115 
113. The very broad attribution resulting from sidewise attribution has 
been discussed at note 33 supra. It becomes even more pronounced under the 
reattribution rules. 
114. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A). 
115. Pub. L. No. 88-554, § 4, 78 Stat. 763 ( 1964). 
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As is the case under section 1563 in connection with trust and 
estate attribution, this section does not employ back-attribution, 
and it imposes a threshold requirement for entity attribution. 
Thus, stock is attributed from a partnership proportionately to its 
partners but not to a partner having less than a five percent 
interest in the partnership. Neither section 267 nor section 318 
undertook to define what was meant by a partner's proportionate 
interest in a partnership. This area of uncertainty assumed im-
portance with the increased popularity of widely, if not publicly, 
held investment vehicles cast in partnership form in which the 
interests of "inside" partners in profits varied over time and was 
different from their interest in partnership capital. To resolve 
these doubts, section 1563 adopted the specific rule that a part-
ner's proportionate interest was to be determined with reference 
to either capital or profits, whichever produced the greater attri-
bution.11• As in the case of section 318, direct partner-to-partner 
attribution is not permitted. 
Section 544, the personal holding company attribution provi-
sion, contains the entity attribution rule providing that stock 
held by a partnership is considered to be owned proportionately 
by its partners. This provision also retains attribution directly 
from partners in the form in which it was introduced into the tax 
laws in 1937 .m Thus, partner-to-partner attribution is required 
under this section without regard to whether the person to whom 
the stock is attributable otherwise owns stock in the corporation. 
Sections 425(d), 447(d)(2), and 613A(d)(3) similarly adopt the 
standard proportionate attribution rule from partnerships to 
partners but do not provide for back-attribution or for attribution 
directly between partners. A special partnership rule, of the ag-
gregation type, is contained in section 1237(a)(2), which attrib-
utes to a taxpayer activities by a partnership that includes the 
taxpayer as a partner. 
VI. CORPORATE AFFINITY 
A. Corporate Relationships 
The provisions contained in the Code involving relationships 
that include corporations are much more extensive and complex 
116. I.R.C. § 1563(e)(2). 
117. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
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than the other relationship provisions because of the large num-
ber of sections prescribing, for a variety of special purposes, rela-
tionships with or among corporations. The welter of provisions 
may logically be divided into two categories: general relationship 
provisions that include corporations within their ambit and lim-
ited provisions that only describe relati()nships among corpora-
tions. The second form of relationship, usually referred to as 
"control," is generally outside the scope of this article although 
it will be useful to describe the more commonly used control 
sections for purposes of comparison. 
Section 267, the original Code relationship provision, estab-
lished the pattern of corporate relationships that continues to be 
the one most commonly used. Section 267 encompasses the rela-
tionships between (1) a corporation and an individual who owns 
more than fifty percent in value of the stock of such corporation, 11s 
(2) a corporation and a fiduciary of a trust if either the trust or 
the grantor of the trust owns more than fifty percent in value of 
the corporation's stock, 111 and (3) two corporations if more than 
fifty percent in value of the outstanding stock of each is owned 
by the same individual, provided that one of such corporations is 
either a domestic personal holding company or a foreign personal 
holding company .•zo 
Section 267 is the only section of the Code that establishes 
corporate relationship rules that are widely used throughout the 
Code for a variety of purposes. 121 Other Code sections set forth 
special relationship rules for corporations that are used solely by 
that particular section. Section 341, governing the sale or ex-
change of stock in a collapsible corporation, contains what may 
be the most confusing use of attribution and relationship rules in 
the Code. Section 34l(e)(8), which defines a related person, pre-
scribes relatiom{hips according to whether the stockholder who 
has sold his interest is an individual or a corporation. If the share-
holder is an individual, a corporation in which he owns at least 
fifty percent of the stock measured by either voting power or 
118. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2). 
119. I.R.C. § 267(b)(8). 
120. I.R.C. § 267(b)(3). 
121. Sections 1504 and 1563, described below, are also used by cross-
reference but only for defining relationships among corporations. See text ac-
companying notes 209-11 & 225 infra. 
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value is regarded as related to him.-Ifthe shareholder is a corpora-
tion, the corporation in question is regarded as related to its par-
ent, its subsidiary, and a sister corporation. However, the defini-
tional tests for these relationships vary slightly. Thus, the same 
fifty percent ownership test of either voting power or value is 
employed in defining the parent and subsidia·ry relationship. A 
related sister corporation, however, is defined as a corporation 
more than fifty percent in value of whose stock is owned by the 
same person who also owns more than fifty percent in value of the 
corpotation in question; voting power is not a part of this test. 
In defining a sister corporation, the stock interests must be owned 
by only a single person although the attribution rules of section 
267(c), with certain modifications, are applicable to this determi-
nation. This attribution approach to ·related business entities is 
consistent with section 267 but should be contrasted to the aggre-
gation approach of more recently enacted sections. 
Section 954(d)(3) defines a person related to a controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC) for the purposes of defining "Subpart 
F income." Generally, the CFC is related to the same persons to 
whom a corporation having a corporate shareholder under section 
34l(e) would be related. However, the "parent" of a CFC may be 
an individual, partnership, trust, or estate. For the purpose of 
defining the parent and subsidiary relationships, the same fifty 
percent test is used except that it refers only to voting power of 
all classes of stock entitled to vote and does not refer to value. 
Similarly, a sister corporation is defined as a corporation more 
than fifty percent of the voting power of which is owned by the 
same person or persons who own fifty percent of the voting power 
in the CFC. As under section 341(e), attribution rules are applica-
ble, thereby expanding the reach of the section. Section 954(d) 
cross-references the attribution rules contained in section 958, 
which adopts, with considerable modification, the rules provided 
by section 318. 
The definition of a related sister corporation in section 954 
is far broader than the section 341 definition since the fifty per-
cent control can be found in an unlimited number of persons 
rather than just a single taxpayer. The section 954 definition is 
also notably broader than the aggregation approach because no 
further relationship is required among the controlling stockhold-
ers to find the specified relationship between the brother-sister 
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corporations. By contrast, under the aggregation form of sections 
613A(c)(8) and 48(k), two corporations will not be regarded as 
related, even though over fifty percent of the stock of both is 
owned by the same person, unless those stockholders are related 
to each other in the manner specified, that is, within the tests of 
sections 267, 707(b), and 1563. As noted above, the scope of these 
more recent sections is also significantly limited by the existence 
of a de minimis rule pursuant to which stock held even by related 
persons is not counted towards the fifty percent requirement if 
the related person owns less than five percent of the stock in 
either corporation in the case of section 613A and ten percent in 
the case of section 48(k). 
These sections also differ with respect to the nature of the 
stock to be taken into account. The clear reference to voting 
power in section 954 may be contrasted with the short-hand refer-
ence to voting stock in section 48(k), which does not expressly 
account for stock possessing unequal voting power, and the ab-
sence of any definition at all in section 613A. 
In contrast to both sections 341(e) and 954, neither section 
613A nor section 48(k) employs attribution rules for the purpose 
of concentrating stock ownership in the corporation in question. 
Presumably the cross-reference to sections 267, 707(b), and 1563 
carry with them references to the attribution rules applicable to 
those sections. However, such attribution would be only for the 
purpose of determining which taxpayers would be regarded as 
related. The effect of attribution at this level is far more difficult 
to visualize than is the effect of the attribution under sections 
341(e) and 954-a difficulty that pervades the approach of sec-
tions 613A and 48(k). Nevertheless, the effect of attribution only 
to expand the list of related parties is generally less extensive 
than the effect of attribution under the earlier sections and can 
be illustrated in the following simplified way. Assume that F 
owns all of the stock of corporation X and forty percent of the 
stock of corporation Y, his son S owns forty percent of the stock 
of corporation Z; and Z owns the balance of sixty percent of the 
stock of Y. The issue is whether corporations X and Yare related 
for these various sections. Under section 341(e), Sis regarded as 
owning twenty-four percent of Y through his ownership of Z, and 
this holding is attributed to F. Thus, F is regarded as owning 
sixty-four percent of Y, and X and Y are related. Under section 
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48(k), X and Y will be regarded as related only if F and Z are 
related within the meaning of section 267. For this purpose, the 
holdings of S in Z are attributed to F, but since S only owns forty 
percent of Z, F and Z are not related. Thus X and Y are not 
related for the purpose of section 48(k). 
Two provisions added by the 1976 Act define relationships 
between corporations and a single family group. Under section 
163(d)(7), the relationship exists if the taxpayer together with his 
spouse and children own fifty percent or more of the value of all 
classes of stock in the corporation and no attribution is required. 
On the other hand, section 447 contains an extremely broad defi-
nition of family 121 and requires ownership of at least fifty percent 
of the combined voting power of all classes of voting stock and at 
least fifty percent of the number of shares of all other classes by 
the several members of the family in the aggregate. In addition, 
section 447(d) prescribes its own unique set of attribution rules. 123 
The relationships specified in section 1239, as expanded by 
the 1976 Act, extend to (1) a corporation and an individual own-
ing eighty percent or more in value of the corporation stock and 
(2) two corporations if the same individual owns eighty percent 
or more in value of the stock of each corporation. For both pur-
poses, a modified form of the attribution rules of section 318 is 
applicable. 
The stylistic differences between such traditional attribution 
sections as 341(e), 954, and 1239 and the more recently adopted 
aggregation provisions in sections 613A, 48(k), 163(d), and 
447(d), although considered more fully below, should be noted 
here. Each of these provisions, at least in part, undertakes to 
define for tax purposes what is meant by a closely held corpora-
tion. The result reached under each section is that all of the stock 
held by defined members of a family are taken into account in 
determining whether the stock holdings are sufficiently concen-
trated. Thus, each of these sections achieves the same substan-
tive result although by two quite different procedures. The need 
for two paths to the same result under the same Code is dubious. 
Section 1237 exemplifies corporate affinity in its most vague 
form. An improvement to property is deemed made by the tax-
122. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. 
123. S'ee text accompanying notes 95 supra & 136-38 infra. 
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payer if it is ~ade "by a corporation controlled by the taxpayer." 
The Code contains no further elaboration of the meaning of 
"controlled," but section 1.1237-l(c)(2)(i)(b) of the regulations 
defines control in terms of ownership of more than fifty percent 
of the corporation's voting stock. This regulation provides that 
ownership may be either direct, constructive, "or otherwise." 
While it is quite clear that the draftsmen of this regulation in-
tended a broad definition of corporate ownership, there is no defi-
nition, such as by cross-reference, of either constructive owner-
ship or "otherwise" ownership. It is unclear whether this state-
ment in the regulations indicates the Treasury Department's be~ 
lief in a common law of constructive ownership or whether the 
regulations were somewhat casually drafted. 124 
In a similarly vague style section 613(c) includes as a related 
person a person under common control with the taxpayer. The 
statutory provision does not contain a definition of control, but 
the regulations refer to the definition contained in section 482. 12~ 
Neither section 482 nor the regulations thereto contain a precise 
definition of control although ownership of fifty percent of the 
voting stock of a corporation has been found to constitute con-
trol.121 
The two prohibited-transaction provisions also include cor-
porate relationships. Section 4946, pertaining to private founda-
tions, defines a disqualified person as including the owner of more 
than twenty percent of the voting power of a corporate substantial 
contributor127 and a corporation in which other disqualified per-
sons own more than thirty-five percent of the voting power .m The 
ERISA provisions contained in section 4975(e)(2) include a corpo-
ration more than fifty percent of the voting power or value of 
which is owned by certain disqualified persons. 12u 
The most common of the corporate control provisions are 
section 368(c) (pertaining to reorganizations), section 1504 (defin-
124. The limited scope of nonstatutory attribution is considered below. 
See Part IX A infra. 
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(e)(5) (1965). 
126. See B. Forman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1114, 1153-55 (2d 
Cir. 1972); Cayuga Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 18 (1975). 
127. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(l)(C)(i). 
128. LR.C. § 4946(a)(l)(E). 
129. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G). 
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ing corporations eligible to file consolidated returns), and sections 
1551 and 1563 (disallowing certain multiple tax benefits). The 
controlled group definitions contained in these sections, except 
for that contained in section 1563, are not widely employed in the 
Code. 
For the purposes of the corporate reorganization provisions, 
section 368(c) defines control as the ownership of stock possessing 
at least eighty percent of the voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote plus at least eighty percent of the total number 
of shares of all other classes of stock. However, section 368(c) is 
not a complete relationship provision by itself since it does not 
specify in whom control must be found. That element is added 
by the various substantive provisions that incorporate the stock 
ownership requirements of section 368(c) and varies from a single 
shareholder to an unlimited number of shareholders that have 
another attribute in common (such as having transferred prop-
erty to the corporation). 
Section 1504, in defining an affiliated group, describes a re-
lated group of corporations that is quite different from those con-
sidered above. The requisite degree of stock ownership, with in-
consequential differences in wording, is identical to the section 
368(c) requirement. However, a corporation is included in the 
group if one or more other corporations that are also included own 
the defined eighty percent of its stock. The common parent is 
separately defined as owning eighty percent of one of the mem-
bers of the chain. The group thus described constitutes a vertical 
chain of related corporations. Under this form of definition, if the 
chain progresses through several tiers and minority stock is out-
standing at each tier, the proportional interest of the common 
parent in the lowest tier corporation may actually be quite small. 
Section 1563 and the similar section 1551'30 employ a quite 
different stock ownership requirement in defining control. While 
under sections 368 and 1504 the two eighty percent requirements 
are cumulative and designed to restrict the scope of control, 
under section 1563 control exists by the ownership of either eighty 
percent of the combined voting power of all classes of voting stock 
130. Section 1551 might be described as an unsophisticated version of 
section 1563. Common ownership must be by individuals only and the section 
1563(c) definition of stock is lacking. Otherwise, the controlled groups described 
are substantially identical. 
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or eighty percent of the value of all shares (including voting 
shares). Pursuant to section 1563( c), certain categories of stock, 
including nonvoting stock that is limited and preferred as to divi-
dends, is entirely excluded from the computation. The definition 
of a controlled group of corporations contained in section 1563 is 
the most carefully drafted of such provisions contained in the 
Code and is the most widely used by cross-reference. The defini-
tion distinguishes between vertically and horizontally related 
groups of corporations and defines such groups separately. With 
respect to vertical groups, section 1563 adopts the section 1504 
chain concept, changing only the definition of stock ownership. 
However, the definition of a horizontal or brother-sister group was 
a considerable advance in the art of defining controlled groups. 
The requisite stock ownership of the potentially related corpora-
tions may be held by five or fewer individuals, estates, or trusts 
rather than by a single individuaL 131 To ensure that a mutuality 
of interest existed among the corporations, it was necessary to 
specify the extent to which the ownership of each must actually 
overlap, that is, the extent to which each shareholder must own 
stock in each of the corporations. Section 1563 adopted a two-
pronged approach to this problem. To the extent of fifty percent 
of the stock of each corporation, the ownership interest of each 
stockholder must be identical. That is, each shareholder's stock 
ownership is counted only to the extent that it is identical in each 
corporation. For example, if A owns seventy-eight percent of X 
corporation and twenty-two percent of Y corporation and B owns 
the balance of the X and Y stock, "five or fewer" individuals own 
over fifty percent of the stock in each corporation, but the test will 
not be met because, counting only their identical interests in 
each corporation, they own only forty-four percent (twenty-two 
percent from each of A and B). 
The second requirement under section 1563 is that at least 
eighty percent of the stock of each corporation must also be 
owned by five or fewer individuals, trusts, or estates. Unfortu-
nately, the brevity of the statutory language leaves several ques-
tions unanswered. The regulations provide that the five persons 
131. The definition of common control contained in such sections as 
954(d}(3) is broader than in section 1563 but is too imprecise, and possibly too 
broad, for general use. 
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owning eighty percent of the stock must be the same five persons 
that own the identical fifty percent interest; that is, there can be 
only one group of five or fewer persons. 132 Thus, if X owns fifty-
five percent of both corporations M and N and A, B, C, and D 
own forty-five percent of M and individuals E, F, G, and H own 
forty-five percent of N, corporations M and N are not related. 
However, the regulations also provide that it is not necessary that 
each person counted in the eighty percent test own stock in each 
of. the corporations. In other words, the Treasury Department 
interprets the eighty percent requirement as essentially unrelated 
to the definition of control and as merely establishing the re-
quirement that to be regarded as related, the corporations must 
be closely held. Under this construction of section 1563, in the 
above example, corporations M and N would be related if A and 
B owned forty-five percent of M and E and F owned forty-five 
percent of N-a single group of five persons would own eighty 
percent of each corporation. It is not at all clear that the drafts-
men of section 1563 intended such a limited role for the eighty 
percent requirement. The Tax Court, with both the majority and 
dissenting opinions reviewing and relying on the legislative his-
tory to section 1563, has twice held this aspect of the regulation 
invalid. 133 In the view of the Tax Court majority, the eighty per-
cent test must be met by counting only stock held by persons 
whose stock was counted in meeting the fifty percent test. In the 
above example, only X's stock would qualify, and since he does 
not own eighty percent of the stock of each corporation, M and 
N would not be related. The Tax Court was reversed in both 
cases on appeal; and thus, for the present, the regulatory con-
struction must be regarded as controlling. 134 While the technical 
position of the Tax Court might appear to be the sounder posi-
tion, the appellate courts evidently agreed with the Treasury 
Department that a sufficient identity of interest was present 
among corporations having fifty percent of their stock subject to 
common control. 
132. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1563-l(a)(3) (1978). 
133. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966,972 (1976), 
rev'd, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts ofN. Va., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 798,802 (1976), rev'd, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977). 
134. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Fair-
fax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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B. Corporate Attribution 
As we have seen elsewhere, section 267, the oldest of the Code 
attribution rules, provides for proportionate attribution from en-
tities to their owners. This rule is also applicable to corporations. 
Thus, stock owned by a corporation is treated as owned propor-
tionately by its shareholders. 
The attribution rules added by section 318 in 1954 substan-
tially restricted attribution from corporations by imposing a high 
threshold requirement that must be met before this provision is 
triggered. No similar threshold requirement was imposed for at-
tribution from trusts, estates, or partnerships. Section 
318(a)(2)(C)· provides that stock shall be attributed proportion-
ately from a corporation to its shareholders, but only if the share-
holder owns or is considered as owning, after the application of 
specified attribution rules, fifty percent or more in value of the 
stock of the corporation from which holdings are to be attributed. 
Thus, under this provision stock is not attributed to a shareholder 
whose holdings, together with the holdings of persons economi-
cally related to him, do not permit control of the corporation. 
Similarly, the back-attribution rule adopted by section 318 only 
attributes to a corporation stock owned by a shareholder who 
owns or is considered to own fifty percent or more of the stock of 
the corporation .. 35 
The high threshold requirement of section 318 was not fol-
lowed under section 1563. Rather, this provision adopted the 
nominal-interest rule for corporations that is applied by this sec-
tion to other entity attribution provisions. Thus, stock owned by 
a corporation is attributed to a shareholder, provided that such 
shareholder owns five percent or more of the value of the stock of 
the corporation. As in the case of section 318, the attribution rules 
of section 1563 are first applied in determining whether the share-
holder owns five percent of the stock. 
· The unusual affinity provisions of section 447(d) have pre-
viously been noted in connection with its extraordinarily broad 
definition of the family and its overall character as an aggregation 
provision.J38 It has also been observed that, in contrast to the 
other recently enacted aggregation provisions, section 447 also 
135. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C). 
136. See text accompanying note 52 supra. 
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employs traditional attribution rules. While the attribution from 
trusts and partnerships rules are commonplace, patterned ex-
actly on the proportional attribution rule of section 267, the 
corresponding corporate attribution rule is unique. 137 
As under section 318, stock owned by a corporation is attrib-
uted to its shareholders only if the shareholders own (directly or 
by virtue of attribution from trusts or partnerships) fifty percent 
or more in value of the stock in the corporation from which attri-
bution is to be made. The computation of the required fifty per-
cent ownership under section 447, however, is quite different from 
the computation of the section 318 threshold requirement in that 
the aggregation style generally applicable under section 44 7 is 
also employed here in place of the usual attribution rules. That 
is, the fifty percent ownership is to be found among members of 
the same family in the aggregate. Again, the substantive result 
is the same regardless of whether the approach of section 318 or 
section 447 is used. Section 447(d)(3) is significant because it 
constitutes a further extension of the substitution in the Code of 
the aggregation form for the traditional attribution rule. 
One striking aspect of the aggregation test for the fifty per-
cent threshold requirement under section 447(d)(3) is that it does 
not parallel the family aggregation test used in section 447(c)(2) 
for the purposes of the basic relationship definition. In defining 
those corporations that are exempt from the substantive applica-
tion of section 447, the basic relationship provision requires that 
the family own fifty percent of the voting power and fifty percent 
of the number of nonvoting shares of the corporation. However, 
the threshold requirement for attribution is ownership of fifty 
percent of the value of all stock-obviously, a very different test. 
Normally the value test will be more easily met, and attribution 
will be made from corporations that would not be regarded as 
controlled for the substantive purposes of the section. While that 
result cannot be criticized, except on the basis of unnecessary 
complexity, the opposite result may also arise. Thus, it is not 
difficult to hypothesize situations in which attribution cannot be 
made from corporations that are regarded as controlled for pur-
poses of the substantive law, and that result does not appear 
sensible . 13K 
137. I.R.C. § 447(d)(3). 
138. The most obvious situation in which this could arise is when the 
1978] AFFINITY PRO VISIONS 611 
The corporation attribution rules also address for the first 
time a question that has remained unanswered under other attri-
bution sections: whether voting stock owned by a corporation 
should be attributed to the holders of its nonvoting stock. Under 
section 447 it appears clear that such attribution is to be made-a 
result that might well be criticized. Section 447(d)(3) provides 
that if the threshold requirement is met, the family is regarded 
as owning its proportional interest in each class of stock in a 
second corporation that is owned by the corporation from which 
attribution is to be made. In the particular case of section 447, 
with its high threshold requirement, attributing voting stock to 
the family without regard to whether any member of the family 
owns voting. stock in the attributor corporation does not seem 
inappropriate since the fifty percent threshold requirement pro-
vides a basis for presuming de facto domination. 
Since section 447 does not contain a general corporate attri-
bution rule but rather attributes stock to the family from a corpo-
ration controlled by it, the section as thus far described would not 
provide for attribution from second-tier corporations. This prob-
lem of reattribution, which is very briefly and most unsatisfacto-
rily covered by a parenthetical insertion in section 447(d)(3), is 
considered below in connection with reattribution. 
Sections 544, 425, and 613A(d)(3) contain the same rule ap-
plied under section 267: stock owned by a corporation is regarded 
as owned proportionately by its shareholders. A similar rule is 
prescribed by section 904(d)(2) but only with respect to stock 
owned by a foreign corporation. 
C. Nature of Stock 
The relationships established by section 267(b) require only 
that the individual or fiduciary own more than fifty percent of the 
value of the outstanding stock of the corporation; it is unneces-
corporation had outstanding two classes of voting stock having unequal voting 
power. Assume, for example, the corporation had outstanding 100 shares of 
Class A Common possessing five votes per share and 400 shares of Class B 
Common possessing one vote per share, the classes otherwise having equal rights 
and priorities. If the family owned all of the Class A but none of the Class B, 
the corporation would be related to the family but attribution could not be made 
unless the value of the 100 shares of Class A exceeded the value of the 400 shares 
of Class B. 
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sary for the shareholder to have any voting interest in the corpora-
tion. Very early constructions of the predecessor to section 267 
established that the required relationship could exist even though 
the individual owned only nonvoting preferred stock. m More re-
cent authority has established that the fifty percent ownership 
requirement can be met, even though the relationship between 
the shareholder and the corporation has been characterized by 
the parties as a creditor relationship, if the Internal Revenue 
Service can persuade the court that the investment in the corpo-
ration more nearly resembled equity than debt and that, accord-
ingly, the purported lender should be regarded as an owner of an 
equity interest in the corporation .1411 
The attribution rules contained in section 267(c) do not dis-
tinguish between voting and nonvoting stock or between common 
and preferred stock. w Where the substantive law purpose for 
which attribution is being made is geared to value, such as in the 
case of the relationships defined by section 267(b), this lack of 
discrimination is immaterial since the application or nonappfica-
tion of this section is not altered by the fact that the individual, 
who owns only nonvoting preferred stock in the parent company, 
may be regarded as owning a portion of the voting common stock 
of its subsidiary. Furthermore, most of the provisions throughout 
the Code that adopt the attribution rules of section 267 are also 
premised upon ownership of a specified value of outstanding 
stock. On occasion, however, the attribution rules of section 
267(c) are used in a section of the Code that determines substan-
tive relationships based upon the ownership of a percentage of 
voting stock. This situation exists in the definition of a disquali-
fied person for private foundation purposes under section 4946 
and in the similar ERISA provisions in section 4975. For example, 
under section 4946(a)(l)(C)(i), a "disqualified person" includes 
an owner of twenty percent of the total combined voting power 
139. See Wolf Bergman, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1118 (1947). 
140. In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Stewart, 448 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 
1971); Harbour Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (1973). 
See the excellent analysis of the debt-equity problem in Plumb, The Federal 
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 
26 TAx L. REv. ~69 (1971). 
141. See Goldstein, Attribution Rules: Undue Multiplicity, Complexity 
Can Create Liabilities, 15 TuL. TAX INST. 384 (1965). 
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of a corporation that is a substantial contributor to a private 
foundation. For the purposes of computing this twenty percent 
interest, the attribution rules of section 267( c) are applicable. 142 
Assume that an individual had invested in a class of preferred 
stock of corporation A in which he owned no voting stock and that 
the value of his preferred stock equaled sixty percent of the value 
of the outstanding stock of the corporation. Assume further that 
corporation A owned forty percent of the single outstanding class 
of stock of corporation B and that the balance of this voting stock 
in corporation B was controlled by unrelated persons. If those 
unrelated persons cause corporation B to become a substantial 
contributor to a private foundation, does the individual become 
a disqualified person with respect to the foundation? If voting 
stock in corporation B is to be attributed to the individual by 
virtue of his ownership of nonvoting stock in corporation A, the 
individual will be regarded as owning twenty-four percent of the 
voting power in corporation B and thus will be a disqualified 
person with respect to the private foundation. Although there is 
no textual basis in the law for avoiding attribution to the individ-
ual, that result is so incongruous that it must be erroneous. If 
corporation A, to which the individual is far more closely related, 
became a substantial contributor to the private foundation, the 
individual then would not become a disqualified person because 
he owns no voting power in corporation A. 
Similarly, section 4946(a)( l)(E) includes as a disqualified 
person a corporation more than thirty-five percent of the com-
bined voting power of which is owned by certain other defined 
disqualified persons. Assume that an individual is on the board 
of trustees of a private foundation, thereby constituting a disqual-
ified person with respect to the foundation; and that the individ-
ual has made an investment in nonvoting preferred stock of cor-
poration C, which stock constitutes forty percent of the value of 
the outstanding stock of the corporation. That corporation would 
not constitute a disqualified person with respect to the private 
foundation. However, if the corporation had a wholly owned sub-
sidiary, the subsidiary would constitute a disqualified person 
since the individual would constructively own forty percent of its 
outstanding voting stock. 
142. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(3). 
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Section 318 also refers only to stock, without elaboration. 
The problems presented by attribution under section 318 might 
have been substantially greater than the problems involved in 
applying section 267 because many of the provisions using section 
318 attribution do involve determinations of voting power. 14:1 
However, the very high fifty percent threshold requirement for 
the application of the corporate attribution rules of section 318 
have tended to eliminate applications of that section that might 
be. regarded as unjustifiably prejudicial to taxpayers since non-
voting stock will rarely comprise fifty percent of the value of a 
viable corporation. While many of the sections that use section 
318 attribution rules lower the threshold requirement, such sec-
tions tend to employ value rather than voting control tests. 
The most egregious absence of legislative or administrative 
guidance in this area occurs in section 425(d), which contains a 
set of attribution rules that are expressly for use in determining 
stock ownership for the purposes of three enumerated sections.u4 
Each of the cross-referencing sections requires the computation 
of voting power, but neither the statute nor the regulationsur, 
provides any hint of how nonvoting stock is to be handled in the 
attribution formula. 146 As previously discussed, section 447(d)(3) 
contains the first express statutory solution to this problem and 
literally appears to mandate attribution of voting stock to the 
holders of nonvoting stock in the first-tier corporation. 147 The 
drafting of that provision is so subject to criticism in other re-
spects that it is not fully clear that Congress actually intended 
such attribution. Furthermore, section 447 is unusual in that it 
provides for attribution, not to an individual, but to a class of 
persons in the aggregate. Perhaps the best analysis of section 
447(d)(3) is that it is unique and should not be regarded as a 
143. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(2)(c), 304(c). 
144. Section 425(d) begins: "For the purposes of this part, in applying the 
percentage limitations of sections 422(b)(7), 423(b)(3), and 424(b)(3) .... " 
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.425-l(d) (1966). 
146. The definition of a controlled group of corporations contained in sec· 
tion !563(a) also requires the computation of voting power although the attribu-
tion rules to that section similarly do not address this question. However, since 
section 1563(c)( t }(A) excludes nonvoting preferred stock from the section 1563 
computations, the problem is here limited to the much rarer nonvoting common 
stock. 
147. See text following note 138 supra. 
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precedent for attributing voting stock to the holders of nonvoting 
stock under other sections. Section 447, however, contains a fifty 
percent threshold requirement that tends to eliminate the prob-
lem for the purpose of that section. It would seem appropriate, 
therefore, to examine critically the precedential value of section 
447 to a proportional attribution section, such as section 267, that 
lacks a threshold requirement. 
Regardless, of the substantive merits of the stock attribution 
rules contained in sections 267 and 318, the application of those 
rules to nonvoting preferred stock is clearly established. A some-
what different situation prevails under section 1563. Section 
1563(c)(1) specifies that for the purposes of sections 1561 through 
1564, which pertain to multiple tax benefits in the case of con-
trolled corporations, the term "stock" does not include nonvoting 
stock that is limited and preferred as to dividends. Obviously, for 
the purpose of applying the attribution rules of section 1563(d) 
and (e) to the substantive provisions of section 1561 through 
section 1564, nonvoting preferred stock is disregarded. Such stock 
is not attributed and does not form the basis for an attribution 
of other stock. However, several provisions of the Code adopt by 
cross-reference the attribution rules contained in section 1563. 
Fortunately, most of these cross-references are to a "controlled 
group" of corporations within the meaning of section 1563(a), for 
which purpose the definition of stock contained in section 1563(c) 
clearly would be applicable. However, a few sections cross-refer 
solely to the attribution rules contained in section 1563(d) and 
(e). For example, section 1551 is closely related to section 1561 
both in purpose and language. Section 155l(b) provides that for 
its purposes, the attribution rules of section 1563(e) shall apply. 
However, neither section 1551 nor the regulations thereto contain 
a definition of stock; the definition contained in section 1563(c) 
literally is not applicable since it is not within the cross-reference. 
Furthermore, the language of section 1551 predates the exclusion 
of nonvoting preferred stock in section 1563 (the cross-reference 
was added when section 1563 was enacted). In such circum-
stances, it is uncertain whether or not the reference in section 
1551(b) to section 1563(e) carries the implication that stock is 
not to be attributed to the holder of nonvoting preferred stock. 
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Even more difficult is a cross-reference contained in section 
993(e), which defines a "related foreign export corporation" for 
the purpose of defining the qualified export assets of a DISC. 
Such a corporation is defined in part in section 993(e)(3) as a 
corporation, less than ten percent of the total combined voting 
power of which "is owned (within the meaning of section 1563(d) 
and (e))" by a controlled group of corporations, within the mean-
ing of section 1563, which includes the taxpayer. In defining the 
controlled group, clearly nonvoting preferred stock is ignored, but 
it is unclear whether such stock is to be ignored for the purpose 
of determining the extent of ownership of the foreign export cor-
poration by the controlled ·group. Certainly it is needlessly com-
plex to include nonvoting stock for one purpose under section 993 
and exclude it for another. On the other hand, if a reference to 
the attribution rules of section 1563(e) is deemed to include a 
reference to section 1563( c) and its exclusion of nonvoting stock, 
attribution pursuant to a cross-reference to section 1563 will be 
quite different in this respect from attribution under the other 
commonly cross-referenced attribution sections. It seems unlikely 
that attribution with respect to nonvoting stock is one of the 
factors taken into account by the draftsmen of tax legislation in 
selecting the section to be cross-referenced. The choice here is not 
between consistency and inconsistency but between different 
forms of inconsistency. Perhaps the better case can be made for 
consistency among the several attribution provisions, but the 
stronger case can be made for regulatory clarification. 1 ~s 
Even where section 1563 is not applicable to nonvoting stock, 
as when applied to section 1561 and possibly elsewhere, the sec-
tion may nevertheless be applicable to purported indebtedness 
found to constitute a form of equity capital. In a case arising 
under section 1561, the Service argued that an investment in the 
form of notes, which the court held constituted stock for the pur-
pose of the relationship provisions of section 267(b), should, 
under the facts of that case, be regarded as stock that was not 
nonvoting and limited and preferred as to dividends. uv While the 
148. There is some relatively weak analagous authority for ignoring sec-
tion 1563(c) in the application of section 1563(e) by cross-reference in the con-
struction of the option rule contained in that section. See text accompanying 
note 163 infra. 
149. Harbour Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 
( 1973). 
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court disagreed and did not take the purported debt into account 
in determining the existence of a section 1561 controlled group, 
the question may be one of fact. In an appropriate case, the de 
facto possession of control over the corporate affairs might be 
sufficient. 
VII. OPTIONS AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 
It is evident that a taxpayer may easily avoid the impact of 
a substantive rule of law that is dependent upon his ownership 
of specified stock in a corporation by permitting others to hold the 
stock while he owns the right to obtain or regain the stock through 
the exercise of an option or otherwise. In such circumstances, the 
taxpayer can maintain his economic interest in the corporation 
but avoid the tax liability of such ownership. In spite of these 
realities, section 267(c) has never contained a provision attribut-
ing stock to the holder of an option on such stock. In this respect, 
section 267 is seriously deficient. In light of the omission, it might 
be anticipated that the Treasury would assert considerable pres-
sure for creative judicial interpretations. However, since either 
taxpayers have not been inclined to take advantage of this defi-
ciency or the Treasury has not been inclined to challenge them, 
there has been little case law expanding the concept of ownership 
under section 267(c) to include options. 150 
By contrast, the other early attribution rules, pertaining to 
the ownership of stock in a personal holding company, adopted 
the extensive rules governing options that were recommended by 
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance. 151 The tight-
ening of the tax laws that took place in the Revenue Act of 1937 
was largely directed to the elimination of specific abuses that the 
Joint Committee had discovered. Thus, while the Committee rec-
150. In Prentiss D. Moore, 17 T.C. 1030 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 
1953), the taxpayers had entered into the agreement to acquire all of the stock 
of a corporation, and the stock was placed in escrow pending the payment of 
the purchase. price. Thereafter the taxpayers sold property to tqe corporation at 
a loss. However, it was stipulated at trial that the transfer of the property was 
not effective until the closing of the purchase of the stock and the rel~:ase of the 
escrow. Accordingly, the court held that, since on the date on which the sale was 
effective the taxpayers had acquired all of the stock of the corporation, the 
predecessor to section 267 forbade recognition of the loss. 
151. H.R. Doc. No. 337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1937). 
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ommended extending the then-existing attribution rules for hold-
ing companies to the relationships described in the predecessor 
to section 267, 15t it did not recommend that its proposed attribu-
tion rules in the personal holding company area should also be 
applied to the disallowance of losses provision. With respect to 
personal holding companies, the Joint Committee and Congress 
were persuaded that circumvention of the stock ownership test 
had occurred through the use of options and convertible securi-
ties; 153 apparently evidence of a similar circumvention of the 
predecessor to section 267 was lacking. 
Under section 544, options and convertible securities are sep-
arately and differently treated. Section 544(b) provides that se-
curities convertible into stock, even though the conversion date 
is deferred, shall be considered as stock but only where the effect 
of so considering the security is adverse to the taxpayer. This last 
qualification is entirely appropriate. Otherwise, the present ac-
tual owner of over fifty percent of the outstanding stock of a 
corporation, for example, could avoid personal holding company 
status by issuing convertible securities to an unrelated person. On 
the other hand, this section also expressly requires that if any 
securities are to be treated as stock, then all securities outstand-
ing and having contemporaneous or earlier conversion dates shall 
also be treated as stock. u~ The requirement that securities other 
than those owned by the taxpayer also be treated as stock is in 
recognition of a significant difference between the convertible 
securities rule and all other attribution rules. For the purpose of 
determining the existence of a personal holding company, as well 
as for the purpose of resolving most questions involving attribu-
tion, it is necessary to determine not only the number of shares 
of stock owned by one or more taxpayers, but also to determine 
the total number of shares of the corporation's stock that are 
regarded as outstanding. That is, to determine whether the pre-
scribed percentage of ownership has been obtained, it is necessary 
to know the denominator as well as the numerator of the fraction. 
The application of all other attribution rules does not change the 
152. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 24, 49 Stat. 1662. 
153. S. REP. No. 1242, supra note 30, at 9. 
154. The effect of this requirement, of course, is taken into account in 
determining whether the application of the option rule will be adverse to the 
taxpayer. 
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denominator of this fraction; however, attributing stock to the 
holder of a convertible security increases the total number of 
shares considered to be outstanding. If only the stock subject to 
options held by the taxpayer were considered to be outstanding 
(in addition to the stock actually outstanding), his proportionate 
interest in the corporation would be unfairly inflated because the 
assumption that only the taxpayer would convert his securities is 
unrealistic. While the assumption of section 544(b) that all secur-
ities that could have been converted would have been will also 
often prove to be inaccurate, the statutory rule is clearly more 
realistic. It is also probably the fairest possible rule, short of an 
intolerably burdensome case-by-case financial analysis of each 
security. 
With one exception, the option rule of section 544(a)(3), in 
contrast, contains none of the operating rules applicable to con-
vertible securities. The exception is that for the specific purposes 
of the personal holding company provisions, which section 544 
accompanies, all of the attribution rules, other than attribution 
from entities, are applicable only if the effect is adverse to the 
taxpayer. Thus, the option rule does not provide that an option 
shall be treated as stock, but rather states that if a person has 
an option to acquire stock, "such stock" shall be considered as 
owned by that person. The section is totally silent with respect 
to stock subject to options held by one other than the taxpayer. 
The evident explanation for the different treatment is that Con-
gress in 1937 only contemplated that stock would be attributed 
under the option rule from an actual holder of outstanding stock, 
in which event the special problems inherent in applying the 
convertible securities rule to unissued stock do not arise.•~~ Re-
gardless of the evils sought to be corrected in 1937, the most 
common form of option in existence today is the compensatory 
option issued to employees. Such options are almost exclusively 
issued by the corporate employer and are options to acquire stock 
·155. The record ownership of stock may be split up among more 
than five individuals but less than five individuals may have an option 
to acquire the stock at any time they desire. In the case of an option to 
acquire stock such stock may be considered as being owned exclusively 
by the holder of the option or the owner of the stock . . .. 
JoiNT CoMM. ON TAx EvASION AND AVOIDANCE, supra note 29, at 11. See also S. 
REP. No. 1242, supra note 30. 
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of the employer that is not outstanding and is normally unissued. 
Since the option rule of section 544(a)(3) only calls for the 
attribution of "stock," it is not at all clear that the rule can be 
applied to attribute stock that is not in existence or at least not 
outstanding. Thus it is not clear whether stock can be attributed 
to the holder of a compensatory or investment option issued by 
the corporation itself. Assuming that the option rule can be so 
applied, it is also unclear to which holders of options attribution 
should be made. There is no textual basis for attributing stock to 
one class of holders but not to others in the manner of the convert-
ible securities rule. Neither of these questions has ever been an-
swered under section 544. 
Section 318 contains an option rule that is substantially 
identical to the rule of section 544. However, because section 318 
is a rule of general application, it does not contain the restriction 
that it only applies if the result is adverse to the taxpayer; nor is 
such a limitation contained in the sections that use section 318 
by cross-reference. Thus, section 318 not only contains the same 
ambiguities as section 544, with respect to unissued stock, but 
also adds a troublesome question of its own: is the application of 
the option rule to persons other than the taxpayer mandatory? 
With respect to all other rules of attribution, it is of no conse-
quence who, other than the taxpayer or taxpayers in question, 
owns stock in the corporation. Thus it is irrelevant whether the 
attribution rules are regarded as applicable to them. However, if 
the option rule is applied to unissued stock subject to options 
held by persons other than the taxpayer, the taxpayer's construc-
tive interest in the corporation will be reduced. 
Finally, these operational aspects of the option rule assume 
a greater importance under section 318 than under section 544 
because section 318lacks an express provision governing converti-
ble securities. Therefore, to the extent that attribution can be 
made to such a security under section 318, it must be made under 
the general option rule. 
The general boundaries of the option rule are not statutory. 
What little light has been shed on the issue has come from case 
law development and a single revenue ruling. It is instructive to 
follow the evolution of these authorities in some detail to see how 
the courts have dealt with complex ambiguities in the affinity 
provisions. The application of the option rule of section 318 in 
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connection with compensatory options has been considered by 
two courts, but regrettably, resolution of the issue was not mate-
rial to either decision. Even more regrettably, the courts adopted 
opposing views. Both cases involved the application of the sub-
stantially disproportionate redemption rules of section 302(b)(2) 
in a situation in which the taxpayer did not hold any options 
but compensatory options were outstanding in the hands of 
employees. In J. Milton Sorem 158 both the Tax Court and the 
court of appeals assumed, without discussion, that unissued 
stock should bt! attributed to all holders of options and that the 
entire amount of such attributed stock should be regarded as 
outstanding. However, in Bloch v. United States 157 the court indi-
cated that if the issue were squarely before it, a contrary result 
might have been reached because attribution with respect to op-
tions that might never be exercised would be unduly speculative. 
The court did not specify on what theory the seemingly manda-
tory language of section 318 might be ignored. us 
In Revenue Ruling 68-60115u the Internal Revenue Service 
announced its agreement with the basic principle of Sorem that 
the option rule of section 318 could be applied to unissued stock. 
While that ruling dealt with warrants, that is, investment op-
tions, there is no basis for distinguishing such options from the 
compensatory options involved in Sorem. While the uncertainty 
can hardly be regarded as settled by this ruling, a contrary rule 
would open a wide gap in the scheme of section 318. It is probable, 
for this reason alone, that most courts would give effect to the 
ruling. 
Revenue Ruling 68-601 actually went beyond merely agreeing 
that the option rule of section 318 could be applied to unissued 
stock. It also addressed the long-unsettled question of whether 
that rule could also be applied to convertible securities. 1' 0 With 
15-6. 40 T.C. 206 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 275 (lOth Cir. 
1964). 
157. 261 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1966). 
158. For such a theory, see Northwestern Steel & Supply Co v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 356 (1973), involving the option rule of section 1563. 
159. 1968-2 C.B. 124. 
160. In their early article on attribution under the 1954 Code, Ringel, 
Surrey, and Warren observed that it could be argued that convertible securities 
were merely a form of option but noted that the history of separate treatment 
under section 544 might preclude that interpretation of section 318. Ringel, 
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little discussion, the ruling asserted that warrants and converti-
ble debentures are not "realistically different" from the options 
referred to in section 318 and that both such securities would be 
regarded as options for the purpose of that section. 
While the foregoing discussion has suggested that convertible 
sec uri ties are indeed different from the options originally in-
tended to be included in the option rule of the predecessor to 
section 544, m it is unquestionably true that convertible securities 
are not realistically different from other options to acquire unis-
sued stock. If the application of the option rule to•compensatory 
options is sustained, the extension to convertible securities con-
tained in Revenue Ruling 68-601 would almost necessarily follow. 
While agreeing that the option rule should be applied to 
unissued stock, Revenue Ruling 68-601 ~isagreed with the 
method by which the rule was applied in Sorem although the 
Service appeared to confine its disapproval to the specific provi-
sions of section 302 rather than to section 318 generally. In Sorem 
stock subject to options had been treated as outstanding for the 
purpose of computing the disproportionality of a redemption by 
a nonoptionee. Seemingly, this approach required reading the 
option rule of section 318 as both mandatory and applicable to 
all options. The ruling, however, relying on the statement in sec-
tion 1.302-3(a) of the regulations that the test of section 302(b)(2) 
shall be applied to each shareholder separately, took the position 
that the option rule should not be applied to the holders of op-
tions whose stock would not be attributed to the shareholder in 
question. 152 It seems clear, however, that this regulation does not 
support the position taken in the ruling since the question pre-
sented is how many shares are considered to be outstanding for 
the purpose of applying the test of section 302 separately to each 
shareholder; the regulations to section 302 clearly do not address 
that question. To the extent that this limitation on attribution is 
peculiar to section 302, it is not important here. Subsequent 
Surrey, & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue 
Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 209, 223-24 (1958). 
161. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 503, 53 Stat. 107. 
162. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.422-2(h)(l) (1966), which somewhat ob-
scurely indicates that for the purposes of that section, stock subject to options 
held by the taxpayer should be included in the numerator of the fraction but 
not in the denominator. 
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cases, however, have indicated that this limitation may be more 
broadly applicable. 
The conflicting authorities under section 318 were reviewed 
in Northwestern Steel & Supply Co. v. Commissioner113 in which 
the court was required to apply the option rule of section 1563(e) 
to unissued stock. The Tax Court treated the option rule of sec-
tion 1563(e) as identical to the rule of section 318 and did not 
question that the option rule of section 1563 could be applied to 
unissued stock. With respect to the method of applying that rule, 
however, the court preferred to follow Revenue Ruling 68-601 
rather than its prior suggestion in Sorem, which it characterized 
as dicta. The specific issue presented was whether the petitioner 
was part of a section 1563(a) controlled group. During the years 
in question, one corporate stockholder owned over eighty percent 
of the actual outstanding stock of the petitioner, and the balance 
was owned by a single individual who also possessed an option to 
acquire from the corporation an amount of stock that would have 
given the individual a twenty-five percent ownership interest in 
the petitioner. The court stated that it was only concerned with 
determining the ownership interest of the corporate shareholder, 
not the interest of the individual, whether actual or constructive. 
Thus, the court held that stock subject to the option should not 
be taken into account for any purpose. While the court's premise 
is indisputable, it does not support its conclusion because the 
question presented is not how many shares the individual owned 
but how many shares are deemed to be outstanding for the pur-
pose of determining the proportionate interest of the corporate 
shareholder. 1M Since the constructive ownership rules deal in hy-
pothetical ownership, these two questions are quite distinct. 
The court's approach in Northwestern Steel, focusing on the 
taxpayer in question in order to bar attribution to others, is 
163. 60 T.C. 356 (1973). 
164. That this decision may have resulted in part from a failure by the 
court to distinguish between options to acquire issued and unissued stock is 
suggested by a second aspect of the opinion. The court stressed that under the 
usual operation of the attribution rules, more than one person may be deemed 
to own the same stock. This aspect of attribution would be relevant if the option 
had been to acquire outstanding stock but does not appear relevant to the facts 
of the case. Attribution of unissued stock does not involve multiple ownership 
but only the number of shares deemed outstanding. 
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identical to the position of Revenue Ruling 68-601 with respect to 
the application of section 302. While the ruling relied upon spe-
cific language in the regulations to the substantive law section, 
the approach taken by the Tax Court would appear to apply 
equally to every application of the option rule of each attribution 
provision. If this construction prevails with respect to compensa-
tory options, it is difficult to see how a different rule could be 
applicable to warrants or to convertible securities. 
However the option rule of section 318 is applied to converti-
ble securities, it would appear inevitable that the result must be 
different than that reached under the special convertible securi-
ties rule of section 544. That result is unsatisfactory. Certainly 
the procedure suggested in Sorem was far more favorable to the 
taxpayer than the section 544(b) rule would have been; since the 
attribution was favorable to the taxpayer, section 544(b) would 
not have permitted attribution. Conversely, the result in 
Northwestern Steel is consistent with this aspect of section 
544(b), but the rationale of that case and Revenue Ruling 68-601 
would prevent attribution to persons other than the taxpayer in 
question regardless of whether the taxpayer also held an option. 
In that respect, these authorities are more hostile to taxpayers 
than is section 544(b). 
The problem, of course, is that the application of the option 
rule to unissued stock in the absence of the operating rules con-
tained in section 544(b) with respect to convertible securities will 
frequently produce unjustifiable results-generally favorable to 
taxpayers. The need is for corrective legislation. 
Regardless of the rigor of the reasoning of the court in 
Northwestern Steel, the case is consistent with the views of the 
Service and is the first clear judicial determination with respect 
to the attribution of unissued stock. Unfortunately, in the follow-
ing year the Tax Court was again presented with the identical 
issue under section 1563. In North American Industries, Inc. v. 
Commissioner1'~ Judge Tannenwald pursued a completely differ-
ent approach. North American also presented the question of 
whether a section 1563(a) controlled group could be broken 
through the issuance of options. After first stating that the case 
was controlled by the prior decision in Northwestern Steel and 
165. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275 (1974). 
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that stock could not be attributed to the holder of the option, the 
court held in the alternative that section 1563(e) applied only to 
stock that is actually outstanding. It will be recalled that section 
1563(c), for the purposes of sections 1561 through 1564, defines 
the term "stock" to exclude certain categories of stock, one of 
which is treasury stock. The Service argued, and the court agreed, 
that if treasury stock were not to be taken into account under 
section 1563, unissued stock certainly should be excluded. 
Whether the Service was well advised to present this argument 
is not clear. If the court's analysis of section 1563(e) is followed, 
the attribution provisions of section 1563 cannot be applied either 
for or against the government to unissued stock, including stock 
subject to compensatory options, warrants, and convertible se-
curities. 
This analysis seems wrong, both from the perspective of the 
proper functioning of the attribution rules in general and the 
construction of section 1563(c). When it was to its advantage, the 
Internal Revenue Service rejected a similar analysis. us The pur-
pose of the attribution rules is to define stock ownership and thus 
define what stock is considered to be outstanding. If the option 
attribution rule is applied to unissued stock, such stock is then 
deemed to be outstanding in the hands of the optionee; for the 
purposes of the substantive section involved, it is no longer re-
garded as unissued. Furthermore, the purpose of the exclusion of 
treasury stock in the context of defining relationships among cor-
porations is to prevent the artificial inflation of the denominator 
of the fraction, thus pushing the required ownership below the 
specified percentage. Clearly, Congress did not intend this exclu-
sion to bar attribution of unissued stock to one who dominated a 
166. In the course of its criticism of the suggestion in Sorem, the court in 
Bloch indicated that regardless of whether the option rule of section 318 in 
general could be applied to unissued stock, when applied to section 302(b)(2), 
§ 1.302-3(a) of the regulations might bar such attribution. 261 F. Supp. at 604. 
In common with section 1563(c), the regulation provides that section 302(b)(2) 
"shall be applied only with respect to stock which is issued and outstanding in 
the hands of shareholders." While Revenue Ruling 68-601 did not refer to the 
Bloch case, it undertook to blunt the suggested limitation of the option rule of 
section 318 by observing that "no mention is made (in the disproportionate 
redemption regulation] as to what shares, if any, that may be acquired through 
the exercise of options are to be considered as issued and outstanding stock for 
this purpose." Rev. Rul. 68-601, 1968-2 C.B. at 125. 
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corporation through ownership of options or convertible securi-
ties. 
The result in North American does have the merits of not 
using the existing option rule to attribute unissued stock, for 
which the rule is not well suited, and of creating a more neutral 
approach between taxpayers and the Service than did the prior 
authorities. Nevertheless, attribution should be made to the hold-
ers of such options for the same reasons that attribution is made 
to the holders of options to acquire outstanding stock. The solu-
tion to the problems arising under the option rule is not to discard 
the major application of the rule but to provide appropriate oper-
ating rules. 
The court in North American was not unaware of the impact 
of its decision and undertook to limit its scope in a somewhat 
confusing footnote that stated: 
In so holding, we deal only with sections 1561 through 1564, 
noting that a different result may obtain, for the purposes of a 
section 302 redemption, in respect to increasing the percentage 
of stock owned by the person whose shares are being redeemed 
and who has an option to acquire additional shares which are 
neither issued nor outstanding. 117 
Of course, this decision under section 1563 would have no 
application to section 318, which does not contain a limiting defi-
nition of stock. Perhaps the court was suggesting that the section 
1563(c) definition of stock constituted a modification of the attri-
bution rules contained in section 1563(e) only when·such rules 
were applicable to sections 1561 through 1564 and that when the 
attribution rules of that subsection are applied by cross-reference 
to other sections of the Code, the limiting definition would be 
inapplicable. Assuming that the option rule of section 1563(e) is 
not applicable to unissued stock for the purposes of sections 1561 
through 1564, it does not necessarily follow that such stock may 
not be attributed in other contexts. The issue presented is the 
same as whether the rules of section 1563 are applicable to non-
voting preferred stock. In that connection it was suggested that a 
mere cross-reference to section 1563(d) and (e) should not be 
deemed to include a cross-reference to section 1563(c). 188 While 
167. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1278 n.6. (citing Northwestern Steel & Supply 
Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 356 (1973)). 
168. See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra. 
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the question remains open under both the corporate and the op-
tion rules, Judge Tannenwald's footnote is encouraging. 
The few authorities that have arisen under the various option 
attribution rules have not contributed significantly to the defini-
tion of an "option" to acquire outstanding stock. Options can 
assume a wide variety of forms, from an immediately exercisable 
right to acquire stock at a bargain price, to the deferred and 
contingent rights held by a party to a "buy-out" agreement per-
mitting the purchase of stock of a deceased shareholder at book 
value. There is some indication in Revenue Ruling 68-601 that the 
Internal Revenue Service would be receptive to a definition of 
options that did not include contingent rights to acquire stock, 
provided that the contingency is ·substantial and not within the 
control of the taxpayer. Thus, in arguing that convertible deben-
tures are not realistically different from options, the ruling stated 
that in each instance stock may be acquired at the election of the 
holder of the option and that no contingencies exist with respect 
to his election. On the other hand, the mere fact that an option 
is not immediately exercisable should not be sufficient to prevent 
attribution. Section 544(b) specifically provides that convertible 
securities will be regarded as stock without regard to whether the 
conversion date is deferred several years. 
It has been ruled under section 318 that when a corporation 
holds an option to acquire its own stock, the corporation will not 
be considered the owner of the stock for the purpose of reattribut-
ing the stock to another shareholder. 111 The reasoning of this rul-
ing, that a corporation acquiring its own stock did not acquire the 
rights of a stockholder and therefore such stock holdings should 
be disregarded, would seem broad enough to prevent attribution 
to the corporation for any purpose. The language of the ruling, 
however, suggests that the stock could be regarded as construc-
tively owned by the corporation for other purposes, that is, for 
treating the corporation as the owner of its own stock. The regula-
tions provide that a corporation will not be considered to own its 
own stock by virtue of back-attribution but are silent with respect 
to the option ruleY0 
169. Rev. Rul. 69-562, 1969-2 C.B. 47. 
170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.318-l(b)(l), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126. 
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VIII. MISCELLANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
Despite the differences in detail, nearly all of the relationship 
provisions include the same entities. However, the Code does 
contain several unique affinity groupings. A number of sections 
add entities to the usual set ofrelationships. For example, section 
267(b)(9) relates any person to an organization exempt from tax 
under section 501 if the organization is controlled by such person 
or, in the case of an individual, by members of his family. In large 
part, this provision was rendered obsolete by various sections 
added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, particularly 
section 4941, which prohibits self-dealing between private foun-
dations and persons related to it. The scope of section 267(b)(9), 
however, is broader than that of the 1969 Act and thus has some 
continuing importance. 
The policy underlying the various relationship sections dis-
cussed above is rarely articulated and frequently unclear. To 
some extent, it assumes some degree of economic identity of in-
terests and occasionally a concept of domination and control. 
Certain substantive law sections of the Code, however, turn solely 
upon considerations of domination and control, and the relation-
ship provisions used by those sections occasionally include rela-
tionships involving control without economic mutuality of inter-
est. A principal example is section 672(c), which defines a 
"related or subordinate party" for various definitional purposes 
of the grantor trust rules. This provision includes as a related 
party an employee of the grantor and a subordinate employee of 
a corporation''in which the grantor is an executive. Similarly, the 
ERISA provisions contain a very broad definition of "disqualified 
person" that includes the employer, employee organizations, and 
officers, directors, and highly compensated employees of disquali-
fied persons. 171 
IX. REA'ITRIBUTION 
While the basic attribution rules described previously are 
sufficiently complex and quite far-reaching, they only begin the 
inquiry. When stock (or, less commonly, a partnership or trust 
interest) is attributed from the actual owner to another, the ques-
171. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2) (H). 
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tion arises of whether the constructive owner of the stock should 
be considered the owner for the purpose of reattributing the stock 
to a third party who stands in a relationship to the second person 
that would normally permit attribution but who bears no rela-
tionship to the actual owner of the stock. Consistent with the 
general.tenor of the affinity rules, the Code answers this question 
in various ways, depending upon the section involved and the 
nature of the initial attribution. These reattribution provisions, 
which have the effect of substantially widening the relationships 
prescribed by the substantive law, are generally referred to rather 
innocently as "operating rules." 
A. In General 
The operating rule applicable to section 267 attribution 112 
provides that stock constructively owned by a person by virtue of 
the normal entity attribution rule shall be considered actually 
ownedby him for the purpose of reattributing the ownership of 
such stock to another. On the other hand, when stock is attrib-
uted to an individual from members of his family or from his 
partner, it is not to be reattributed for any other purpose. Thus, 
stock owned by an entity may be attributed upwards through 
various tiers of trusts, partnerships, and corporations to an indi-
vidual and thereafter attributed to the individual's spouse or 
other family members, but stock attributed to an individual from 
his spouse or his brother, for example, cannot then be reattrib-
uted to another member of the family. Since section 267 does not 
permit back-attribution from individuals to entities, the more 
complex reattribution problems presented by such rules do not 
arise. 
Reattribution upward from entities is necessary to prevent 
taxpayers from too easily avoiding the impact of the attribution 
rules by separating their ownership of the entity in question by 
more than one tier of equally dominated entities. Reattribution, 
of course, is accomplished pursuant to the general attribution 
rules including the nearly universal proportionality requirement. 
Thus, if an individual owns only twenty percent of corporation A, 
which owns thirty percent of corporation B, which owns forty 
percent of corporation C, the individual is only regarded as own-
172. I.R.C. § 267(c)(5). 
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ing twenty percent times thirty percent times forty percent or 
2.4% of corporation C. At this point reattribution becomes essen-
tially meaningless, but it would not be appropriate to limit arbi-
trarily the number of tiers through which attribution may be 
made because of those circumstances in which the interest of the 
ultimate owner is not significantly diluted while passing through 
several tiers. 
On the other hand, there is no need for family reattribution 
if the initial definition of family is sufficiently broad to describe 
the full relationship desired. Furthermore, if family reattribution 
were required, constructive ownership would pass from one fam-
ily to their relatives by marriage in an endless chain. 
Family attribution following entity attribution has generally 
been thought necessary to prevent dispersion of stock ownership 
that lacked substance. Presumably the same is to be said for 
partner-to-partner attribution following entity attribution-
assuming that attribution from partners is appropriate at all. 
In one not at all uncommon circumstance, however, this attribu· 
tion rule produces a clearly unwarranted result. A partner is 
treated as the owner of not only his proportionate interest in any 
stock owned by the partnership, as might appear from a casual 
reading of section 267(c)(1), but rather he is treated as the owner 
of the entire amount of such stock by virtue of reattribution from 
his partners. Such overly broad attribution is the effect of the 
direct sidewise attribution that is limited to partners and sections 
267 and 544. 
Section 318, which contains considerably more elaborate at-
tribution rules than does section 267, also employs far more com-
plex reattribution rules. Section 318 adopts the limitation con-
tained in section 267 to the effect that stock attributed under the 
family attribution rule shall not again be attributed. However, 
the prohibition is only applicable to reattribution under the same 
rule, that is, the family rule. Since section 318 does employ back-
attribution, stock constructively owned by an individual because 
it was actually owned by his parents or other family members 
may be reattributed to a corporation or other entity in which the 
individual holds the requisite threshold ownership. 173 
Section 318(a)(5)(C) contains a similar limitation on reattri-
173. Rev. Rut. 77-218, 1977-1 C.B. 82. 
1978] AFFINITY PROVISIONS 631 
bution following the application of the back-attribution rules. 
Thus, stock that is constructively owned by an entity by virtue 
of the rules attributing stock owned by shareholders, partners, 
and beneficiaries to entities may not be reattributed under the 
normal attribution rules to make another shareholder, partner, or 
beneficiary the constructive owner of the·stock. This is the prohi-
bition against so-called "sidewise" attribution. 
On the other hand, it is permissible to employ back-
attribution downward by reattribution through more than one 
tier. Thus, stock owned by an individual may be attributed to his 
corporation and then to a subsidiary of the corporation. Reattri-
bution, particularly involving back-attribution, can produce 
some rather odd and unpredictable results, some of which are 
mercifully forclosed by the regulations. For example, assume that 
an individual owns all the stock of corporation A, which owns all 
of the stock of corporation B. Under section 318(a)(3)(C), corpo-
ration A is regarded as owning all of the stock owned by the 
individual, which includes the stock in corporation A itself. That 
is, corporation A would be regarded as owning itself. Further, all 
stock actually and constructively owned by corporation A is re-
garded as owned by corporation B. Thus, the subsidiary would be 
regarded as owning all of the stock of its parent. Section 1.318-
l(b)(l) of the regulations prevents both results by providing that 
a corporation shall not be regarded as owning its own stock by 
virtue of section 318(a)(3)(C). 
There are no reattribution limitations on entity attribution 
nor on reattribution following the application of the option rule. 
Moreover, the statute specifically provides that if stock could be 
attributed to an individual under either the family attribution 
rule or the option rule, it shall be considered to have been attrib-
uted under the option rule in order to permit the reattribution of 
such stock. 
In theory, stock constructively owned may be reattributed 
under the option rule. It is not entirely clear, however, what stock 
could ever be so reattributed. The only stock attributed under 
this rule is the stock subject to the option. In order for an arrange-
ment to constitute a valid option, the stock subject to the ar-
rangement must be described to some extent, and it is difficult 
to conceive of a description that would encompass stock construc-
tively owned by virtue of an attribution provision. Even an open-
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ended option, covering all stock owned or thereafter acquired by 
the person subject to the option, probably should not be regarded 
as extending to stock constructively owned. 
The reattribution rules of section 1563 approximate the sim-
plicity of section 267 because of the omission of back-attribution 
from that section. As under sections 267 arid 318, attributed 
ownership is treated as actual ownership for the purposes of re-
attribution except when specifically prohibited. Section 1563 
adopts the same prohibition against the reattribution of stock 
constructively owned by virtue of the family attribution rule that 
is contained in section 267. As in the case of the other two provi-
sions, there is no limitation on reattributing stock constructively 
owned by virtue of the entity attribution rules. 
Similarly, there is no prohibition against reattributing stock 
owned by virtue of the option attribution rule. However, section 
1563 expands the dominance of the option attribution rule by 
providing that if stock is considered owned by virtue of both the 
option rule and any other attribution rule, it shall be considered 
as owned under the option rule. The priority of the option rule 
over the entity attribution rule is not designed to overcome limi-
tations on reattribution, since no limitations exist. Rather, the 
entity attribution rules of section 1563 contain threshold require-
ments barring attribution to the owners of a nominal interest in 
the entity, and it is these restrictions that the priority of the 
option rule overcomes. Thus, for example, if an individual owns 
three percent of the stock of a corporation and holds an option 
issued by the corporation to acquire stock in a subsidiary, he 
could not be regarded as constructively owning stock in the sub-
sidiary by virtue of the rule attributing stock owned by a corpora-
tion to its shareholders because of the five percent threshold re-
quirement. However, he would be regarded as owning all of the 
stock of the subsidiary subject to the option by virtue of the 
option attribution rule. 
Section 544 contains operating rules similar to those con-
tained in section 267. Thus, stock attributed pursuant to the 
family attribution rule is not to be reattributed, but stock attrib-
uted from an entity to its owner may be reattributed one or more 
times either under the same attribution rule or under the family 
rule. As under section 267, partners are treated in the same man-
ner as family members. Thus, stock attributed to an individual 
from his partner cannot be reattributed to his wife, and vice 
19781 AFFINITY PROVISIONS 633 
versa, while stock attributed to a partner from an entity, includ-
ing the partnership, may be reattributed to either. The effect of 
these rules under section 544, treating each partner as owning the 
entire amount of any stock owned by the partnership, is the same 
as under section 267. 
Section 544 does not contain a back-attribution rule, but 
unlike section 267, it does contain an option rule. As is consis-
tently the case, section 544 provides that stock attributed under 
the option rule prevails over the family attribution rule. In con-
trast to sections 318 and 1563, however, reattribution under the 
option rule is not permitted. 
There is no specific provision in section 544 pertaining to the 
attribution of stock that an individual is deemed to own by virtue 
of his ownership of convertible securities. However, it is clear that 
when the ownership of such securities is deemed to be ownership 
of stock, such characterization prevails for all purposes. Thus, 
stock constructively owned by virtue of the convertible securities 
rule may be attributed and reattributed under the other attribu-
tion rules as if the security actually was stock. 
B. Nature of Operating Rules 
It has never been clearly established whether the operating 
rules described above constitute specific grants of authority to 
treat attributed stock as actually owned for the purposes of reat-
tribution, or whether these rules serve to restrict the otherwise 
unlimited scope of reattributionY4 Since the operating rules, 
when they are provided, are complete, that is, they provide for 
every possible combination of attribution and reattribution, the 
question only arises under the relatively few attribution provi-
sions, such as sections 425(d) and 447, that do not contain operat-
ing rules. Accordingly, little authority exists. However, that au-
thority suggests that the Service, at least, views operating rules 
as restrictive rather than permissive. The question arose under 
section 425(d) with respect to double family attribution, a form 
174. One explanation for the lack of authority on such a basic question as 
whether the operating rules are restrictive or permissive is that outside the 
limited area of double family attribution nonstatutory reattribution has been 
characterized as a construction of the pervasive word "indirect," thus providing 
at least a pretense of statutory authorization. See text accompanying note 175 
infra. 
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of reattribution not permitted by any operating rule in the Code. 
The obscure answer given by the Service was in effect that such 
reattribution was not required-but as a matter of Service policy 
only. The ruling characterized section 425 as lacking a prohibition 
on double family attribution and implied that such attribution 
would be permissible under the statute. m If correct, this analysis 
presumably would not be limited to the family attribution rules 
or to section 425. 
It is not at. all clear that the operating rules should be so 
viewed. Reattribution constitutes a substantial broadening of the 
scope of attribution and arguably should not be implied in the 
absence of affirmative congressional approval. Furthermore, at 
least some of the operating rules plainly read as grants of author-
ity rather than as limitations. Section 544(a)(5), for example, 
specifically mandates reattribution under paragraphs (1) and (2), 
the entity and family rules, but is silent with respect to reattribu-
tion under paragraph (3), the option rule. It is obvious that this 
silence constitutes a lack of authority to reattribute and that the 
approval under paragraphs (1) and (2) is not mere surplusage. 
X. NONSTATUTORY AFFINITY GROUPINGS 
Given the complexity and variety of the statutory provisions 
defining relationships, attribution, and reattribution, it might 
seem only fair that a taxpayer should be entitled to rely on those 
provisions and not be required to look beyond the statute for 
further definitional provisions. But as with any other area of the 
Code, such is not the case. There is a wide variation from section 
to section in the scope of these provisions. It has frequently oc-
curred that a taxpayer or, more commonly, the Service has con-
cluded that the statutory language was unduly limited and 
should be given an expansive reading. To a limited extent, courts 
have been willing to adopt such extensions and have effectively 
fashioned nonstatutory relationships or rules of attribution. One 
basis for such an extension is the characterization of the operating 
rules, discussed above, as restrictive; but the Service has not 
pursued this line of reasoning. The same result, however, has 
been sought and on occasion achieved through a liberal construc-
tion of the word "indirect." 
175. Rev. Rul. 67-262, 1967-2 C.B. 169. 
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A. "Indirect" Ownership 
Throughout the affinity provisions of the Code, stock or other 
interests in an entity are generally referred to as being owned 
"directly or indirectly." One of the most difficult questions of 
statutory construction in this area is the meaning, if any, to be 
assigned to that phrase in the various contexts in which it ap-
pears. When it appears in an attribution provision that is supple-
mented by operating rules that provide for every possible source 
of stock ownership, it is difficult to find any meaning in the 
phrase. For example, section 267(c)(2) states that "[a]n individ-
ual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or 
indirectly, by or for his family." As we have seen, the balance of 
section 267(c) specifies the circumstances under which the indi-
vidual family members will be treated as constructively owning 
stock, and those rules appear to be complete. Thus, it would seem 
that in such an attribution provision, the use of this language 
serves only to provide a statutory basis for treating an individual 
as owning stock that he beneficially owns but that is registered 
in the name of another (for example, a custodian). Since there 
clearly is no need for statutory authorization to ignore such tech-
nicalities of title, the phrase appears to be meaningless. 
On the other hand, when a statutory attribution provision 
lacks operating rules, the Service has on occasion undertaken to 
construe the word "indirectly" as authorizing reattribution. Be-
tween 1934 and 1937, the definition of a personal holding com-
pany included a rule attributing stock from corporations, partner-
ships, estates, and trusts to the owners thereof but did not con-
tain an operating rule. Presumably as an interpretation of the 
statutory provisions permitting attribution of stock "directly or 
indirectly" owned, the regulations during this period required 
reattribution under this provision, at least in the simple case of 
direct vertical attribution through various tiers of owners. The 
regulations suggested that if two individuals were the sole equal 
beneficiaries of a trust that owned all of the outstanding stock of 
a corporation, each of the individuals would be regarded as own-
ing fifty percent of the stock of the corporation and of a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the corporation.178 The validity of this regula-
tion has not been tested. 
176. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 351-2, 1937-1 C.B. 123. 
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The example in the regulations was not changed after the 
addition of the operating rules to the predecessor of section 544. 
Even under present regulations, this same example is used to 
illustrate attribution from entities, referred to in the regulation 
as indirect ownership. 177 There would appear to be an inconsis-
tency between the elaborate attribution and operating rules con-
tained in section 544 and the ease with which the Treasury De-
partment achieved the same result through an interpretation of 
the word indirect. In light of this history, however, there may be 
an arguable basis for an equally broad construction of the lan-
guage "direct or indirect" contained in those attribution sections, 
such as section 425(d), lacking operating rules. 
A similar question arises in the interpretation of the thresh-
old requirements contained in several of the attribution sections. 
Thus, under section 318, if fifty percent or more of the stock of a 
corporation is "owned, directly or indirectly, by or for any per-
son," stock owned by the corporation will be attributed to that 
shareholder .17A The statute does not define "ownership" for the 
purpose of the fifty percent requirement beyond the use of the 
word "indirectly." The regulations, however, prescribe their own 
operating rules t.o the effect that in determining the fifty percent 
threshold requirement, all of the stock actually and construc-
tively owned by the shareholder shall be aggregated. 178 Thus, the 
meaning given to the word "indirect" under the threshold re-
quirements of section 318 is far broader than the meaning given 
the same word under the predecessor to section 544. The example 
used under the latter section only imported the entity attribution 
rules, while under section 318 the word is regarded as importing 
all of the attribution rules of that section. 
It is clearly objectionable for Congress to enact attribution 
rules without accompanying operating rules. However, for the 
Treasury to prescribe operating rules under such slight authority 
as the use of the word "indirectly," seems equally objectionable. 
But in one section added to the Code in 1976, Congress required 
reattribution solely through the use of the word "indirectly." Sec-
tion 447(d), while containing the usual rule attributing stock 
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.544-2 ( 1960). 
178. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C). 
179. Treas. Reg.§ 1.318-l(b)(3), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126. 
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owned by partnerships and trusts to their owners, does not con-
tain a general rule attributing stock owned by corporations. 
Rather, section 447(d) provides that if fifty percent of the value 
of a corporation is owned by members of one family "such mem-
bers shall be considered as owning each class of stock in a second 
corporation (or a wholly owned subsidiary of such second corpora-
tion) owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the first corpora-
tion. "180 The family group is thus treated as owning that stock of 
the third-tier corporation that is owned, directly or indirectly, by 
the first-tier (controlled) corporation. Because the third-tier cor-
poration must be wholly owned by the second-tier corporation, 
presumably the first-tier corporation is to be treated as owning 
"indirectly" the same proportion of the stock of the third-tier 
corporation that it owns in the second-tier corporation. This cas-
ual approach to reattribution created several unsatisfactory re-
sults. It is unclear why the first-tier corporation should not be 
regarded as owning any stock in a ninety-nine percent owned 
third-tier corporation or in a wholly owned fourth-tier corpora-
tion. Most likely, in view of the style of the basic corporate attri-
bution provision of section 447, the limited reattribution may well 
have been dictated solely by a desire to avoid the drafting com-
plexities of a more complete provision. This section appears to be 
the only instance of Congress requiring reattribution but provid-
ing no more guidance than the word "indirectly." 
Outside the realm of reattribution, the Internal Revenue 
Service has had little success. Nevertheless, when the Service has 
concluded that a relationship or attribution provision contained 
in (or omitted from) the Code was inadequate, it has sought a 
broader scope for the provision in question, generally through an 
expansive reading of the word "indirectly." While the courts have 
almost uniformly rejected these efforts, the potential for chal-
lenge and litigation remains to complicate efforts by taxpayers to 
predict the results of their transactions. For many years, a large 
proportion of the Service's effort in this area was focused on the 
pre-1976 version of section 1239. This section addressed a rela-
tively common form of transaction that could produce a consider-
able savings in tax but that employed, prior to its amendment, 
only limited relationship and attribution. Thus, while section 
1239 only specified the relationship between a corporation and an 
180. I.R.C. § 447(d)(3). 
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eighty percent stockholder, in Revenue Ruling 69-109181 the Serv-
ice stated that the sale of depreciable property between two cor-
porations, each of which was over eighty percent owned by the 
same individual, was within the section because the sale was 
indirectly between the shareholder and the transferee corpora-
tion. That ruling was consistently rejected in the courts. 182 In 1976 
section 1239 was amended to include that relationship. 
On occasion a court has opted for an expansive construction 
of a relationship provision. For example, it has been held under 
section 267 that a transaction with an individual constitutes an 
indirect transaction with the individual's spouse183 even though 
that relationship is not included in section 267(b). Other cases, 
however, have reached a contrary conclusion. 184 
The Service has been similarly unsuccessful, even on rela-
tively appealing facts, in attempting to expand the attribution 
provisions of sections, such as section 1239, that employ only 
limited attribution or none at all. Thus, when a taxpayer sold 
depreciable property to a corporation in which he owned seventy-
nine percent of the stock and held an option to acquire the bal-
ance, the Tenth Circuit refused to manufacture an option attribu-
tion rule for section 1239. 18~ 
A similar result was ultimately reached in Mitchell v. 
181. 1969-1 C.B. 202. 
182. Miller v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 32 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 294 (1973); 10-42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593 (1971), nonacq., 
1972-2 C.B. 4. Analogous arguments by the Service under other sections of the 
Code have been similarly rejected. Fort Walton Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
54 T.C. 653 (1970) (arising under section 178, which employs the section 267(b) 
relationships by cross-reference). 
183. Barnes v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (D. Mass. 1963) (a sale of 
property at a loss from a trust to the spouse of a beneficiary constituted an 
indirect sale between the trust and a beneficiary of the trust). 
184. Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (accrual 
of interest in favor of a wife of a controlling shareholder did not result in the 
disallowance of the interest deduction). 
185. Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927 (lOth Cir. 1966). In view of its 
decision the court did not have occasion to consider whether the option in 
question constituted the type of option that should permit attribution in any 
event. The stock subject to option was owned by an employee of the corporation 
and permitted the acquisition of his stock at book value upon his death or 
retirement. As indicated above, the better view is that such options should not 
support an attribution of stock prior to the time when they become immediately 
exercisable. 
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Commissioner1" 8 in which the Service argued that the reference to 
"beneficial" ownership in the regulations 1 ~7 to section 1239 should 
be construed to include attribution from entities. The taxpayer 
had sold depreciable property to a corporation in which he, to. 
gether with his wife and minor children, actually owned 79.54% 
of the outstanding stock, and trusts created by the taxpayer for 
the benefit of his minor children owned an additional 12.21% (the 
balance was owned by adult children). The opinion of the Tax 
Court is of special interest because the court undertook an exten. 
sive review of both the variety of attribution rules contained in 
the Code and the legislative history of section 1239. 1 ~8 The court 
was unable to find order in the bewildering diversity that it dis-
covered. It acknowledged that the omission of any suggestion of 
attribution in the pre-1976 version of section 1239 most likely 
represented a deliberate, although mystifying, decision on the 
part of Congress. Nevertheless, it concluded that the taxpayer 
had avoided the clear purpose of section 1239 too easily and held 
that the beneficiaries of the trust were to be regarded as indirectly 
owning the stock held by the trust, which stock was then attrib-
uted from them to the taxpayer. In a subsequent decision, 1 ~ 9 the 
Tax Court remarked that its decision in Mitchell had been 
reached "reluctantly" and only in view of a longstanding regula-
tion that the court interpreted as requiring a trust beneficiary to 
be treated as beneficially owning the stock held in trust, an indi-
cation that it would not generally endorse efforts to create non-
statutory attribution rules. The decision of the Tax Court in 
Mitchell was reversed by the Fourth Circuit on the ground that 
the deliberate congressional limitation of the scope of section 1239 
could not be ignored. 1110 The result in Mitchell was also changed 
186. 300 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1962), rev'g, 35 T.C. 550 (1960). 
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239·1 (1957). 
188. 300 F .2d at 535·38. 
189. 10·42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593 (1971), nonacq. 1972·2 
C.B. 4. 
190. Accord, United States v. Rothenberg, 350 F.2d 319 (lOth Cir. 1965). 
Efforts have on occasion been made to apply the attribution rules of section 318 
to certain of the corporate reorganization provisions. For an outrageous and 
unsuccessful effort by the government, see Breech v. United States, 439 F .2d 409 
(9th Cir. 1971). For a successful argument by a taxpayer, see World Service Life 
Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Rev. Rul. 76·36, 
1976-1 C.B. 105. 
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by the 1976 expansion of section 1239. 
The general lack of success in the Service's efforts to expand 
the affinity provisions on an ad hoc basis is encouraging from the 
perspective of restraining the spiraling complexity of these provi-
sions through sound statutory construction. As a matter of sub-
stantial justice, however, the Service should have prevailed in 
each instance. Thus, this history also illustrates the inadequacy 
of the affinity provisions. The solution to this inadequacy should 
not be attempted through litigation-such patchwork solutions 
do little to prevent evasion of the statutory provisions while doing 
much to enhance the difficulty in understanding and applying 
those provisions. The proper solution is the one ultimately 
adopted for the much litigated section 1239: statutory amend-
ment of the basic Code provisions. It is unfortunate, therefore, 
that corrective legislation in the affinity area has been so rarely 
achieved. 
B. The Special Case of Dividend Equivalence 
In one highly significant area it was unclear for many years 
whether attribution rules were applicable. The ultimate resolu-
tion of this question may be regarded as an example of judicially 
created attribution. Section 302(b) contains a series of tests for 
distinguishing true redemptions from redemptions having the ef-
fect of an ordinary dividend. It is clear from section 302(c) that 
the attribution rules of section 318 are applicable in determining 
stock ownership for the purposes of section 302. Paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of section 302(b) contain safe-harbor rules that turn quite 
mechanically on changes in stock ownership determined after the 
application of the attribution rules. Paragraph (1), however, con-
tains a catch-all statement that a redemption will not be treated 
as a dividend "if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to 
a dividend." Since this language does not expressly refer to stock 
ownership, the application of the attribution rules of section 318 
to the determination of dividend equivalence was doubtfuL But 
logic required their application, and in United States v. Davisn• 
the Supreme Court so held. 
A provision somewhat similar to section 302(b)(l) appears in 
section 356(a), which governs the distribution of "boot" in a cor-
191. 397 u.s. 301 (1970). 
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porate reorganization. Paragraph (2) thereof specifies that boot 
shall be treated as a dividend if it has "the effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend." For many years it was the position of the 
Internal Revenue Service that the distribution of boot automati-
cally had the effect of the distribution of a dividend, thus render-
ing such refinements as the attribution rules irrelevant. 192 In 1974, 
however, the "automatic dividend" rule was formally abandoned 
by the Service in favor of a flexible test resembling the rules of 
section 302(b). 113 While the Service acknowledges that the tests 
of section 302 are not strictly applicable to the determination of 
dividend equivalence under section 356(a)(2), the rulings adopt-
ing the flexible approach to section 356 specified that those tests 
would serve as guidelines for decisions under the reorganization 
section. The rulings further acknowledge, with respect to the at-
tribution rules, that section 318 is not strictly applicable to sec-
tion 356 but are silent with respect to whether those attribution 
rules could be used to supplement the guidelines of section 302. 
In a subsequent ruling, however, the Service cited section 318 in 
a manner suggesting its application to section 356 although on the 
facts of that ruling the attribution rules would not have been 
material to the result. 114 It seems probable that the attribution 
rules of section 318 will in time be incorporated into section 
356(a)(2) to the same extent that the Supreme Court incorpo-
rated them into section 302(b)(l). 195 
The ripple effect of United States v. Davis may not end with 
section 356. For example, preferred stock distributed in a corpo-
rate reorganization will be section 306 stock but only to the extent 
that "the effect of the transaction was substantially the same as 
the receipt of a stock dividend." ••• It has long been accepted by 
both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service that under this 
language the recapitalization of a closely held corporation for the 
purpose of passing control to the second generation in which all 
of the common stock held by the older generation was converted 
into nonvoting preferred stock does not create section 306 stock. 1117 
192. B. BITIKER & J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.34.2 (3d ed. 1971). 
193. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121. 
194. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112. 
195. See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). 
196. I.R.C. § 306(c)(l)(B). 
197. Ehrlich, Corporate Recapitalization as an Estate Planning Business 
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However, the regulations to section 306 provide that the distribu-
tion of preferred stock in a reorganization will be regarded as 
creating section 306 stock if cash received in lieu of such stock 
would have been treated as a dividend under section 356(a)(2). m 
If the attribution rules of section 318 are applied to section 356, 
their application to section 306 may soon follow. 
The dividend equivalence test of section 302(b)(l) and the 
related tests of sections 356 and 306 are quite different from other 
substantive law sections that employ attribution. Under these 
sections, stock ownership alone is not determinative of the in-
come tax consequences of a transaction but rather constitutes 
only one of several factors to be taken into account. If stock own-
ership is not determinative, it might seem to follow that the attri-
bution rules should not be determinative of the amount of stock 
that the taxpayer should be regarded as owning. That is, for the 
purposes of these more flexible tests, perhaps the attribution 
rules should not be mechanically applied, and stock should be 
attributed to the taxpayer only when the identity of interest pre-
sumed by the attribution rules exists in fact. Needless to say, 
such an approach to attribution would greatly increase the diffi-
culty of applying the substantive provisions in question and pre-
dicting the resolution of tax disputes. Nevertheless, prior to the 
decision in Davis, the Tax Court, •~u with some support, 200 had 
adopted such an approach to attribution for the purpose of deter-
mining section 302(b)(l) dividend equivalence-at least with re-
spect to family attribution. 
These decisions held that when intrafamily hostility existed 
and the actual owner of stock that otherwise would be attributed 
to the taxpayer was not in fact subject to his control because of 
such hostility, such stock would not be attributed to the tax-
payer-the so-called "bad blood" exception to attribution. The 
decision in Davis did not refer to such an exception. In view of 
this silence and because the court stressed the necessity for a 
meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest 
in the corporation to avoid dividend equivalence, after Davis the 
Retention Tool, N.Y.U. 34TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1661, 1675-76 (1976). 
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d); see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 10704 (1978). 
199. E.g., Estate of Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961). 
200. Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962). 
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Tax Court approached the application of the attribution rules as 
a purely mechanical exercise. 201 However, in Haft Trust v. 
Commissioner202 the First Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax 
Court and held that the Davis opinion did not preclude an exami-
nation of all relevant facts and circumstances, including family 
hostility. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of the existence of family discord that would have the 
effect of negating the taxpayer's presumed continuing control 
over the corporation. 
The decision of the First Circuit seems correct. It would ap-
pear entirely appropriate to construe the catch-all language of 
section 302(b)(l) in the most flexible manner possible to counter-
act the rigidly mechanical approach taken by the balance of the 
section. However, the extent to which the bad blood exception 
retains vitality remains to be seen. 
XL UsE oF AFFINITY SECTIONs BY CRoss-REFERENCE 
From the perspective of the overall complexity of the Code 
in general and the affinity provisions in particular, the foregoing 
discussion has only scratched the surface. Many of the affinity 
provisions thus far described are adopted by cross-reference in 
many more sections of the Code. In addition, the majority of 
provisions that cross-refer to the basic relationship and attribu-
tion sections also modify the definition being adopted in a variety 
of ways. Thus, the diversity of definition contained within the 
Code is multiplied through the use of modifying cross-references. 
Obviously, space does not permit a detailed analysis of each of 
the resulting provisions; however, a statistical summary will ade-
quately indicate the extent of diversity within the Code and the 
corresponding need for legislative attention. 
A. Cross-References to Basic Sections 
The relationship or attribution rules provided by section 267 
are employed in at least twenty-one distinct subsections of the 
Code. Of these, ten subsections incorporate by cross-reference the 
full range of relationships established by section 267(c). Only five 
201. See Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974); Haft Trust v. 
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 398 (1973). 
202. 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975), vacatinq 61 T.C. 398 (1973). 
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adopt the section 267(b) relationships without modification: sec-
tions 103(b)(6)(C), 170(a)(3), 178(b)(2), 465(b)(3)(B), and 631(c). 
Each of the five sections modifying the 267(b) relationships do so 
by initially restricting the definition of family. Three of the sec-
tions eliminate brothers and sisters from the relationship; and in 
two of those sections, sections 44(c)(3) and 179(d)(2)(A), that is 
the only modification in the cross-reference. The two final sec-
tions, sections 613A(c)(8) and 48(k)(5), greatly modify the defini-
tion of family to include only an individual's spouse and minor 
children, but they otherwise adopt the section 267 relationships 
and employ the cross-reference to these relationships in an aggre-
gation form of attribution. 203 The one remaining section that elim-
inates brothers and sisters from the family definition, together 
with the one section that does not modify the section 267 relation-
ships, also alters the threshold percentage of ownership of corpo-
rate stock that an individual must possess in order to create the 
corporation-shareholder relationship. Section 178(b)(2) increases 
the percentage from fifty to eighty percent while section 1235(d) 
reduces the required ownership to twenty-five percent. 
Of these ten sections that cross-refer to section 267, eight 
appear to adopt the attribution rules of section 267(c) along with 
the cross-reference to the relationship provisions of section 
267(b). Sections 170(a)(3) and 465(b)(3)(B), however, cross-refer 
to section 267(b) only. The regulations to section 170(a) provide 
no hint of whether this cross-reference should be regarded as in-
cluding the constructive ownership rules of section 267(b), and 
there are as yet no regulations to the newly added section 465. 
Section 178 has been somewhat arbitrarily classified as cross-
referring to the section 267 relationships without modification of 
the definition of family. Actually, the cross-reference is more 
complex. As in the case of section 170(a)(3), the initial cross-
reference deviates from the usual language and refers instead to 
the relationships described in subsection (b) of section 267.2114 Sec-
203. Both sections severely restrict the use of a Code benefit that pre-
viously was available-percentage depletion on oil and gas in the case of section 
613A and the investment tal[ credit on motion pictures in the case of section 
48(k)-and the limited family definition appears to be Congress' way of mildly 
reducing the impact of the new limitations. One might suppose that whatever 
justification exists for attribution at all would equally support a somewhat 
broader family definition. 
204. I.R.C. § 178(b)(2)(B). 
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tion 178, however, provides that for the purpose of determining 
the existence of the section 267(b) relationships, the attribution 
rules of section 267(c) shall be applied except that brothers and 
sisters are deleted from the family definition.205 Thus, while an 
individual would be regarded as related to his brother and to a 
corporation wholly owned by his child, he is not related to a 
corporation wholly owned by his brother. Section 178 appears to 
be the only instance of separate cross-references to sections 267(b) 
and 267(c) and thus is the only instance in which the Code uses 
two different family definitions for the single purpose of defining 
one set of relationships.ZM 
Six of the ten sections that cross-refer to section 267 supple-
ment the cross-reference by also cross-referring to the similar 
provision in section 707(b) relating to partners and partnerships. 
Of these six sections, two cross-refer to section 267 without modi-
fication (sections 103(c)(6)(C) and 631(c)), two modify 267(b) 
only by eliminating attribution from brothers and sisters (sec-
tions 44(c)(3) and 179(d)(2)(A)),. and two employ the sharply 
limited definition of the family (sections 48(k)(3)(D) and 
613A{c)(8)). 
Accordingly, while there are ten sections of the Code that 
employ the relationship and attribution provisions contained in 
section 267 for the purpose of expanding the substantive law pro-
vision using the cross-reference, there are seven distinct subcate-
gories of relationships: 
1. unmodified adoption without attribution, 
2. unmodified adoption with attribution, 
3. unmodified adoption adding partnership relation-
ships, 
4. unmodified adoption with modified attribution and 
increased stock-ownership threshold, 
5. elimination of brother-sister attribution and addition 
of partnership relationships, 
6. elimination of brother-sister attribution and reduction 
of stock ownership threshold, and 
205. I.R.C. § 178(b)(2) {flush language). 
206. Section 178, however, is not the only instance in which a single sec-
tion of the Code uses two variations of the section 267 definition of family for 
quite similar purposes. See note 228 infra. 
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7. sharply narrowed family definition but added partner-
ship relationships. 
Obviously, there is no consistency among the numerous modifica-
tions of section 267. 
Of the remaining eleven sections that cross-refer to section 
267, six refer only to the definition of family and are discussed 
below. The remaining five sections cross-refer only to the attribu-
tion rules contained in section 267(c) while prescribing their own 
relationships. Of these five sections, only section 50B(c)(5)(A) 
uses the section 267(c) attribution rule without modification. Sec-
tion 707(b), which prescribes its own partnership relationship 
rules, essentially adopts section 267(c) attribution without modi-
fication although it excludes the application of section 267(c)(3), 
which attributes stock from one partner to another. Section 
341(e), discussed in somewhat greater detail below, modifies the 
definition of family for section 267(c) purposes by eliminating 
brothers and sisters. The final two sections using these attribu-
tion rules are the prohibited-transaction provisions in sections 
4946(a) and 4975(e) pertaining to private foundations and pen-
sion plans, respectively. In each instance, the cross-reference to 
section 267(c) is modified by eliminating brother-sister attribu-
tion and by including spouses of lineal descendants as members 
of the family. 
Section 318 is used in eighteen distinct ways in fourteen sec-
tions of the Code. While section 318 is exclusively an attribution-
of-stock-ownership section that does not purport to establish rela-
tionships in the manner of section 267(b), four of the cross-
references to section 318 are for the purpose of defining relation-
ships rather than prescribing attribution. Three of these four 
cross-references do not modify the provisions of section 318. Thus, 
section 306(b)(l)(A) sets forth an exception to the normal treat-
ment of the disposition of section 306 stock, provided, among 
other things, that the disposition is not to a person the ownership 
of whose stock would (under section 318(a)) be attributable to the 
stockholder. Section 302(c)(2)(B)(i) requires full attribution in a 
''termination of interest" redemption if any stock redeemed was 
acquired within ten years from a person whose stock would be 
attributed at the time of the redemption to the shareholder under 
section 318(a). Section 334(b)(2)(B) also uses section 318 with 
respect to the acquisition of stock but with the added complexity 
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that it may be necessary to determine the date upon which the 
corporate parent "is first considered under section 318(a) as own-
ing stock owned by the corporation {which must stand in the 
section 318 relationship] from which such acquisition was 
made." The final use of section 318 as a relationship section oc-
curs in section 382(a)(5), which modifies section 318 by eliminat-
ing the fifty percent threshold requirement for the ownership of 
stock in a corporation. 
Twelve of the eighteen cross-references to section 318 are 
adoptions of the full attribution rules provided by that section. 
Of those twelve, only five sections adopt the attribution rules 
without modification: sections 302(c)(l), 306(b)(l)(A), 367(c)(2), 
545(c)(3)(B),207 and 995(e)(10). 
The remaining cross-references to section 318 all prescribe 
reductions in the fifty percent threshold requirement for owner-
ship of a corporation before attribution may be made. Two of 
these references, sections 856(d) and 6038(d), reduce the thresh-
old requirement to ten percent. Sections 304(b), 304(c), 382(a)(3). 
and 1239(c) completely eliminate the fifty percent threshold. The 
final cross-reference to the attribution rules of section 318 is con-
tained in section 958, discussed below, which modifies the appli-
cation of that section considerably. The set of attribution rules 
resulting in section 958 is used by cross-reference in four sections: 
679(c)(2), 1246(b)(2), 1248(a) and (c), and 1249(b). In each in-
stance, these rules are used to establish ownership of a foreign 
corporation for which section 958 is specifically adapted. Thus, 
these four sections may be added to the list of uses of section 318 
by cross-reference. 
Two of the cross-references to section 318 are solely to the 
definition of family contained in that section and are discussed 
below. 
The final basic affinity rule contained in the Code is section 
1563. This section, although it constitutes a relatively recent ad-
dition to the Code, is referenced twenty-two times in eighteen 
sections. Of these, sections 243(b)(6) and 404(a)(1)(C) are special 
207. The cross-reference to section 318 in section 545 is curious. Section 
545 defines undistributed personal holding company income, and it might have 
been anticipated that any attribution rules used by that section would be 
adopted from section 544, which prescribes the attribution rules that are gener-
ally used with respect to personal holding companies, rather than section 318. 
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rules that will not be further considered. Of the remaining twenty 
cross-references, sixteen involve cross-references to the corporate 
relationships established by section 1563(a). Of those, eight do 
not modify the provisions of section 1563(a): sections 46(a)(6), 
50A(a)(5), 58(b), 250(d), 368(a)(2)(F), 414(b), 86l(e)(l), and 
99(e)(3)(A). An equal number modify that definition by reducing 
the eighty percent ownership requirement to fifty percent: sec-
tions 48(c)(3)(C), 48(k)(3)(D), 52(a), 103(b)(6)(C), 179(d)(7), 
415(h), 613A(c)(8)(D), and 993(a)(3). 
The cross-reference to section 1563 in section 993(a)(3) is in 
the context of defining a controlled group of corporations for the 
purpose of the DISC sections of the Code. This definition is in 
turn used by cross-reference throughout the DISC provisions. In 
1976, when the international boycott provisions were adopted and 
the need arose to define a controlled group of corporations, the 
definitional cross-reference was made to section 993(a)(3) rather 
than to section 1563, as had previously been done throughout the 
Code. Thus, sections 908(a) and 999(a) and (b) also in effect 
cross-refer to section 1563. 208 
One additional section may cross-refer to section 1563. Sec-
tion 48(c)(l), in defining relationships, uniquely cross-refers to 
the relationships established by section 179(d)(2)(A) and (B). 
While subparagraph (A) of that provision cross-refers in turn to 
sections 267 and 707, subparagraph (B) merely refers to a con-
trolled group of corporations. For the purposes of section 179, 
section 179(d)(7) defines such a controlled group by a modified 
cross-reference to section 1563. While section 48(c)(l) does not 
cross-refer to paragraph (7), it would seem reasonable to assume 
that such a reference should be implied by the reference to para-
graph (2) (B). This imprecision in draftsmanship is the direct 
result of defining relationships by means of double cross-
references through apparently randomly selected and wholly un-
related substantive provisions such as section 179. Such a draft-
ing technique is totally without merit and needlessly complicates 
the task of decoding the relationship intended.201 
208. At one point in the international boycott provisions it was necessary 
to refer to a person in control of a corporation; and, for that purpose, section 
999(e) contains a unique cross-reference to section 304(c). For the purpose of 
defining the relationship established by section 304(c), section 304(c)(2) requires 
the use of the attribution rules of section 318, with modifications. 
209. The cross-reference to section 304, for example, is for the purpose of 
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While the attribution rules prescribed by section 1563 are the 
most refined and sophisiticated in the Code, they are employed 
by cross-reference in only four sections that-do not also adopt a 
cross-reference to the 1563(a) relationship provision. These sec-
tions are 993(e)(3)(A), 210 1551(b),211 120(d)(6), and 415(c)(6)(B). 
Within the relatively sophisticated attribution rules of section 
1563(e), the definition of family is the most refined. That defini-
tion, however, is not employed in any other section of the Code. 
Presumably, the restrictions on such attribution, particularly 
from a spouse, are regarded as too great for general use. 
The cross-references to section 1563 contained in sections 414 
and 52 form the basis for the all-inclusive relationship provisions 
created by these sections. In the earlier of these two sections, 
section 414(b) routinely cross-refers to the section 1563(a) defini-
tion of a controlled group of corporations for the purpose of treat-
ing all related employers as one employer in the context of the 
ERISA provisions. Section 414(c) provides that all businesses, 
whether or not incorporated, shall be treated as a single employer 
for those specified purposes if they are under common control as 
determined under regulations based upon the principles applica-
ble to section 414(b)-presumably the definitions of section 1563 
and the attribution rules applicable thereto. The temporarym 
and proposed final213 regulations that have been issued under sec-
tion 414 have faithfully undertaken the required adaptation, and 
there is no present indication that the resulting relationship pro-
defining control over a corporation. Section 304 does provide such a defini-
tion-in fact an unusual one that could not be incorporated by reference to any 
of the commonly cross-referenced provisions. Assuming the control definition in 
section 304(c) exactly met the objectives of the draftsmen of section 999(e), the 
economy of words achieved by the cross-reference seems a rather modest success 
in view of the present length of the Internal Revenue Code. Of far greater 
importance is the rationality and simplicity of the draftsmanship of the Code, 
and that cannot be obtained when the construction of a provision pertaining to 
international boycotts requires referring back some two hundred pages to two 
·sections relating to an entirely different subject matter. 
210. Section 993(e)(3)(A) separately does cross-refer to the section 1563 
definition of a controlled group. 
211. This section contains a definition of a controlled group that is similar 
to the section 1563 definition. 
212. Treas. Reg.§ 11.414(c), T.D. 7388, 1975-2 C.B. 180. 
213. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.414(b), .414(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 51467-68 
(1975). 
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vlSlon is unsatisfactory in either form or scope. Indeed, it was 
copied with only a minor revision in 1977.21 • While these regula-
tions and the resulting relationship cannot be described as un-
complicated, they are far easier to understand than the alterna-
tive aggregation form used in sections 613A and 48(k) in the 1969 
and 1975 Acts. 
The regulations to section 414 supply traditional answers to 
the problems posed in adapting the principles of section 1563 to 
unincorporated entities. Since the Treasury Department had con-
siderable flexibility in fashioning these regulations, it is some-
what disappointing that the opportunity was not taken to im-
prove various aspects of the relationship and attribution rules. 
Section 1563 distinguishes between voting and nonvoting stock 
in defining the corporate relationship but not in defining its at-
tribution rules. 215 While the proposed regulations to section 414 
restate the voting power or value test for corporations, m owner-
ship of a partnership is measured by interest in profits or capital 
with no reference to voting power. 217 The absence of the voting 
power alternative means that in a limited partnership in which 
the general partners own less than fifty percent of the profits or 
capital interest, the partnership will not be regarded as controlled 
by those persons who in fact have exclusive control over its daily 
activities. This regulatory focus on the traditional formula may 
not be consistent with the principles of section 1563. 
With respect to trusts and estates, the determination of con-
trol is based solely upon the actuarial interest in the entire trust 
or estate.218 This would seem to be the only appropriate test. 
Consistent with section 1563, however, attribution from a trust or 
estate is made in accordance with the beneficiaries' actuarial 
interest in the stock or other ownership interest being attrib-
uted.m While again this basis for attribution seems to be appro-
priate, it must be observed that in the context of section 414, the 
214. LR.C. § 52; see text accompanying note 222 infra. 
215. Nonvoting preferred stock is ignored entirely. See text accompanying 
note 130 supra. 
216. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(A), -2(c)(2)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 
51469 (1975). 
217. /d. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(C), -2(c)(2)(iii). 
218. !d. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(B), -2(c)(2)(ii). 
219. /d. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(3)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 51471-72 (1975). 
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application of these two different rules can produce unexpected 
results. For example, assume that an individual holds an actuari-
ally computed forty percent interest in a trust and thus is not 
regarded as controlling the trust. He may nevertheless be re-
garded as controlling a corporation wholly owned by the trust if 
other beneficiaries are excluded under the trust agreement from 
obtaining any interest in the stock. 
While the regulations prescribe an option attribution rule, 
they contain no explanation at all concerning the operation of 
that rule.220 In view of the rather confused case law under the 
option rule of section 1563,221 it is probable that the omission was 
deliberate and that the Treasury Department was either unable 
or unwilling to prescribe a coherent set of rules governing this 
area. One can have sympathy with the Treasury Department's 
difficulties, but it seems clear that nothing is to be gained by 
leaving the resolution of the doubts under the option rule to fur-
ther case development. It would be preferable for the Treasury to 
take the opportunity presented by section 414 to rationalize this 
area. 
After developing the aggregation form of all-inclusive rela-
tionships in 1976, Congress returned in 1977 to the section 414 
approach of modifying a cross-reference to section 1563. Congress 
may have reverted to the section 414 approach because of the 
similar need in the new section 52 to define a related group of 
entities in order to treat the group as a single employer.222 How-
ever, while the cross-reference to section 1563 was not modified 
by section 414, the cross-reference in section 52 eliminates the 
eighty percent requirement,m thus creating dissimilar defini-
tions. The regulations to section 414 entirely restate the princi-
ples of section 1563 while the regulations that have been proposed 
under section 52 largely cross-refer to the temporary regulations 
under section 414.224 
.Eleven sections cross-refer to the definition of a controlled 
220. See id. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51471 (1975). 
221. See text accompanying notes 165-67 supra. 
222. Section 52 imposes a limitation on the "new jobs" credit allowed by 
section 448 and is unrelated to the ERISA provisions of which section 414 is a 
part. 
223. I.R.C. § 52(a)(l). 
224. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.52-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 62932 (1977). 
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group of corporations contained in section 1504,225 which limits 
the relationship to parent-subsidiary chains. Of these cross-
references, five do not modify the section 1504 definition: sections 
178(b), 542(d)(3), 904(d), 1313(c)(7), and 137l(a). Section 
1504(b) excludes from the definition of an affiliated group certain 
types of corporations, and five of the cross-references delete these 
exclusions, thus broadening the definition: sections 48(h)(10), 
49(b)(8), 279(g), 337(c), and 593(e). Section 593(e), in addition, 
reduces from eighty percent to fifty percent the quantity of stock 
in the subsidiary that must be owned to establish the relation-
ship. Section 47(a)(7)(B) also reduces the required stock owner-
ship to fifty percent but retains all of the exclusions except foreign 
corporations. 
B. Multiple Cross-References 
Several of the Code sections that employ cross-references to 
section 267, and perhaps to section 707(b), supplement the basi-
cally individual orientation of those sections with a cross-
reference to one of the sections focusing on relationships among 
controlled groups of corporations. Thus, sections 48(k)(3)(D), 
103(b)(6), 179(d)(2), and 613A(c)(8)(D), in addition to referring 
to both sections 267 and 707(b), cross-refer to section 1563(a), 
in each case reducing the ownership test to fifty percent. Section 
178(b)(2) supplements its reference to section 267 by reference to 
an affiliated group of corporations within the meaning of section 
1504 but does not include a reference to section 707(b). Other 
sections, such as section 631(c), supplement their reference to 
section 267 with their own definition of controlled corporations. 
C. Cross-References to the Family Definition 
Numerous sections of the Code define the family, generally 
to deny a benefit otherwise granted by the Code to transactions 
occurring between members of the family or to impute to an 
individual activities detrimental to his tax position even if such 
activities were actually undertaken by members of the defined 
family. Most sections of the Code that define the family do so in 
225. This tally does not include those sections that refer to groups of 
corporations filing consolidated income tax returns, eligibility for which is de-
fined by section 1504. 
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the course of adopting complete relationship rules by cross-
reference to either section 267 or section 318. As we have seen, 
these cross-references are subject to numerous modifications. A 
few additional sections cross-refer solely to the family definition 
contained in section 267 or section 318 and either do not use 
nonfamily relationships at all or supply their own. 
Six sections of the Code228 adopt the definition of family con-
tained in section 267, which includes an individual's spouse, 
ancestors, lineal descendants, and brothers and sisters. As noted 
above, the regulations may intend that the terms "ancestors" and 
"lineal descendants" be limited to two generations.227 None of the 
sections cross-referencing to these rules modify the section 267 
definition of family except section 464(c)(2)(E). The other sec-
tions are 274(e)(5) (which is atypical because a benefit granted 
by the Code is extended to family members under this provision), 
280A(d)(2)(A), 1237(a)(2), and two prohibited-transaction sec-
tions, 503(b) and 4975(d).228 
The Tax Reform Bill of 1975, as originally passed by the 
House of Representatives, contained a provision identical in sub-
stance to the present section 464 that adopted by cross-reference 
the family definition of section 267. 221 In the Senate, this cross-
reference was broadened into its present form, which includes the 
members of the family, as defined in section 267(c)(4), of "a 
grandparent" of the taxpayer.230 It seems clear that the purpose 
226. An unmodified cross-reference to the family definition in section 
267(c)(4) is also contained in sections 613A(c)(9)(B)(iii) and 613A(d)(l)(D), but 
these are special provisions applicable only to one taxpayer and are not further 
considered herein. 
227. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
228. The unmodified adoption of the family definition by section 4975(d) 
is not for the purpose of defining a so-called disqualified person with respect to 
a qualified trust. As we have seen above, the definition of family for such pur-
pose was modified by deleting brothers and sisters and adding any spouse of a 
lineal descendant. Section 4975(d), however, contains a series of exceptions from 
the definition of a prohibited transaction, and to these exceptions there is in 
tum an exception for a qualified plan benefiting owner-employees that engage 
in certain activities. In the course of describing those activities, section 4975(d) 
employs the unmodified family definition of section 267(c)(4). Thus, the same 
section of the Code uses two different definitions of family for essentially identi-
cal purposes. 
229. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § lOl(a), 121 CoNG. REc. 38598-601 
(1975). 
230. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1531. 
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of this change was to expand the family definition along the lines 
of the broad definition contained in section 447. The report of the 
Committee on Finance states that "[f]or the purpose of this 
provision, the family of an individual includes not only his broth-
ers and sisters (whether by whole or half-blood), his spouse, 
ancestors, and lineal descendants but also other lineal descen-
dants of the individual's parents and grandparents."%31 The first 
portion of this statement recites the family definition of section 
267 exactly, while the balance includes descendants of the indi-
vidual's grandparents. The simplistic cross-reference to the sec-
tion 267 family of "a grandparent" does not accomplish that 
objective. 
The initial interpretation question under section 464 is 
whether the reference to "a grandparent" should be construed as 
meaning "any grandparent." The plurals used in the committee 
report would support this construction as would a comparison 
with section 447 (although consistency among such similar uses 
of the family definition has not been an earmark of the affinity 
provisions). Obviously the defined family will be far broader if the 
descendants of all four grandparents are to be included, but the 
important difference between these two interpretations is not in 
their overall breadth. The descendants of a single grandparent 
would only include one of the taxpayer's parents so that under a 
literal reading of section 464( c)(2)(E), the taxpayer's family 
would include either his father or his mother, but not both. 
Of even greater importance, under the present statutory lan-
guage, is the fact that the taxpayer's spouse is clearly excluded 
from the definition of family since a spouse is not commonly a 
descendant of any of the taxpayer's grandparents. The Technical 
Corrections Bill of 1977232 proposed adding spouses of each family 
member to the definition of family. While this proposal would 
have remedied the clearly unintentional omission of the tax-
payer's spouse, the addition of all spouses of family members 
seems to go beyond the family description contained in the above-
quoted committee report. The proposal, however, would be in 
conformity with the related section 447 family definition. Pend-
231. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 59, reprinted in [19761 U.S. 
CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEws 3439, 3495. 
232. H.R. 6715 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(k)(3), 123 CONG. REc. H 11096 
(1977). 
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ing the adoption of this or similar corrective legislation, the sec-
tion 464 definition of family only includes the spouse of the tax-
payer's grandparent. 
There may even be a question concerning whether the family 
of the taxpayer, as so defined, includes his children. It will be 
recalled that while section 267(c)(4) refers to an individual's lin-
eal descendants, the regulations thereto define those terms as 
including children and grandchildren.233 If this statement in the 
regulations is construed as a limitation rather than as a relatively 
pointless illustration, the limitation presumably would be applic-
able to all uses of section 267(c)(4) by cross-reference. In the 
context of section 464, the taxpayer in question is the grandchild 
of the "grandparent." If the relationship extends no further, the 
children of the taxpayer are not included. This question could be 
resolved appropriately by regulation in favor of including all des-
cendants of the taxpayer. It might be hoped, however, that clari-
fication would come by removing the limitation suggested by the 
regulations to section 267 rather than by a regulation to section 
464. Clarification by a regulation to section 464 would necessarily 
suggest that the term ulineal descendants" in section 267 has a 
different meaning when applied to section 464 than when applied 
elsewhere. 
The form and substance of the family definition of section 
464 should be compared to the family definition contained in 
section 447, discussed above.zs. Both sections 447 and 464 were 
added to the Code in 1976 to reduce the attractiveness of farming 
as a tax shelter by altering the tax accounting rules that pre-
viously had been applicable to all farming operations. Both sec-
tions exempt from their application family-owned farms, and 
both sections define family quite broadly for this purpose. It is 
interesting to compare the different approaches taken to define 
the family in section 464 (by way of a modified cross-reference) 
and in section 447 (through its own definition). It is also instruc-
tive to note the different, although perhaps unintentional, results 
reached by these approaches. 235 
233. Treas. Reg.§ 1.267(c)-l(a)(4) (1958). 
234. See text accompanying note 52 supra. 
235. In light of the difficulties encountered in modifying an existing defini-
tion to arrive at the desired breadth, it might be concluded that when such a 
dramatic deviation from the established definition is sought, a better approach 
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Two sections of the Code adopt the definition of family con-
tained in section 318: sections 103(c)(3) and 1379(d). Neither of 
these sections modify the definition so adopted:m 
D. Cross-References to Miscellaneous Sections 
In addition to the double cross-references referred to above, 237 
a few sections of the Code cross-refer, with or without modifica-
tion, to the affinity provisions defined in sections other than sec-
would be to draft a new provision as in section 447. 
The 1976 Act generally receives very low marks for its approach to attribu-
tion. The Act defined family for stock attribution purposes eleven times in the 
course of eight different newly added or amended sections. Of these eleven 
sections, two cross-refer to the section 267 definition of family, and both then 
modify the definition so adopted, one in a unique and extreme way. One section 
incorporates the section 318 definition by reference without modification and 
another cross-refers to section 958 that itself cross-refers to section 318. One 
section cross-refers to section 1563 without modification of its family definition 
and three sections cross-refer to section 993(a)(3) that in turn cross-refers to 
section 1563-thereby adding a new double cross-reference to the Code. One 
section adds a unique cross-reference to section 304 that cross-refers to section 
318 for a second new double cross-reference. Finally, two sections contribute 
their own family definition, one of which is very narrow and the other very 
broad. Of the eleven provisions, seven employ the traditional approach and four 
use the aggregation form of attribution. 
236. Section 103(c) contains an exception to the general exemption under 
section 103 from tax for interest on municipal bonds when such bonds constitute 
arbitrage bonds as defined in section 103(c). Section 103(c)(3) contains an ex-
ception to the arbitrage bond definition but that exception is in tum subject to 
an exception for bonds held by a person who is a substantial user of the property 
being financed or a member of his family. For this purpose, the unmodified 
definition of family contained in section 318 is employed. Section 103(b) con-
tains a second exception to section 103 for industrial development bonds, but 
that exception is in turn subject to a variety of exceptions for particular types 
of industrial development bonds, the interest on which remains exempt from 
tax. These exceptions are themselves subject to certain exceptions including the 
provision subjecting the interest on such a bond to tax during any period of time 
in which the bond is held by a substantial user of the facilities being financed 
or a person related to the substantial user. For this purpose, a related person is 
defined very broadly and includes all of the relationships prescribed by sections 
267 and 707(b) as well as an expanded reference to section 1563(a). The cross-
reference in section 103(b) to section 267 is unmodified. Accordingly, this section 
also employs two different definitions of family for substantially identical pur-
poses. 
237. See notes 208-09 supra and accompanying text. 
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tions 267, 318, 1504, and 1563.238 Of these, the most significant is 
the uniqueZ3' cross-reference in section 341(d) to the "rules pre-
scribed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) of section 
544(a)."2~0 Section 341(d) is the de minimis exception to collapsi-
ble corporation treatment, reserving ordinary-income treatment 
for shareholders owning more than five percent of the value of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation (subparagraph (A)) or for a 
shareholder whose stock is attributable to such a five percent 
shareholder (subparagraph (B)). Thus, section 341(d) not only 
uses the rules of section 544(a) for attribution purposes, but also 
in section 341(d)(1)(B) establishes a relationship among share-
holders of a collapsible corporation based upon those attribution 
rules. The complexity of the resulting provision has caused under-
standable confusion. 
The cross-reference to section 544(a) specifically includes a 
cross-reference to the operating rules contained in paragraph (5). 
However, at least one court has concluded that the limitations 
upon reattribution contained in the section 544 operating rules 
may not be applicable, at least in part, to section 341(d). This 
construction, of course, could have the effect of widening the 
scope of that provision beyond all reasonable bounds. In that 
case, Lewis S. Jacobson, 241 the Tax Court was faced with the 
question of whether stock owned by a partner of the husband 
could be attributed to the wife. At this time, the predecessor to 
section 341(d)(1)m prescribed a ten percent threshold. The wife 
held seven and one-half percent of the value of the outstanding 
238. For example, section 704(e)(3) defines family to include only the 
spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants and thus is identical to the definition 
contained in section 267 except for the deletion of the reference to brothers and 
sisters (although the regulations to this provision do not suggest that the refer-
ence to ancestors and lineal descendants is limited to grandparents and grand-
children only) and section 704(e) is used by cross-reference in section 1375(c). 
See text accompanying note 41 supra. 
239. Prior to 1964, section 1551 also used the attribution rules of section 
544 but that cross-reference was changed to the more closely related attribution 
rules contained in section 1563(e) when that section was enacted. 
240. See also I.R.C. § 704(e) (used by a cross-reference from section 
1375( c)). 
241. 32 T.C. 893 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 
1960). 
242. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m), as amended by Revenue Act of 
1950, ch. 994, § 211(a), 64 Stat. 933. 
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stock of the collapsible corporation, the husband owned no stock, 
and his partner owned in excess of ten percent. The taxpayer 
argued that the wife could not be regarded as owning the stock 
owned by the partner because of the operating rule in the prede. 
cessor to section 544 prohibiting double family and partner attri-
bution. However, the court concluded that the predecessor to 
section 34l(d)(l)(B) overruled the prohibition against such reat-
tribution and held that the wife was subject to tax on her sale of 
the stock at ordinary income rates. This statement by the Tax 
Court seems to be based upon a misreading of the section and is 
clearly wrong. In fact, the wife was subject to tax under the pre-
decessor to section 341(d)(l)(B), not because she was construc-
tively a ten percent shareholder (which would require an imper-
missible attribution of the partner's stock to her) but rather 
because her stock was attributable to another (her husband) 
who was constructively a ten percent shareholder. This case 
illustrates the logic of the proposition that attribution rules 
should never be used to establish relationships, not only be-
cause the resulting statutory language is unduly confusing but 
also because of the extreme breadth of the relationship so 
created. In any event, the erroneous suggestion that the operat-
ing rules of section 544 are not applicable to section 34l(d) pre. 
sumably will not be followed. 
It may be recalled that section 544 is unique among attribu-
tion rules in that it provides a specific and detailed provision 
treating convertible securities as stock. However, the cross-
reference in section 341(d) is only to section 544(a) and therefore 
excludes the convertible securities rule contained in subsection 
(b). This exclusion raises an interesting question with respect to 
the scope of the option rule contained in section 544(a) as applied 
to section 34I(d). It may also be recalled that the Service has 
interpreted the option rule contained in section 318 as being ap-
plicable to convertible securities on the ground that such securi-
ties were not realistically different from options. Presumably, a 
similar construction of the identical option rule contained in sec-
tion 544 could not be made because of the superseding specific 
rule contained in subsection (b). Cases like Jacobson, 243 however, 
have suggested that attribution rules adopted by an unrelated 
243. 32 T.C. 893 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 
1960). See also North Am. Indue., Inc., v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275 
(1974). 
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substantive law section of the Code become in effect a part of that 
substantive law and may be subjected to varying interpretations 
depending upon the substantive section to which they are being 
applied. Thus, a court might regard itself as free to interpret the 
option rule of section 544, as applied to section 341(d), entirely 
differently from the manner in which that option rule would be 
applied for the purpose of the personal holding company provi-
sions. In spite of the specificity of the cross-reference to section 
544(a), the question cannot be regarded as free from doubt. If a 
court were presented with what it regarded as a clear case of tax 
avoidance under section 341(d) through the use of convertible 
securities, the pressure for an expansive reading of the option rule 
would be considerable. 
The cross-reference to the family definition contained in sec-
tion 544(a) is specifically modified for the purposes of section 
341(d) to create the broadest family attribution (and relation-
ship) rules existing in the Code-except for the farm-family defi-
nitions of sections 447 and 464. The definition in section 544(a) 
is an older, relatively broad definition that includes an individ-
ual's spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and siblings. Section 
341(d) adds the spouses of the individual's brothers and sisters 
and the spouses of his lineal descendants. 
The rules of section 544 are also used, for the purposes of 
section 341(e), by means of a cross-reference in section 341(e)(10) 
to section 341(d). Unfortunately, section 341(e) also cross-refers 
to the rules of section 267(c) and blends these cross-references 
into a most confusing pattern. With extensive elaboration and 
refinement, section 341(e) excludes from ordinary-income treat-
ment any gain on the sale of stock of a collapsible corporation if 
the unrealized appreciation inherent in the assets of the corpora-
tion is below a specified amount. Under paragraph (1), however, 
this treatment is not available to a twenty percent shareholder if 
his stock is redeemed or sold to a person "related" to him within 
the meaning of paragraph (8). Paragraph (10) prescribes that for 
the purposes of section 341(e), including the twenty percent com-
putation, stock ownership shall be determined under section 
341(d), that is, under the rules of section 544(a). However, this 
provision is expressly inapplicable to the definition of a related 
person under paragraph (8). Paragraph (8) establishes its own, 
relatively narrow, relationship provisions pursuant to which an 
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individual shareholder is regarded as related only to his spouse, 
ancestors, lineal descendants, and a corporation in which he owns 
fifty percent of the stock based either upon voting power or 
value. 24~ To determine ownership of stock for these purposes, par-
agraph (8) cross-refers, not to section 544(a), but to section 267(c) 
and modifies the cross-reference to the section 267(c) definition 
of family by eliminating brothers and sisters.245 
The application of these very different rules of section 34l(e) 
to the same transaction can produce somewhat surprising results. 
For example, if an individual and his brother each owns fifteen 
percent of the stock of a collapsible corporation that otherwise 
satisfies the requirements for exemption from collapsible treat-
ment provided by section 341(e)(l), the individual will be re-
garded as a more than twenty percent shareholder of the corpora-
tion because of the attribution of the stock owned by his brother 
to hini as required by sections 341(e)(10), 341(d), and 544(a). 
Nevertheless, he is free to sell stock to his brother, avoiding ordi-
nary income treatment, since his brother is not regarded as re-
lated to him under sections 341(e)(8) and 267(c) as modified. 
E. Defining Relationships by Cross-References 
to Attribution Rules 
On a few occasions the Code has defined relationships among 
taxpayers by a cross-reference to attribution rules. Since, in gen-
eral, attribution may be made from a considerably broader circle 
of entities than would normally be regarded as related to the 
taxpayer, the effect of this use of attribution rules is to describe 
an unusually broad set of relationships. The impropriety of this 
244. If the shareholder is a corporation, it is regarded as related to its 
parent and its subsidiary, which relationship is established by the same 50% of 
voting power or value test, and to a sister corporation if more than 50% of the 
value only of the stock of the shareholder is owned by a person who also owns 
50% in value of the stock of the sister corporation. 
245. It is not at all clear why the draftsmen of section 341(e), which post-
dates section 341(d), adopted the attribution rules of section 267(c). These rules 
differ from the rules contained in section 544 in only two respects. First, both 
permit attribution directly from a partner, although section 267(c) requires as 
a condition to such attribution. that the individual to whom stock is being 
attributed otherwise owns stock in the corporation. Second, section 2671acks the 
option rule contained in section 544 and all other principal attribution sections 
of the Code. 
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device has long been recognized, 2 .. and the regulations attempt 
to remedy its worst defects. Unfortunately, different regulations 
attack different problems, leaving behind a pattern that is more 
confused than the statute alone. 
Sections 334(b)(2) and 382(a) both prescribe certain conse-
quences to the purchase of corporate stock under the conditions 
specified in those sections, and both exclude from the definition 
of purchase the acquisition of stock "from a person the ownership 
of whose stock would, under section 318(a), be attributed to the 
person acquiring such stock."u7 In common with most attribution 
rules, section 318 contains an option attribution rule. Taken liter-
ally; therefore, if the purchaser of stock first obtains a short-term 
option to purchase the stock, the later exercise of the option 
would not constitute a "purchase" under these sections since the 
stock would be acquired from a person whose stock would be 
attributed to the purchaser. Such a rule would not only eliminate 
from the definition of "purchase" a large number of arm's length 
sales between unrelated persons that clearly should be included 
within the substantive provisions of sections 334(b)(2) and 
382(a) but would also permit taxpayers to avoid "purchase" 
characterization at their election by arranging their acquisitions. 
In recognition of these objections, the regulations to section 334 
in effect ignore the existence of the option. 248 Unfortunately, a 
parallel provision is absent from the regulations to section 382. 
The use of section 318 to define the relationships used in 
these two sections eliminates what would be the most serious 
source of excessive breadth because atypically, under section 318, 
attribution is only made from a corporation to a fifty percent 
shareholder. Accordingly, the relationship so described conforms 
to the usual threshold requirement for relationship purposes. 
However, attribution is made to a partner with no threshold re-
quirement, which is inconsistent with the usual cross-reference to 
the fifty percent partner definition of section 707 (b) ( 1). The regu-
lations to the pre-1976 version of section 382(a) attacked this 
246. See, e.g., Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Standardi-
zation of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and 
"Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L. REV. 253, 278 (1960). 
247. I.R.C. § 334(b)(3)(C). The pre-1976 version of section 382(a) con-
tained a substantially identical provision in the prior section 382(a)(4). 
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.334-l(c)(6)(iii), T.D. 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176. 
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problem by ignoring the statutory language and excluding from 
the definition of purchase only the shares of stock that would be 
attributed to the purchaser immediately before the transaction in 
question.uu Under the regulations, therefore, if a partnership 
owns sixty shares of stock, all of which are purchased by a fifty 
percent partner, only the acquisition of thirty shares is excluded 
from the definition of purchase since only fifty percent of the 
partnership holdings would be attributable to the purchasing 
partner. 
Section 382(a) was considerably modified in the 1976 Act. 
While the basic structure of this relationship provision was not 
changed, the law was conformed to the proportional approach of 
the regulation.2511 The unsatisfactory effect of the cross-reference 
to section 318 cannot be remedied so easily. While the result now 
reached under section 382(a) may be superior to the prior ap-
proach, it is nevertheless totally unsound and inconsistent with 
the very concept of the relationship provisions. Taxpayers are 
either so closely related that their transactions should not be 
accorded the same treatment as transactions between unrelated 
taxpayers or they are not so related; it is illogical to assert that 
they are sufficiently related with respect to a portion of their 
holdings. 
The third example of this technique, the cross-reference to 
section 544 in section 341(d), has been described above. 251 Typi-
cally, under section 544, there are no threshold requirements for 
attribution from corporations to their stockholders, and thus 
under this provision a corporation is regarded as related to each 
owner of a single share of its stock-a patently absurd result. 
Unfortunately, the regulations to this section do not address any 
of the problems posed by the inordinate breadth of the described 
relationships. 252 
The opposite problem, the use of relationship provisions for 
attribution p·urposes, is more than just a question of improper 
cross-referencing; it is the substance of the device referred to 
herein as the aggregation form of attribution. The weaknesses in 
this drafting style are considered below. 253 
249. !d. § 1.382(a).l(e)(1), T.D. 6616, 1962-2 C.B. 106. 
250. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(e), 90 Stat. 1583. 
251. See text accompanying notes 231-32 supra. 
252. See Treas" Reg. § 1.341-4, T.D. 6738, 1964-2 C.B. 95. 
253. See Part XII infra. 
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XII. THE ULTIMATE IN ATTRIBUTION: SECTION 958 
One section of the Code that in part employs attribution by 
a modified cross-reference to section 318 and in part prescribes 
its own rules is deserving of more individualized attention than 
that given to other uses of attribution by cross-reference. Several 
of the particular rules either contained in section 958 itself or in 
the regulations thereto are unique although they are not uniquely 
required by the substantive law supplemented by these rules. If 
the approach of section 958 is meritorious, it should be applied 
elsewhere; if it is not, it should be eliminated from the Code 
altogether. In any event, from the perspective of sheer complex-
ity, section 958 is the ultimate in attribution. 
Sections 951 through 964, collectively referred to as Subpart 
F of the Code,154 set forth a complex series of rules designed to 
impose a current tax on certain classes of income earned abroad 
by foreign corporations that are controlled by "United States 
persons." The "controlled foreign corporations" subject to Sub-
part F are foreign corporations of which more than fifty percent 
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock is owned 
by United States shareholders. The effect of the application of 
Subpart F is to include a portion of the income actually earned 
by a controlled foreign corporation in the tax return of its United 
States shareholders. For these purposes, a United States share-
holder is a citizen or resident of the United States or a domestic 
corporation or other entity that owns ten percent or more of the 
combined voting power of the controlled foreign corporation. Sub-
part F requires a careful definition of stock ownership, and that 
definition is supplied by section 958. In addition, for the purposes 
of the substantive provisions of Subpart F, a distinction is drawn 
between United States persons and nonresident aliens or foreign 
corporations. This distinction is also reflected in the stock owner-
ship rules provided by section 958. 
Section 958 essentially prescribes two sets of attribution 
rules, one of general and one of limited scope, that overlap consid-
erably. Section 958(a) (2) prescribes a rule for attributing stock 
from entities to their owners that is similar in operation to the 
rule prescribed by section 267. Thus, the shareholders, partners, 
or beneficiaries are treated as owning proportionately the stock 
254. Actually, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part III, Subpart F. 
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held by the respective entities and there are no threshold require-
ments. Constructive ownership of stock under this rule is treated 
as actual ownership so that stock may be vertically reattributed 
indefinitely. However, the provision is only applicable when the 
entity from which stock is attributed is a foreign corporation, 
partnership, trust, or estate. Accordingly, once stock is attributed 
to a United States person pursuant to this provision, attribution 
ceases. For example, assume that domestic corporation A owns 
twenty percent of domestic corporation B, which owns sixty per-
cent of foreign corporation C, which owns twenty percent of for-
eign corporation D. Under this provision, domestic corporation B 
is regarded as owning twelve percent of foreign corporation D 
(sixty percent times twenty percent), but domestic corporation A 
is not regarded as owning any stock in either foreign corporation 
C or foreign corporation D. 
Section 958(b) adopts by cross-reference all of the attribution 
rules contained in section 318 but imposes a number of modifica-
tions. The fifty percent threshold requirement for the normal 
attribution of stock from a corporation to its shareholders is re-
duced to ten percent although the fifty percent threshold for 
back-attribution is not changed. Second, if an entity owns, di-
rectly or indirectly, more than fifty percent of the voting power 
of all outstanding stock in a corporation, it is regarded as owning 
all voting stock in the corporation for the purpose of the rules 
attributing stock owned by that entity to its owner. Thus, in the 
illustration used above, domestic corporation B, by virtue of its 
sixty percent ownership of foreign corporation C, would be re-
garded as owning one hundred percent of foreign corporation C 
and, therefore, would also be regarded as owning twenty percent 
(one hundred percent times twenty percent) of foreign corpora-
tion D. Domestic corporation A would be regarded as owning 
twenty percent (twenty percent times one hundred percent) of 
foreign corporation C and four percent (twenty percent times one 
hundred percent times twenty percent) of foreign corporation D. 
The family definition of section 318 is not modified for the 
purposes of section 958 except that in applying the family attribu-
tion rules, stock owned by a nonresident alien is not to be attrib-
uted to a citizen or resident even though the nonresident alien 
otherwise constitutes a member of the family of the United States 
individual. Thus, if United States citizen A has two brothers, B 
and C, and B is a resident alien but C is a nonresident alien, stock 
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owned by B may be attributed to A, but stock owned by C cannot 
be attributed to either A or B. Furthermore, the back-attribution 
rules of section 318(a)(3) may not be applied to treat a United 
States person as owning stock that is actually owned by an indi-
vidual or entity who is not a United States person. Thus, stock 
owned by nonresident aliens or foreign corporations or other for-
eign entities that are shareholders, partners, beneficiaries, or 
grantors of grantor trusts may not be attributed to the United 
States corporation, partnership, trust, or estate in which they 
have an interest. Stock owned by a non-United States family 
member or shareholder can, however, in some instances be attrib-
uted to a United States person. For example, the prohibition 
against attribution is not applicable to the option rule. Thus, if 
individual A held an option on stock owned by his nonresident 
alien brother C, such stock would be attributable to A. Of course, 
there is no limitation on the attribution of stock held by foreign 
entities to United States shareholders, partners, beneficiaries, 
and the grantors of grantor trusts. 
In contrast to the relatively brief and mechanical regulations 
appearing under other attribution sections of the Code, the regu-
lations to section 958 add considerably to the statutory provision. 
This elaboration is particularly extensive under the limited attri-
bution rule prescribed by section 958(a)(2) governing indirect 
ownership through foreign entities. Section 1.958-l(c)(2) of the 
regulations asserts that attribution under this rule is not a mere 
mechanical exercise but rather is to be made in light of "all of 
the facts and circumstances in each case" and, in particular, the 
purpose for which attribution is being made. It will be recalled 
that all of the attribution rules discussed above attribute stock 
from entities to their owners in accordance with the value of such 
owner's interest in the entity (or in the stock being attributed). 
Accordingly, a proportionate share of voting stock owned, for ex-
ample, by a corporation or partnership will be attributed to the 
holder of nonvoting preferred stock or to a limited partner. The 
regulations to section 958, interpreting substantially identical 
statutory language, take a different tack. 
Section 951(a), to which the attribution rules of section 958 
are applicable, prescribes the amount of income of a controlled 
foreign corporation includable in the income of a United States 
shareholder. The regulations provide that in applying section 
958(a)(2), for the purpose of this provision, a person's proportion-
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ate interest in a foreign corporation will be his proportionate in-
terest in the income of the corporation and not his proportionate 
interest in value of all outstanding stock or voting power. 255 On 
the other hand, the definitions of a United States shareholder and 
of a controlled foreign corporation are in terms of the ownership 
of a proportion of the voting power of the controlled foreign corpo-
ration. The regulations to section 958 provide that when section 
958(a) (2) is applied, for the purpose of these sections, an individ-
ual's proportionate interest is to be determined by reference to his 
interest in the voting power of the corporation.15' It would appear 
to follow that an individual's interest in a controlled foreign cor-
poration for the purposes of determining whether he is a United 
States shareholder may be different from his interest in the corpo-
ration for the purpose of determining the amount of its income 
to be included on his tax return. 157 
With respect to trusts and estates, the regulations adopt the 
more refined rule of attribution employed by section 1563: stock 
is attributed to a beneficiary with respect to the beneficiary's 
interest in the stock, not with respect to his interest in the trust 
or estate. Thus, example (4) of section 1.958-l{d) provides that if 
pursuant to the terms of a will governing a foreign estate, stock 
in a foreign corporation is specifically bequeathed to a United 
States individual, he will be considered the owner of the entire 
amount of such stock, and the other beneficiaries of the estate 
will not be regarded as owning any of such stock. 
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.958-l(c)(2) (1966). 
256. ld. 
257. For example, assume that foreign corporation F has two classes of 
stock with an equal number of shares of each class outstanding. The classes are 
identical in all respects except that one class possesses all of the voting power 
in the corporation. Assume further that foreign corporation F owns 60% of the 
single class of stock of foreign corporationS. If domestic corporation Downs 30% 
of the outstanding voting stock of foreign corporation F, it will be regarded under 
the interpretation of section 958(a)(2) contained in the regulations as owning 
18% (30% x 60%) of foreign corporation F for the purpose of determining whether 
domestic corporation D constitutes a United States shareholder of foreign corpo-
ration S by virtue of its ownership of over 10 percent of the voting control of 
foreign corporation S. On the other hand, domestic corporation D will be re-
garded as owning only 9% (30% x 50% x 60%) of the income of foreign corpora-
tionS for the purpose of determining the amount of Subpart F income of foreign 
corporationS upon which domestic corporation D will be taxable (assuming that 
foreign corporation S constitutes a controlled foreign corporation because of 
other United States ownership of its stock). 
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The tax avoidance possibilities in the regulatory interpreta-
tion to section 958(a)(2) are obvious and were not overlooked by 
the Treasury. The regulations indicate that the "facts and cir-
cumstances" test may be a one-way street in favor of the collec-
tion of tax since they specifically state that an arrangement that 
"artificially" decreases a United States· person's proportionate 
interest in the foreign entity will not be recognized. For example, 
assume that United States corporation A is the sole limited part-
ner of foreign partnership P, which in turn owns one hundred 
percent of the only class of stock outstanding of foreign corpora-
tion B. Assume further that ninety percent of the income of the 
partnership was attributable to the limited partner and that pur-
suant to the partnership agreement, the partnership could be 
dissolved at any time without delay by the limited partner. 
Applying the regulatory interpretation of section 958(a)(2) liter-
ally, while ninety percent of the Subpart F income of foreign 
corporation B would be attributable to domestic corporation A, 
domestic corporation A would not constitute a United States 
shareholder nor would foreign corporation B constitute a con-
trolled foreign corporation because of the absence of voting con-
trol. Accordingly, Subpart F would be inapplicable and domestic 
corporation A would not be subject to taxation with respect to the 
income of foreign corporation B. Nevertheless, in such circum-
stances, it may be assumed that the Internal Revenue Service 
would seek to invoke the qualification in the regulations and treat 
domestic corporation A as constructively owning over fifty per-
cent of the voting stock of foreign corporation B. u8 
The regulatory refinement of the attribution rules contained 
in section 958(a)(2) is not applicable to the adaptation of section 
318 incorporated in subsection 958(b). Presumably, therefore, 
stock is attributed in accordance with the regulations to section 
318 subject to the statutory modifications of section 958(b)(l) 
through (4). Thus, attribution from a corporation to its share-
holders under section 958(b) is strictly in proportion to the value 
of the stock owned by the stockholder, and attribution from trusts 
is solely in proportion to the beneficiary's actuarial interest in the 
trust.:z:;' Accordingly, the process of determining stock ownership 
258. See also Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974); Gar-
lock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973). 
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.958-2(c)(l)(ii) (1966). 
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under section 958 requires the computation of constructive own-
ership pursuant to two entirely different sets of rules. As might 
be expected, the regulations provide that the Service will apply 
whichever of the two attribution rules, section 958(a) or section 
958(b), that would result in the attribution of the largest amount 
of stock to United States shareholders. 280 Generally, the adapta-
tion of section 318 used in section 958(b) will result in the greatest 
attribution unless such attribution is prohibited by a failure to 
meet the threshold requirements of those provisions. 261 
While the cross-reference to section 318 naturally includes 
the operating rules of that section for the purposes of reattribu-
tion, there are no operating rules in section 958(b) itself with 
respect to its modifications of section 318. The two provisions 
barring the attribution of stock owned by a non-United States 
person to a United States person pose few questions because if 
stock actually owned by the foreigner cannot be so attributed, 
obviously stock constructively owned by the foreigner cannot be 
so attributed. However, a question could arise with respect to 
stock actually owned by a United States person that might be 
attributed to another United States person through a foreign indi-
vidual or entity. 
A more difficult question arises under the provision deeming 
a stockholder that "owns, directly or indirectly" more than fifty 
percent of the voting power of the stock of a corporation to be the 
owner of all of such voting stock. 2' 2 The regulations, perhaps de-
liberately, do not indicate whether stock attributed to the stock-
holder may be aggregated with stock actually owned by him for 
the purpose of determining whether the fifty percent threshold 
requirement has been met. 283 The regulations to section 318, in 
interpreting the fifty percent threshold requirement of that sec-
tion, require that stock constructively owned by the shareholder 
be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the 
threshold requirement has been met. 284 It is unfortunate that the 
regulations to section 958 do not disclose the views of the Treas-
260. ld. § 1.958-2(!)(2) (1966). 
261. The "facts and circumstances" test of section 958(a) can produce a 
different result when two classes of ownership are involved. 
262. I.R.C. § 958(b)(2). 
263. See Treas. Reg. § 1.958·2(c) (2} (1966). 
264. ld. § 1.318-l(b)(3), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 131. 
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ury with respect to this fifty percent threshold requirement since 
it is not clear that the same rule should be applied. The effect of 
this special rule in section 958(b), which is not mirrored by any 
other section of the Code, is severe. The provision can only be 
justified by the analysis that fifty percent voting control' of a 
corporation in practice permits complete domination of its af-
fairs. Thus, in the context of attributing stock in a subsidiary of 
such a corporation to the stockholder, the analysis must be that 
such attribution should not be diluted by the existence of ineffec-
tual minority ownership. It is not clear that stock of the parent 
corporation attributed to the stockholder, the voting of which he 
does not in fact control, should be taken into account in deter-
mining that there is such a complete domination of the parent by 
the stockholder that the stockholder should be regarded as own-
ing all of the subsidiary's stock. Nevertheless, it is probable that 
the Internal Revenue Service, should the question arise, would 
seek to interpret the word "indirectly" in section 958(b)(2) in the 
same manner as it interprets the same language used for a similar 
purpose in section 318.265 
Xffi. THE AGGREGATION FORM OF ATTRIBUTION 
It has been repeatedly observed that the Code employs two 
distinct forms of attribution, the traditional form and what has 
been referred to herein as aggregation, and that the aggregation 
form is becoming increasingly popular with the draftsmen of tax 
legislation. Conceptually, the aggregation form is appealing; but 
as thus far reduced to statutory expression, it is not. Traditional 
attribution is authoritarian: it assumes a single source of wealth 
and· the diffusion of that wealth, -presumably for tax avoidance 
purposes, throughout the members of a family and into various 
entities dominated by them. The traditional attribution rules 
constructively reverse the process and treat that wealth as again 
concentrated in its source. The aggregation form is more demo-
cratic and perhaps more contemporary in outlook. It discards the 
concept of a single dominant figure and assumes instead a com-
munity of interest among a number of economically related tax-
payers. Rather than focusing on the largely artificial relationship 
between the reconstructed dominant figure and a business entity, 
265. See text accompanying note 173 supra. 
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the substantive law is addressed to the relationship between the 
entity and the economic group as a whole. 
The flaw in the seemingly more realistic aggregation ap-
proach lies in the assumption that an economic community of 
interest among a diversity of entities can clearly be defined. For 
the purposes of the traditional relationship provisions, such a 
community of interest is defined because it must be defined; 
taxpayers are either so closely related that their transactions 
should be accorded exceptional treatment or they are not so re-
lated.2118 There is an obvious arbitrariness in the definition of fam-
ily and in the establishment of the threshold ownership require-
ments, but the arbitrariness is tolerated because of the necessity 
of definition. 
On the other hand, when the focus shifts from the definition 
of the primary relationship to the determination of whether that 
relationship exists, that is, to the definition of the secondary rela-
tionship, the traditional attribution rules have permitted far 
greater flexibility. A partner, for example, need not be treated as 
the owner of either all or none of the stock owned by his partner-
ship. Instead, the partner may be treated as the owner of only the 
proportion of its holdings that corresponds to his interest in the 
partnership. It is this flexibility that the aggregation form of attri-
bution eliminates. As a result, this newer form of attribution 
produces a less realistic result than the traditional approach. 
A second difficulty with the aggregation approach as it has 
been drafted lies in the definition of the aggregate-those taxpay-
ers having the requisite community of interest. Not surprisingly, 
the draftsmen of both sections 613A and 48(k) turned to the tradi-
tional relationship provisions for this definition. The inadequa-
cies of those provisions become aggravated when they are used for 
attribution purposes. 
The operation of the aggregation form can best be understood 
by examining section 48(k). The section itself is of only minor 
interest since it constitutes an elective alternative for the compu-
266. Such has been the virtually uniform treatment of relationship provi-
sions under the Code, including the aggregation provisions. A proportional ap-
proach to the relationship provisions is not logically impossible, but it presents 
a variety of problems that have not to date been given thoughtful attention. For 
one such relationship provision under the Code and some of the problems it 
raises, see text accompanying notes 99-103 supra. 
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tation of the useful life of motion picture films and video tapes 
for investment tax credit purposes. However, the aggregation 
form of attribution used in the section is an expanded version of 
the form first used in section 613A, and it seems probable that 
any future use of this form will be patterned on section 48(k). 
The objective of section 48(k) is to define a controlled group 
of business entities for the purpose of requiring a uniform election 
by all such entities. The traditional approach to this objective is 
represented by the cross-reference to section 1563(a) in sections 
414 and 52. 281 Section 48(k), however, defines the primary rela-
tionship as the ownership of a fifty percent or greater interest in 
each potentially related entity by the "same or related persons." 
Persons are related if they are within the relationships described 
in sections 267(b) or 707(b)(l) or if they are members of a section 
1563(a) controlled group.ze8 Finally, the holdings of a related per-
son are not counted towards the required fifty percent unless the 
person owns at least ten percent of the interest in the business 
entity. 
When the cross-referenced relationship provision does not 
contain a threshold limitation, as in the case of a trust and its 
beneficiaries under section 267(b)(6), the section 48(k) aggrega-
tion approach will cause far more tangentially related entities to 
be regarded as under common control than would the traditional 
approach. Thus, under section 48(k) the entire stock holdings of 
a trust in a business corporation will be aggregated with the 
stockholdings of a beneficiary of the trust even though the benefi-
ciary's interest in the trust may be less than one percent. If the 
beneficiary and the trust each owned thirty percent of the out-
standing stock of the corporation, the corporation would be re-
garded as controlled under the aggregation approach since related 
persons own over fifty percent of its stock. Under the traditional 
proportional attribution approach, the beneficiary would be re-
garded as owning only one percent of the trust's thirty percent 
interest, and therefore the beneficiary would not be regarded as 
controlling the corporation. 
On the other hand, when the cross-referenced relationship 
provision contains threshold requirements, the "all or nothing" 
267. See text preceding note 212 supra. 
268. I.R.C. § 48(k)(3)(D). Both cross-references are slightly modified. 
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aspect of the aggregation approach will produce results that are 
either more or less restrictive than those produced by traditional 
attribution. Thus, while under section 48(k) the holdings of a 
trust are aggregated with the holdings of any beneficiary, none of 
the holdings of a corporation are aggregated with the holdings of 
an owner of forty-nine percent of its stock. All of its holdings, of 
course, are aggregated with the holdings of an owner of fifty-one 
percent of its stock.289 
These rather dubious results are inherent in the use of rela-
tionship concepts for attribution purposes and would not be al-
tered by changes in the definition of a related person (although 
the thresholds used in the definition might be changed). In addi-
tion, the cross-references in both section 48(k) and section 613A 
to the existing Code relationship provisions have created further 
irrationalities. Most prominently, the list of types of taxpayers 
included in the cross-referenced relationship provisions is less 
complete than are the lists of taxpayers from whom traditional 
attribution is made. Thus, section 267(b) does not include any 
reference to estates or to partnerships although attribution is 
made from both such entities under section 267(c). With respect 
to partnerships, this omission is partially corrected by the further 
cross-reference in section 48(k) to section 707(b), which defines 
269. As a further illustration, assume that an individual owns over 50% 
of corporation A and the question if whether corporation B is related to corpora-
tion A. The corporations will be related if 50% of the stock in B is owned by the 
individual or a corporation 50% owned by the individual (because under section 
267(b)(2) such a corporation would be related to the individual). Assume that 
the individual owns 40% of corporation B and 40% of corporation X and that 
corporation X owns the remaining 60% of B. Since the individual is not related 
to corporation X, corporations A and Bare not related. If the normal attribution 
rules applied and the individual were regarded as owning a proportionate share 
of the stock owned by corporation X, he would be regarded as constructively 
owning 24% of corporation B by attribution from corporation X, which when 
added to his actual 40% results in a deemed 64% ownership of corporation Band 
thus corporations A and B would be regarded as related. Now assume that the 
individual owns 60% of corporation X, which owns 20% of corporation B. Since 
the individual is now related to corporation X, their 40% and 20% is combined 
to cause corporation B to be under common control with corporation A. Under 
proportional attribution, however, the individual would now only be regarded 
as constructively owning 18% of corporation B in addition to this actual 40%, 
or 6% less than in the first example. The problem, of course, is that the threshold 
requirements used in the relationship provisions make those provisions inappro-
priate for use as attribution provisions. 
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relationships between a partner and a partnership. But the sepa-
rate references to sections 267 and 707 do not result in defining a 
relationship between a partnership and any other entity. Noth-
ing, however, rectifies the omission of estates. Thus, for example, 
if two business entities subject to section 48(k) were owned, one 
by a husband and one by a wife, they would be regarded as 
related, but upon the death of the husband they would no longer 
be related since estates are not included in the section 267(b) list 
of related taxpayers-even if the wife were the sole beneficiary of 
the estate. 270 Under the traditional attribution rules, of course, 
the wife would be regarded as owning the interest held by the 
estate and the businesses would continue to be regarded as re-
lated. It is unclear why this omission has been tolerated in section 
267, but it should not be tolerated under 48(k). 271 
There is a question as to the purpose served by excluding 
from the category of related persons the owners of less than ten 
percent of the interests in a business enterprise. In fact, it is not 
altogether clear how the exclusion is to be applied. For example, 
if an individual owns a twelve percent interest in business A and 
a seven percent interest in business B, it is questionable whether 
his ownership in business A is to be counted or whether he must 
own a ten percent interest in both entities. If his interest in busi-
ness A is counted, it is also unclear whether he then qualifies as 
a related person for all purposes so that his interest in business 
B can also be counted. 
Aside from these ambiguities, the ten percent exclusion su-
perficially resembles the threshold requirements for attribution 
that the traditional provisions employ to restrict the otherwise 
excessive breadth of attribution-such as the condition for attri-
bution from trusts under section 1563(e) that the beneficiary own 
a five percent interest in the trust. These provisions, however, 
270. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
271. A further difficulty with the aggregation form is that it only describes 
horizontal or brother-sister relationships among business entities and does not 
specifically describe vertical or parent-subsidiary relationships. Rather, the 
application of these provisions to such relationships must be determined indi-
rectly. For example, assume that an individual owns 100% of trust A, which in 
turn owns 100% of trust B. Trust A and trust B are related business entities, 
not because trust A owns all of trust B, but because the individual and trust A 
are related within the meaning of section 267 and the individual owns in excess 
of 50% of trust A and trust A owns in excess of 50% of trust B. 
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serve an entirely different purpose. Under the section 1563 type 
restriction, regardless of the extent of the interest of the trust in 
a corporation, its holdings will not be attributed to a beneficiary 
unless the relationship between the trust and the beneficiary is 
large enough (in excess of five percent) to warrant that result. 
Under section 48(k), regardless of how closely related the trust is 
to the beneficiary, the trust's holdings are disregarded if they fall 
below ten percent. Indeed, it appears that under the section 48(k) 
approach, a business entity will never be regarded as controlled 
if the ownership of the business is spread equally among eleven 
or more persons, regardless of how closely related those persons 
may be-which is exactly the tax avoidance technique that the 
attribution rules were created to prevent. A de minimis rule 
might be sensible but only if the ten percent computation were 
made after the application of appropriate attribution rules. Such 
traditional rules, however, are not applied by section 48(k) for 
this purpose. Unless the regulations can construe this ten percent 
limitation differently, it opens an easy path to avoiding the re-
lated business entity provision of section 48(k). · 
If, on balance, the aggregation form possesses any advan-
tages over traditional attribution, they are not evident. Even 
worse than the use of aggregation alone, however, is the possibil-
ity of combining the two approaches and creating a hybrid form 
of attribution. Presently, only section 447 employs such a provi-
sion. The aggregation is limited to members of the family, and 
stock is traditionally attributed to the family from entities in 
which they have an interest. 272 The resulting inadequacies of that 
section have been detailed elsewhere. 273 Here it is sufficient to 
observe that once the established form is abandoned, the possible 
alternatives, and the ensuing complexity of the Code, are Vlf-
tually without limit. 
272. I.R.C. § 447(d)( 1 )-(3). As noted above, it vastly oversimplifies section 
447 to characterize it as using traditional attribution rules. Estates of deceased 
family members are treated as members of the family rather than as entities, 
and estates of nonfamily members are ignored even if a family member is a 
beneficiary. While attribution from trusts and partnerships is in the traditional 
mold, attribution from corporations is unique in that stock is attributed to the 
members of the family as a group if they own in the aggregate 50% or more in 
value of the stock of the corporation from which attribution is to be made. 
273. See text accompanying notes 147 & 180 supra. 
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XIV. ToWARD UNIFORM RuLES 
By this point, it should be obvious that the relationship and 
attribution rules used throughout the Code are badly in need of 
repair. The rules range from the grossly inadequate to the exces-
sive, and at all times are inconsistent and frequently imprecise. 
It is not difficult to see how the Code reached such a state. The 
earliest relationship and attribution rules were incorporated into 
the Code during a simpler era and at a time when social and 
business relationships differed from those prevailing today. These 
early rules were primitive in design and were expanded on an ad 
hoc basis through efforts to eliminate specific abuses. At no time 
were these early rules the subject of a rational investigation de-
signed to produce comprehensive rules appropriate in· scope. Oc-
casionally, these initial rules were adopted for use in other sec-
tions, again with modifications that seemed appropriate at the 
time. 
The decision to add attribution rules applicable to the corpo-
rate adjustment provisions in 1954 occasioned the adoption of an 
entirely new set of attribution rules that corrected many of the 
faults of the earlier provisions. However, no attempt was made 
to revise the earlier provisions. In turn, several of the decisions 
contained in section 318 proved to be unsatisfactory and were 
extensively criticized, principally by an American Law Institute 
(ALI) study. 274 While section 318 was thereafter modified to elimi-
nate sidewise attribution, perhaps the most serious defect, the 
provision has never been comprehensively modified. However, 
section 1563, enacted several years later, substantially adopted 
the AU recommendations. Thus, the Code attribution and rela-
tionship rules have been subject to a generation of fine tuning, 
but almost without exception the result has been the addition of 
new improved models without a revision of prior efforts; and in 
some instances, the new models were far from improved. 
In addition to the inconsistency inherent in the statute, the 
Treasury regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions in this area 
all have injected further inconsistency and confusion as efforts 
were made to fill perceived gaps in the statutory scheme. Thus, 
identical statutory wording in different attribution rules may 
274. ALI REPORT ON INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 548 (Oct. 31, 1958) [hereinafter referred to as ALl REPORT]. 
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have different meanings, and in some instances the same lan-
guage in the same attribution rule may have different meanings 
depending upon the substantive section applying the rules. 
It is clear that, in spite of the ronsiderable diversity among 
these provisions that presently ei~ts, a substantial uniformity 
could be achieved with little sacrifice of the individual policies 
contained in the affected substantive provisions. Twenty years 
ago the American Law Institute determined that substantial uni-
formity could be achieved, although the task becomes more diffi-
cult each year as additional relationship and attribution rules are 
adopted, modified, and referred to throughout the Code.m Never-
theless, it does not appear that uniformity has not been achieved 
because of the inherent impossibility of the task but rather be-
cause of the natural disinclination of the legislative process to 
replow old ground. 
Given the sheer number and diversity of the affinity provi-
sions and the variety of ways that they are used throughout the 
Code, the task of drafting acceptable uniform rules is considera-
ble. Clearly, it would be presumptuous to attempt such a draft 
here. It is possible, however, to distill some general notions or 
principles that would be of assistance should Congress wish to 
undertake such an effort. 
If the goal were to achieve a perfectly drafted Internal Reve-
nue Code, theoretically it would be necessary to identify the pur-
pose underlying each of the relationship provisions established by 
the various sections of the Code. Then each relationship provision 
and its accompanying attribution rules could be tailored precisely 
to that policy. Quite likely, the enormity of such a task would 
discourage any general revision of these provisions. However, 
practical obstacles to such a complete overhaul do not mean that 
substantial improvement could not be achieved by undertaking 
a far more modest investigation. 
The relationship provisions generally may be classified into 
a comparatively small number of categories. Several sections of 
the Code that grant a specific benefit require that one such bene-
fit be shared by two or more taxpayers. Examples of such sections 
include the ceiling on the investment tax credit for used property 
in section 48(c), the floor on taxable items of tax preference in 
275. /d. at 487. 
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section 58, and the independent producers allowance for percen-
tage depletion in section 613A(c)(8). Because these provisions 
directly conflict with the individualistic orientation of our tax 
laws, the relationship provisions established by these sections 
have always been highly limited. With one exception, these rela-
tionships extend only to husbands and wives and to controlled 
groups of corporations within the meaning of section 1563. The 
one exception is the recently adopted section 613A in which the 
draftsmen, encouraged by the successful attack on oil depletion, 
required that a husband and wife share their allowable produc-
tion with their minor children. It is doubtful that minor children 
should be deprived of their own entitlement to percentage deple-
tion any more than they should be deprived, for example, of their 
own untaxed items of tax preference. In both instances, it is 
equally likely that their ownership of the property in question is 
derived from their parents and subject to their control. Regard-
less of whether it is now the view of Congress that such tax bene-
fits should be shared by the entire family unit or only by the 
parents, there would not appear to be any valid reasons for distin-
guishing among these situations. 
With respect to controlled corporations subject to such single 
benefit provisions, there is similarily a difference between adopt-
ing the section 1563(a) definition intact and modifying it by re-
ducing the ownership requirement from eighty percent to fifty 
percent. Thus, a fifty percent controlled group must share the 
maximum investment tax credit on used property, but each 
member is entitled to his own floor on items of tax preference 
unless the eighty percent test is met. Similarly, the eighty percent 
test is applicable to the sharing of the work incentive program 
credit provided by section 50A, but the fifty percent limitation is 
applicable to the percentage depletion allowance. There appears 
to be no rationality behind these varying treatments, and with no 
loss of equity, Congress could adopt a uniform single benefit rela-
tionship definition. It does appear, however, that the sections 
using these relatively narrow relationships are in a separate cate-
gory and should not be broadened by a cross-reference to a gen-
eral relationship provision. 
A second category of relationships that would appear to war-
rant special treatment are relationships that are not established 
in connection with a revenue producing or protecting provision of 
the Code but rather stem from essentially regulatory provisions, 
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particularly the supervisory functions recently imposed upon the 
Internal Revenue Service. These sections include the several 
prohibited-transaction provisions, such as those applicable to 
private foundations and qualified pension trusts.276 Such sections 
are designed to control conduct that may be beneficial to all 
parties concerned (except the charity or pension trust). Thus, it 
would appear appropriate to adopt an expanded definition of 
relationships for the purposes of these sections. 
The balance of the relationship provisions fall in two princi-
pal categories. While quite different in their operation, both cate-
gories generally reflect similar policy limitations and thus could 
appropriately be of similar scope. 217 These provisions either im-
pute a status or activity of one taxpayer to another or treat trans-
actions between related taxpayers differently from the manner in 
which such transactions are treated for tax purposes when they 
occur between wholly unrelated taxpayers, typically either by 
ignoring the transaction or by imposing a higher tax· burden on 
its consummation. The imputation sections may be illustrated by 
section 103(b), which in effect taxes what would otherwise be 
exempt interest attributable to an industrial revenue bond if the 
holder of the bond is either a user of the facilities financed 
through the issuance of the bond or a person related to the 
holder-thus imputing the use of the facilities to the holder of the 
bond. In the absence of such a provision, the user of the facility 
would be entitled to a full income tax deduction for amounts paid 
in the nature of interest with respect to the bonds, which interest 
(upon receipt by him) would be free of tax..218 
276. I.R.C. §§ 503(b), 4946(a), 4975(e). 
277. Excluded from consideration here are (1) the 80% control require-
ment specified by section 368(c) for a variety of corporate adjustment purposes, 
which constitutes a problem distinct from that considered herein, and (2) a 
small number of special purpose sections that only involve particular categories 
of relationships and thus must be considered separately on their individual 
merits. An example of the latter is contained in section 4942, which restricts the 
ability of a private foundation to make grants to a public charity that is 
"controlled (directly or indirectly)" by the private foundation or by disqualified 
persons with respect to the private foundation. 
278. Similarly, section 1237 was designed to allow limited sales of real 
property to be eligible for capital gains taxation without regard to the case law 
definition of a dealer, a definition that had developed along somewhat vague but 
quite restrictive lines. Among other requirements, the property subject to this 
19781 AFFINITY PROVISIONS 679 
The provisions affecting transactions among related taxpay-
ers are the most common form of relationship provisions and do 
not require extended illustration. Several sections exclude acqui-
sitions from related persons from the definition of purchase, ei-
ther for the purpose of barring a credit with respect to the pur-
chase (the residence credit provided by section 44), barring a 
depreciation advantage (first-year depreciation under section 
179), or permitting a step-up in tax basis (the step-up received 
in a liquidation subject to section 334(b)(2)). Section 1235 prohib-
its capital gain taxation on the sale of certain patents to a related 
person, and section 1239 taxes gain on the sale of depreciable 
property between related taxpayers as ordinary income. 
All of these sections assume that the taxpayers within the 
prescribed relationship have a sufficient identity of economic in-
terest, and perhaps also a measure of mutual control, that trans-
actions between them could be manufactured or modified in an 
unbusinesslike manner in order to obtain or increase tax benefits. 
Even absent deliberate tax avoidance, such parties are so related 
that a transfer of property from one to another does not amount 
to a sufficiently complete disposition to occasion the imposition 
of the normal tax consequences. A rational approach to unifying 
the affinity rules could quite properly begin with the presumption 
that the identity of economic interest and control required for 
each of these sections is the same or at least so nearly the same 
that each such section could be revised to cross-refer to the same 
relationship definition. If upon close scrutiny of each substantive 
provision it appeared to Congress that the tax reduction device 
being attacked was relatively easier or more difficult to accom-
plish or would have more serious consequences if accomplished, 
modifications of the cross-reference could be made within the 
substantive section-a practice too common under the existing 
Code. However, the presumption should be to the contrary, and 
each section should at least begin with the same cross-reference. 
Certainly, there does not appear to be any obvious reason 
that a taxpayer would trust his brother with depreciated stock 
over which he did not wish to lose control any more than he would 
provision may not have been substantially improved by either the taxpayer or 
a person related to him within the special definition of related person provided 
by that section. 
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be willing to trust him with his patents, although section 267 
would deny a loss on the stock while section 1235 permits capital 
gain treatment on the patent sale. On the other hand, if the 
taxpayer sold these properties to a thirty-five percent owned cor-
poration, for some reason the loss would be allowed but capital 
gain treatment denied. It is unclear why borrowing from one's 
brother is treated as a sham for purposes of section 465 while the 
purchase of property for purposes of section 179 is not. Nor is it 
clear why provisions designed to prevent the conversion of ordi-
nary income into capital gain should be highly limited when sales 
of depreciable property under section 1239 are involved, subject 
to unique rules when iron ore is involved under section 631(c) or 
subject to unusually broad rules under sections 306 and 341(e). 
Although the primary relationships that involve entities are 
subject to enlargement through the attribution rules to ensure a 
proper scope of the substantive law, the relationship provisions 
should be drafted wholly without regard to this effect. The rela-
tionship provisions establish the minimum connection appropri-
ate for substantive law purposes and therefore must be given a 
sufficiently broad reach to ensure that in the absence of any attri-
bution all appropriate relationships among entities will become 
subject to the substantive law. Presumably, the starting point for 
a uniform relationship rule would be section 267, which contains 
the most comprehensive list of relationships in the Code. 
Section 267(b), however, is seriously defective in a number 
of respects. The definition of family contained in that provision 
should be modified to conform to the more recent Congressional 
decisions with respect to the scope of an individual's family for 
relationship purposes. Most of the recent cross-references to the 
section 267 family definition, as well as most special definitions, 
have excluded brothers and sisters, presumably on the premise 
that an individual's economic· relationship with his siblings is not 
sufficiently close to justify inclusion of the relationship. Natu-
rally, there are individual circumstances inconsistent with that 
assumption, and there may be cases in which Congress would 
seek to employ a broader family definition in order to achieve a 
greater assurance that a particular tax reduction device cannot 
be used. However, for general purposes, it is believed that the 
definition of family should exclude brothers and sisters. 
Perhaps more as a matter of style than substance, a revised 
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section 267 should refer to children and grandchildren and par-
ents and grandparentsm rather than to lineal descendants and 
ancestors. In the relatively rare circumstances in which more 
remote generations are in existence, it is unreasonable to conclu. 
sively presume a sufficiently close identity of interest to justify 
inclusion in the relationship. While there has been considerable 
diversity in treatment in the more recent attribution provisions 
of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, and even of the 
parent-adult child relationship, the identity of interest among 
such persons is sufficiently close to be included in a general rela-
tionship section. 
Naturally, an individual's spouse should be included within 
the relationship. However, the exception contained in section 
1563 for spouses under an interlocutory or final decree of divorce 
or separate maintenance does seem appropriate. With the appar· 
ently increasing popularity of cohabitation by unmarried coup-
les, precision might require an extension of the concept of 
common-law marriage, but the difficulties of definition and the 
relatively small number of financial transactions involving such 
relationships would militate against such a revision. 
A second defect in section 267 is its omission of estates. With-
out question, an estate should be treated in exactly the same 
manner as a trust under the relationship provisions. 
The relationship between persons and exempt organizations 
establi~hed under section 267 is largely obsolete and since 1969 
279. The ALI criticism of section 318 concluded that grandparents should 
be returned to the family, and that was done in section 1563. The premise for 
this decision was that a grandchild had a reasonable expectation through inheri-
tance of obtaining an interest in stock owned by the grandparent and that 
accordingly this relationship should be included. ALl REPORT, supra note 274, 
at 471. There may, however, be an inconsistency in this decision with the exclu-
sion of brothers and sisters for it is probable that holdings of a grandparent will 
be divided between two generations, and it may more properly be said that an 
individual may reasonably expect to acquire an actual interest in only a minor 
fraction of such stock, perhaps less than 20% of such stock in a normal family. 
Since an individual is not deemed to have a sufficiently close relationship to his 
brothers and sisters and, a fortiori to his cousins, the factual basis for attributing 
all of such holdings to the grandchild is weak. It would certainly be unduly 
complex to attribute only a fraction of such stock computed on the basis of the 
number of grandchildren who may be presumed to have an expectation of inher-
itance from the grandparent, and thus the choice is between full attribution or 
none at all. Given this choice, the ALI conclusion seems to be better. 
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has had little effect except with respect to noncharitable exempt 
organizations. Rather than suggest the creation of a complex set 
of rules applicable to all exempt organizations, similar to those 
currently applicable to private foundations, it would seem appro-
priate to retain this relationship in substantially its present form. 
However, to the extent that this provision is currently applicable 
to private foundations, it is redundant, and such charities should 
be removed from its scope. 
Trusts have been treated in section 267(b) in the same man-
ner as members of a family rather than as separate entities, as 
corporations are treated. Thus, any quantum of interest in a trust 
is assumed to be sufficient to justify including the trust-
beneficiary relationship, while a shareholder is only regarded as 
related to a corporation in which he owns, actually or construc-
tively, a certain threshold interest. Frequently, however, a benefi-
ciary does not own even a significant portion of the assets of a 
trust, and the identity of interest of a minor beneficiary with a 
trust cannot be assumed. The absence of a threshold requirement 
can only be justified if it is assumed that other individuals related 
to the beneficiary own the major portion of the assets of a trust. 
The factual basis of this assumption would be significantly 
eroded if brothers and sisters are deleted from the definition of 
family for relationship purposes. Even in the absence of such a 
deletion, there is no justification for making such an assumption 
rather than referring to the actual factual circumstances, as is 
done with corporations and, under section 707(b), with partner-
ships. In fact, the more recent efforts toward an all-inclusive rela-
tionship provision in sections 414 and 52 have treated trusts in 
the same manner as other entities. 
It seems preferable to treat all entities that may have more 
than one beneficial owner in the same manner. Thus, the pre-
scribed relationship should not exist unless, after the application 
of appropriate attribution rules, an individual is regarded as own-
ing at least fifty percent of the trust. The added complexity of this 
approach is slight and well justified by the greater precision it 
achieves. For example, under present section 267, if an individual 
only owns one percent of a trust and the balance is owned by 
individuals outside the section 267 family (for example, aunts 
and uncles), the individual's transactions with the trust are pro-
scribed. However, since transactions directly between the indi-
vidual and the other trust beneficiaries would not be proscribed, 
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his transactions with such a trust should also be permissible. 
Under the rule here suggested, a taxpayer may to some extent 
avoid the proscription against dealing with members of his fam-
ily. However, since unrelated persons must by definition possess 
at least fifty percent of the value of the trust, in most instances 
the trust would be sufficiently independent of the individual to 
bar manipulative transactions. Furthermore, the situation pre-
sented is no different from that now generally prevailing for 
closely held corporations. 
The problem of defining the extent of a beneficiary's rela-
tionship to a trust or estate does not presently arise under section 
267. However, the problem would arise if the modification sug-
gested here is adopted. Since it is necessary to quantify a benefi-
ciary's interest in trusts and estates for the purpose of the attribu-
tion rules, no additional complexity is presented by the need to 
quantify such interests for relationship purposes-provided, of 
course, that the same computation is employed. As has been seen, 
the Steuben Securities rule is probably no longer applicable to 
trusts under any provision but seems to be applicable to estates 
under section 318. The consensus in favor of the all-encompassing 
actuarial approach is clear, and that measure should be used in 
determining the extent of a beneficiary's interest for relationship 
purposes. 
For attribution purposes, section 958 and 1563 require that 
the actuarial interest be computed, not with reference to the en-
tire assets of the trust or estate, but only with reference to the 
interests of the beneficiaries in the stock subject to attribution. 
This basis for attribution is in recognition of the fact that it is not 
uncommon for the interests of beneficiaries to extend to such 
assets unequally. The greater precision of this rule has much to 
recommend it when the inquiry concerns a specific identifiable 
trust asset, which is always the case when attribution is involved. 
However, the relationship provisions are used for a wide variety 
of purposes-some, as when conduct of one person is imputed to 
a related entity, not directly involving specific assets at all. Any 
attempt to be more precise than determining a beneficiary's in-
terest in the entire trust or estate for relationship purposes would 
require an intolerably difficult section-by-section analysis of the 
uses of the relationship provision without corresponding equita-
ble benefit. Thus, for relationship purposes, the actuarial interest 
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should always be computed with respect to the entire trust or 
estate.280 
For the suggested revision of the trust rules to operate effec-
tively, it is necessary to establish a device attributing the owner-
ship of an interest in a trust from one beneficiary to another in a 
manner similar to the attribution rules presently employed by 
section 267 with respect to corporations and adopted by section 
707(b) with respect to partnerships. This problem is considered 
below. 
The primarily personal orientation of section 267(b) is re-
flected both by its failure to include partnerships in its enumera-
tion of relationships and by the very limited inclusion of corpo-
rate relationships. While there is no important reason for the 
partnership relationships provision to be contained in subchapter 
K, there is a very sound reason for the creation of a universal 
relationship provision. Section 707(b)(l), the partnership provi-
sion corresponding to section 267(b), specifies the relationship of 
a partnership and a partner owning more than fifty percent of the 
profits or capital interest in the partnership, whichever is the 
greater. This definition is consistent with the general tenor of the 
relationship provisions and evidently has proven satisfactory in 
practice since the definition has never been modified by a cross-
referencing provision. As discussed below in connection with cor-
porations, however, it is doubtful that a general relationship pro-
vision should be based solely on value. If the corporate relation-
ship definition were to be based on an alternative voting power 
or value test, it follows that the partnership provision should be 
similarly based. The voting power test would be met if as a matter 
of state law or the partnership agreement, a partner is entitled 
to cast more than fifty percent of the votes on questions of part-
nership business. Thus, in a partnership in which each partner 
has one vote, the test will not be met with respect to any part-
ner-in the absence of attribution. Limited partners, under a law 
conforming to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, should not 
be regarded as possessing voting power even though they are enti-
tled to vote on certain extraordinary questions or in case of cer-
tain contingencies. 281 
280. The proposed regulations to section 414 adopt this approach. See 
Proposed Treas. Reg.§ 1.414(c).(2}(b)(2)(i)(B), 40 Fed. Reg. 51469 (1975). 
281. Such contingent rights are analogous to the rights typically granted 
holders of "nonvoting" stock when, for example, dividends are in arrears. 
1978] AFFINITY PROVISIONS 685 
The relationship established by section 267 between a corpo-
ration and an individual owning fifty percent of its stock should 
be retained, but its single test based upon value of stock owned 
should be reexamined. The several sections of the Code addressed 
to corporate relationships vary widely on whether votes or 
value, or both, are to be taken into account.2ll2 Expension of the 
section 267 test to include the greater of voting power or value 
would affect a relatively small number of taxpayers. The only 
shareholder-corporation relationships that would be added would 
be when the requisite shareholder group had retained voting con-
trol of the corporation but had permitted nonvoting stock to be 
held by others. It would seem that the possession of control over 
corporate transactions would establish a sufficient identity of eco-
nomic interest between the shareholders and the corporation to 
justify the inclusion of the relationship. 
There would seem to be good reason to exclude from consid-
eration, under either test, stock that is both nonvoting and lim-
ited and preferred as to dividends. The holder of such stock not 
only does not possess any measure of control over the corporation 
but also does not stand to be benefited materially by transactions 
entered into by the corporation since his interest in the income 
of the corporation is limited.183 Both the alternative reference to 
voting power and value and the exclusion of nonvoting preferred 
stock are consistent with section 1563, the most recent compre-
hensive statement by Congress of the basis for measuring corpo-
rate relationships. 
By far the most serious defect in the existing scheme of the 
affinity provisions is the absence of a generally applicable provi-
sion defining relationships among different types of entities. Sec-
tion 267, with its personal orientation, is extremely weak in this 
respect; the section does not refer to partnerships at all. When the 
draftsmen of a particular substantive provision wish to include 
282. In. some cases the differences are related to the substantive law using 
the relationships. 
283. The holder of a preferred stock, of course, has some interest in the 
economic health of the corporation, particularly if earnings are sufficiently de-
pressed that the payment of dividends is in arrears. Nevertheless, it is not 
believed that this interest is sufficient to bring the shareholder within the pro-
scribed relationship. The AU recommendations were to the same effect. See 
AU REPORT, supra note 274, at 467. 
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partnership relationships, the standard approach has been to 
cross-refer to section 707(b). That section, however, is addressed 
solely to partnerships, and thus a cross-reference to it does not 
include relationships between a partnership and a trust or corpo-
ration. Corporations are related under the present section 267 
only to other corporations that are personal holding companies 
and to trusts that own fifty percent of the stock of the corporation 
(or the grantor of such a trust). After section 1563 was added, a 
cross-reference to that section could accompany the cross-
reference to section 267 and 707(b); but, as in the case of partner-
ships, that addition would solve only the problem of corporation-
to-corporation relationships. A growing number of sections have 
addressed this problem on an ad hoc basis. While the overall 
relationships established under these sections are vastly im-
proved over the pre-1969 provisions, the piecemeal approach to 
all-inclusive relationships has greatly increased the pointless di-
versity within the Code. As part of a comprehensive scheme of 
revision, these ad hoc solutions should be repealed and replaced 
with a single, uniform, all-inclusive relationship provision. 
When defining the relationship between an individual and an 
entity, it is necessary that the individual, after attribution, own 
fifty percent of the interests in the entity; otherwise, a sufficient 
identity of interest will be lacking. In relating entities, however, 
it is only necessary that fifty percent of the interests in each 
entity be commonly owned for the entities to have the same de-
gree of identity of interest. Such common ownership need not be 
in one person; indeed, in theory, the number of common owners 
could be unlimited. Thus, if the same one hundred persons each 
owned a one percent interest in each of two corporations, it might 
fairly be presumed that the interests of the corporations were 
identical and that they should be regarded as related. As a practi-
cal matter, however, when ownership is so diffused, the likelihood 
that the corporations will be acting in concert is too remote to 
justify the complexity and difficulty of application that such a 
sweeping relationship provision would entail. Thus, it is desirable 
to limit the number of owners that can be taken into account for 
the purpose of this fifty percent test. Section 1563 limits this 
number of owners to five, thus permitting the relationship to be 
found if the degree of overlap exceeds five ten percent sharehold-
ers. This degree of ownership concentration finds supj:mrt in other 
1978] AFFINITY PROVISIONS 687 
sections of the Code. 28' Unless experience under section 1563(a) 
indicates that this test is too narrow, it should be adopted in a 
uniform relationship rule. 
In addition to being closely held, of course, the ownership of 
the entities must actually overlap to the extent of fifty percent 
of the interests in the entities. The section 1563(a)(2)(B) defini· 
tion of this requirement seems appropriate: the common owners 
must own fifty percent of each entity taking into account only 
that degree of ownership that is identical in each entity. 
The ALI proposals were both broader and more flexible. The 
ALI relationship provision would have found entities to be under 
common control if the entities were owned by up to twenty per· 
sons, after attribution, and their interests in each entity were "in 
approximately the same proportion."ZM The twenty.person test 
seems far too broad. After giving effect to the attribution rules, 
the test would include entities having a very large number of 
shareholders. The benefits from such a broad definition simply do 
not justify requiring all entities in the quasi·public 
range-entities having up to one hundred shareholders before 
attribution-to keep track of the relationships among their share. 
holders and the shareholders of entities with which they have 
dealings ·in order to ensure that they do not fall within the scope 
of this provision. The administrative cost is too great a price to 
pay to reach the very few entities that have such highly diffused 
ownership and are in fact being operated in concert to obtain an 
undue tax advantage.288 
The section 1563 definition of horizontally related entities 
adds one further requirement that would not be appropriate for 
general application. Not only must fifty percent of the stock be 
commonly owned, but eighty percent of the stock in each corpo· 
ration must be owned by the sarne five persons, although not 
necessarily in the same proportion. There does not appear to be 
any reason that entities must be so closely held before they can 
be regarded as related to other entities. In fact, about one-half of 
284. E.g., I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (defining a personal holding company); 
I.R.C. § 957(a) (defining a controlled foreign corporation). 
285. ALI REPORT, supra note 274, at 469. 
286. Furthermore, the "approximately proportional" requirement is unac-
ceptably vague for use in a relationship provision, even assuming that some 
degree of mechanical content to the phrase were provided by regulation. 
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the provisions that cross-refer to section 1563 drop this require-
ment. It should not be included in a uniform relationship provi-
sion. 
Similarly, section 1563 imposes an eighty percent ownership 
requirement for vertical relationships among entities. Such a re-
quirement is too high for use in a uniform provision. An eighty 
percent ownership requirement is employed in the reorganization 
and consolidated return provisions as indicating such a substan-
tial identity of interest that the two corporations may properly be 
regarded as one. This degree of identity is far too stringent a 
requirement for a general relationship provision; a substantial 
identity of interest is sufficient. The vertical relationship between 
entities should be subject to the same fifty percent test as that 
used for the relationship between an individual owner and the 
entity._ 
The present section 1563 uses the concept of a parent-
subsidiary chain in defining vertical relationships, a definitional 
style that would seem too broad for a uniform relationship provi-
sion, particularly if the ownership requirement were reduced to 
fifty percent. Thus, under 1563 (a)(l), all corporations are re-
garded as related if eighty percent of their stock is owned by one 
or more other members of the chain (except the common parent). 
Thus, if corporation A owns eighty percent of corporation B, 
which owns eighty percent of corporation C, which owns eighty 
percent of corporation D; all four corporations are related even 
though corporation A only owns, actually and constructively, 
fifty-one percent of corporation C and forty-one percent of corpo-
ration D. The premise for this result is that the twenty percent 
minority should be disregarded and that through its ownership, 
corporation A effectively dominates each tier and thus possesses 
substantial economic identity of interest with each corporation in 
the chain. Even with the required ownership at the eighty percent 
level, this result may be too extreme for use with all of the sub-
stantive provisions that employ relationship definitions. For ex-
ample, in connection with transaction provisions such as section 
267(a)(1), when the underlying issue is whether there has been a 
meaningful change in ownership, a transfer of property from cor-
poration A to corporation D would result in a reduction of interest 
in the property transferred of fifty-nine percent. Under other 
branches of the relationship definition, this would be sufficient to 
avoid relationship status. 
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If the required ownership percentage is reduced to fifty per-
cent, the assumptions of the chain concept become more doubtful 
and the reach of the relationship definition clearly too broad. If 
the ownership in the above example were reduced to fifty-one 
percent, corporation A would constructively own twenty-six per-
cent of corporation C and only thirteen percent of corporation 
D-clearly not a sufficient interest to justify inclusion in a general 
relationship provision. Thus, it would seem appropriate to aban-
don the chain concept and require that an entity own, actually 
or constructively, over fifty percent of a second entity before they 
would be regarded as related. Thus, assuming a chain of eighty 
percent ownership, corporation A would be related to corporation 
B and C but not to corporation D although corporations B and C 
would be related to corporation D. 
The resulting definition of related entities would generally 
provide that an entity of any type would be regarded as related 
to another entity if it controlled or was controlled by such other 
entity or if the two entities were under common control-in each 
instance with reference to both actual and constructive owner-
ship. 
There is a far greater consensus with respect to the broad 
outlines of the attribution provisions than there is with respect 
to the relationship provisions. The considerable diversity that 
does exist among these provisions goes generally to their de-
tail-for example, the use of varying threshold requirements. The 
one exception to this relative uniformity is in the family, for 
which, as with the family relationship, there is a total absence of 
uniformity. 
Initially, it may be observed that there is no inherent reason 
that the definition of family for the purpose of the attribution 
rules should be identical to the definition of family for relation-
ship purposes although almost uniformly that has been the case. 
Previously, it was suggested that brothers and sisters be excluded 
from the family for relationship purposes because their identity 
of economic interest was not sufficient to justify disregarding 
transactions among brothers and sisters. However, it may not 
follow that an ownership interest in an entity, such as stock, 
should never be attributed to a taxpayer from his brother. It 
might be thought, for example, that when a taxpayer owns, ac-
tually or constructively, forty-five percent of the stock of a corpo-
ration and his sister owns an additional six percent, there is a 
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strong factual basis for concluding that the economic interest of 
the taxpayer in the corporation is just as strong as when the 
additional six percent interest is owned by the taxpayer's daugh-
ter. On the other hand, if the taxpayer owned only six percent of 
the corporation, it would appear that his relationship to the cor-
poration would be substantially less if his sister owned forty-five 
percent of the stock than if his son owned the forty-five percent. 
Section 1563 introduced the appealing concept of a threshold for 
attribution among family members in appropriate circumstan-
ces.2K7 It would seem proper, therefore, to require attribution to 
an individual from brothers and sisters ifthe individual otherwise 
held a dominant interest in the entity. However, the fifty percent 
threshold established by section 1563 is excessively high in the 
context of defining section 267 relationships, which themselves 
only require a fifty percent ownership interest. Perhaps a thirty 
percent threshold for brother-sister attribution would be more 
appropriate. 
Section 1563 provides a complicated pattern for family attri-
bution involving threshold requirements depending on whether or 
not an individual is a minor. That pattern is too complex, as well 
as too restrictive, for use in a generally applicable attribution 
rule. The well-thought-out limitations on family attribution con-
tained in section 1563 are designed to ensure a substantial likeli-
hood of both identity of economic interest and control. However, 
an adequate factual basis exists for attributing stock among par-
ents and adult children, and, therefore, the older rules of sections 
267 and 318 should be retained. If these rules are found to be 
overly broad, the use of a threshold requirement would be prefera-
ble to deleting entirely a family member (as in the section 318 
deletion of grandparents). 
With respect to attribution from entities, the rules contained 
in section 1563(e), which are substantially similar to the ALI 
recommendations, do not require any considerable modification. 
Attribution from all such entities-corporations, partnerships, 
trusts, and estates-should be proportional to the ownership in-
terest of the shareholder, partner, or beneficiary. The five percent 
de minimis rule contained in 1563 should be retained to elimi-
287. Prior to section 1563, section 267 required that an individual own 
some stock before stock owned by his partner was attributed to him but did not 
establish a threshold requirement. 
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nate attribution of insignificant holdings that would generally be 
irrelevant to the relationship definition. Of course, for the pur-
pose of determining the existence of a five percent or greater 
interest, the attribution rules should be applied. 
The reference to proportionality, however, conceals some 
quite difficult questions. With respect to stock, attribution rules 
have invariably attributed stock in proportion to the value of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation held by the taxpayer. How-
ever, if the corporation from which stock is being attributed has 
outstanding more than one class of stock and the purpose of the 
attribution is to determine voting control of the corporation 
whose stock is being attributed, sole reliance upon a value test 
can produce inappropriate results. 
Relatively few relationship provisions in the Code that em-
ploy attribution rules are bas~d upon ownership of a specified 
percentage of voting power; value is far more commonly used. 
Accordingly, in the past, the problem of attributing voting stock 
through an entity to an individual who only held a nonvoting 
interest (such as nonvoting stock or a limited partnership inter-
est) in the entity from which attribution was being made has not 
commonly arisen. However, if the suggestion herein-that the 
relationships for section 267 purposes between individuals and 
entities be defined, in the alternative, with reference to voting 
power-were adopted, the problem would achieve far more signif-
icant dimensions. 
To a substantial degree, the anomalies produced in this area 
can be eliminated by excluding from consideration nonvoting 
stock that is preferred and limited as to dividends. This exclusion 
has been suggested with respect to the definition of relationships 
and would be equally applicable for attribution purposes. How-
ever, such an exclusion does not solve the problem of nonvoting 
common stock. For example, assume that an individual owned 
stock in corporation P that possessed over fifty percent of the 
voting power but, because of an outstanding issue of nonvoting 
class A stock having dividend rights equal to the common stock, 
represented only forty percent of the value of corporation P. Fur-
ther assume that corporation P owned all of the outstanding stock 
in corporation S. The relationship between the individual and 
corporation P would meet the fifty percent of voting power test. 
However, corporation S would only fall within the defined rela-
tionship with the individual if fifty percent of the stock of corpo-
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ration S were attributed to him. If the attribution rules were 
based upon value alone, only forty percent of the stock of corpora-
tion S would be so attributed, and the required relationship 
would not exist. Clearly, such a result is untenable. 
The only provision focusing on this problem is contained in 
the regulations to section 958, which attribute ownership based 
upon voting power or interest in income, depending upon the 
purpose for which attribution is being made. If attribution is 
being made for the purpose of a relationship provision that em-
ploys an alternative definition based upon voting power or value, 
then under the rule of section 958 attribution from entities should 
be computed twice, once for each branch of the relationship test. 
For example, assume that an individual held both voting and 
nonvoting stock in corporation A and possessed ten percent of the 
voting power but thirty percent of the value of corporation A. 
Further, assume that corporation A held fifty percent of the vot-
ing power of the stock in corporation B but that such stock repre-
sented only twenty percent of the value of B. The issue is the 
extent of the individual's constructive ownership of corporation 
B's wholly owned subsidiary, corporation X. With respect to vot-
ing power, the individual would own five percent (fifty percent 
times ten percent) of the voting power of X; with respect to value, 
he would constructively own six percent (twenty percent times 
thirty percent) of the value of the outstanding stock of corpora-
tion X. Thus, for relationship purposes, the individual would be 
regarded as owning six percent-the greater of the two computa-
tions-of corporation X. Of course, attribution with respect to 
voting power and value must be entirely separate. It would be 
clearly inappropriate to combine the individual's thirty percent 
by value interest in corporation A with corporation A's fifty per-
cent voting power in corporation B to conclude that the individ-
ual held a fifteen percent interest in corporation X. 
Attribution from partnerships should follow substantially 
the same format with one modest increase in complexity: the 
value branch of the test applicable to corporations should be 
replaced by the partner's proportionate interest in profits or capi-
tal, whichever is greater, as under the current section 707(b). 
There is no technical reason that the partnership provision could 
not be conformed fully to -the corporate provision and be based 
upon valuation of the entire partnership interest-a weighing of 
the profits and capital interest. The objection to this approach is 
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purely practical: an accurate valuation of the partnership interest 
will rarely be readily available while the proportionate interest in 
profits and capital will be apparent from the partnership agree-
ment. If in the preceding example corporation A was a ten-man 
partnership in which the individual held a thirty percent interest 
in profits and a twenty percent interest in capital but was only 
entitled to one vote along with each of his partners, the same 
attribution of the stock of corporation X would be made. 
The addition of the alternative voting power test admittedly 
adds to the complexity of the affinity provisions and may thus 
seem out of place in an argument for greater mechanical simplic-
ity. However, if the variety of affinity provisions presently in the 
Code were replaced with a single uniform provision, substantial 
simplification would be achieved regardless of the complexity of 
that provision. Furthermore, it is expected that the alternative 
test will not often be used. If nonvoting preferred stock is elimi-
nated from the value computation, the alternative test will be 
necessary only for corporations having particularly complex capi-
tal structures. Similarly, in most partnerships, voting power cor-
responds to the partner's interest in profits and capital. Perhaps 
most importantly, however, it is believed that the added com-
plexity is amply justified by the greater consistency of the alter-
native approach with the realities of mutual interest and control. 
With respect to trusts and estates, attribution should gener-
ally be made in accordance with the same actuarial formula used 
in determining relationships with such entities. These entities, 
however, pose a special problem since, more commonly than in 
the case of corporations and partnerships, the interests of the 
several beneficiaries may not constitute an undivided interest in 
the entire corpus. Rather, either the income from or the ultimate 
entitlement to certain assets of the trust or the estate may be 
greater with respect to a particular beneficiary. In this situation, 
attribution under a single mechanical formula will not produce a 
proper result. For example, the trust instrument may provide 
that upon the death of the life beneficiary, all of the stock that 
would be the subject of attribution is to be distributed to A while 
the balance of the assets are to be distributed to B. In this situa-
tion, the life beneficiary has an interest in the stock being attrib-
uted equal to his actuarial interest in the entire trust. A's interest 
in the stock is equal to the actuarial interest of the entire remain-
der interest. B has no interest in the stock, and it would be inap-
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propriate to attribute any of such stock to him, either for the 
purpose of treating him as the owner thereof or for the purpose 
of diluting the ownership interest therein of A or the life benefici-
ary. 
Although this problem has long been recognized, no statu-
tory provision has yet attempted to provide special attribution 
rules for such trusts. The regulations to section 958 appear to 
require a special allocation but do so by way of an example, not 
by attempting to state a specific allocation rule.m The ALI draft 
proposal suggested statutory language requiring a special alloca-
tion, but the proposal was vague and its operation unclear.289 
Because of the considerable flexibility that exists in the drafting 
of wills and trust instruments, it may not be feasible to provide 
a definitive statutory provision that will not require ad hoc devel-
opment. However, it would appear that the statute generally 
should provide that stock (or the partnership or other interest 
that is the subject of attribution) shall not be attributed to a 
beneficiary who, under the express terms of the will or agreement 
establishing the estate or trust or pursuant to the law governing 
the distribution of income or assets held by the entity, cannot 
under any circumstance obtain by virtue of his interest in the 
trust or estate any interest in the stock (or other interest) includ-
ing the income therefrom or the proceeds of any distribution 
thereof. Rather, such stock (or other interest) shall be attributed 
to those beneficiaries who may obtain an interest therein in pro-
portion to their actuarial interests in the stock (or other interest) 
that is the subject of attribution. 
288. Treas. Reg. § 1.958-l(d), ex.(4) (1966). 
289. AU REPORT, supra note 274, at 461. The ALI provision specified that 
stock would not be attributed to a beneficiary who could not obtain any interest 
therein and continued to provide that the stock would be considered owned by 
the other beneficiaries "in proportion to their relative actuarial interests in the 
balance of the estate or trusts." By balance of the trusts, the draft presumably 
is referring to the actuarially computed portions of the trust determined after 
subtracting the actuarial interest of the beneficiaries who could not obtain any 
interest in the stock. This formulation appears defective when the trust creates 
income and remainder interests in different persons as would normally be the 
case. Referring to the example in the text, it would not be appropriate to treat 
the income beneficiary as having a greater interest in the stock than would be 
his actuarial interest in the trust. Rather, only the interest of A should be 
enlarged by the inability of B to obtain any interest in the stock. 
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Back-attribution, that is, attribution from owners to entities, 
presents the most complex problems of attribution. There is a 
strong factual basis for treating closely held entities as mere crea-
tures of their owners and treating the owners as directly owning 
their proportional interest of the assets of the entity. The reverse, 
however, is not necessarily the case. The economic interest of, for 
example, a shareholder-even a substantial shareholder-may 
not be identical to the interest of the corporation, and clearly the 
shareholder is not controlled by the corporation. Thus, back-
attribution is never appropriate except in the case of a controlling 
owner. Furthermore, the field of attribution should not, and gen-
erally does not, include widely held corporations and partner-
ships; rather, it is a concept applicable to closely held entities. 
However, unrestrained back-attribution may easily result in such 
overly broad relationship provisions that widely held entities be-
come affected. Thus, corporation A, which does not actually own 
any stock in corporation B, may be regarded as owning stock in 
corporation B that is actually owned not only by a stockholder in 
corporation A, but also by members of his family or by other 
entities in which the shareholder or the members of his family 
hold an interest. Thus, in the absence of appropriately high 
threshold requirements, General Motors would be regarded as 
controlling IBM if shareholders of General Motors and their fami-
lies, trusts, and personal holding companies in the aggregate con-
trolled IBM. 
Even when such results of back-attribution are eliminated by 
high threshold requirements, such as the fifty percent require-
ment employed by section 318, back-attribution is generally un-
necessary.no The function of back-attribution is to enhance the 
290. The AU study, which recommended a considerably broader scope of 
relationships for section 267(b) than is here recommended, concluded that the 
list of relationships so described did not require back-attribution. 
Congress has accepted the proposition that back-attribution is not required 
if the relationships described are sufficiently complete since such attribution 
was deliberately omitted from section 1563(d) and (e). The relationships estab-
lished in this section constitute an extension of the definition of controlled 
corporations contained in section 1551. Section 1551 requires ownership of a 
second corporation by only a single corporation but employs a limited form of 
back-attribution for this purpose, specifying that the ownership must be by "the 
transferor corporation, its shareholders or both." Section 1563 eliminates back· 
attribution and relies upon a complete definition of controlled groups. 
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ownership interest in one entity by another for the purposes of 
establishing a relationship among such entities. If the relation-
ship provision to which attribution is applicable is complete, 
specifying all of the relationships between various entities to 
which the substantive law is to be applicable, back-attribution is 
unnecessary and, if applied, would result in an overly broad rela-
tionship. 281 
291. For example, assume that an individual holds an actuarially deter-
mined 80% interest in a trust, that the individual owns a 20% interest in a 
corporation, that the trust owns a 40% interest in the same corporation, and that 
the balance of both the trust and the corporation was owned by unrelated 
persons. Under a relationship provision such as recommended here (including 
entities if one owned a 50% interest in the other or if 50% of each is owned by 
an individual or a third entity), the individual and the trust would be related 
as would the individual and the corporation since the individual directly owned 
20% and indirectly 32% of the corporation, producing a 52% constructive owner-
ship. However, the trust and the corporation would not be related based solely 
upon direct ownership of the corporation by the trust. However, since the rela-
tionship provision includes a 50% common ownership provision, the trust and 
the corporation would be related because the individual actually or construc-
tively owned 50% of each and back-attribution is not required to reach that 
result. If the relationship provision lacked a common control feature, the use of 
back-attribution would be required in order to find the trust and the corporation 
related: the trust would be regarded as owning the 20% of the corporation owned 
by the individual in addition to the 40% it owned directly. 
Assume now that the individual's beneficial interest in the trust was only 
a 60% interest. The individual and the trust are still related, but the individual 
and the corporation are not because the individual would constructively own 
only 24% of the corporation that, when added to his actual20% interest, would 
fall below the required 50%. In addition, the trust and the corporation would 
not fall within the relationship provision because 50% of the corporation was not 
owned by the individual. This result seems clearly correct. By itself, the interest 
of the trust in the corporation is not sufficient to cause the entities to be re-
garded as related: were property sold from the trust to the corporation, for 
example, the retained indirect ownership in the property by the trust would be 
over 50% less than its interest prior to the transfer. The fact that a related 
beneficiary of the trust held an additional interest in the corporation should not 
change this result. Prior to the transfer, the individual together with the other 
beneficiaries of the trust indirectly owned the entire property; after the transfer 
only the individual retained an indirect interest and that interest is only a 44% 
interest. Thus, the trust and the corporation should not be regarded as related. 
If we were to assume in addition that a second individual owned a 10% 
interest in both the trust and the corporation, these two entities would be related 
because the relationship provision takes into account overlapping ownership by 
up to five persons. In other words, if the relationship provision is of proper 
breadth, back-attribution is not necessary. 
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There are, however, certain substantive provisions of the 
Code that employ attribution but do not use general relationship 
provisions. Certain of these provisions, principally those govern-
ing corporate distribution and adjustments, require back-
attribution in order to reach a proper result. For example, for the 
purpose of section 302, which establishes the distinction between 
redemptions and dividends, it is not relevant whether the corpo-
ration is related to the redeeming shareholder. Rather, the in-
quiry focuses on the precise number of shares of stock that the 
shareholder is deemed to own after the application of the attribu-
tion rules. 292 For the purposes of these sections, back-attribution 
must be retained-but only for the purposes of these sections.293 
The back-attribution provision, presumably in substantially the 
form now contained in section 318, must be separated from the 
balance of the attribution rules so as to be included in a casual 
cross-reference. 
The possession of an option presents a clear basis for attribu-
tion, and there should be relatively little controversy concerning 
either the need for such a rule or its preferred scope. The holder 
On the other hand, if back-attribution were applicable to this example, 
ignoring the second individual, the trust would be regarded as owning the 20% 
of the corporation's stock actually owned by the individual, which, when added 
to the 40% actually owned by the trust, would exceed the required 50%. Thus, 
these entities would be regarded as related, which would give the relationship 
provisions excessive breadth. 
292. If both an individual and a trust of which the individual was the 
primary beneficiary owned stock in a corporation and stock held by the individ-
ual were redeemed, the stock held by the trust would nevertheless be attributed 
to the individual under the normal entity attribution rule for the purpose of 
determining whether the redemption should be taxable as a dividend. This 
result is entirely proper, and it is clear that the reverse should also be true. That 
is, a redemption of stock held by the trust should be tested for dividend equiva-
lence by taking into account the stock owned by the individual. Back-
attribution is required in order to achieve that result. 
293. It would be considerably beyond any proper scope of this review to 
examine all of the substantive provisions of the Code to which attribution is 
applicable to determine whether back-attribution would be appropriate. Such 
a study, undertaken by the ALI, concluded with respect to sections of the Code 
existing in 1958 that back-attribution was only required in sections 302, 306, 341 
(assuming certain other revisions were made in that section), and might be 
necessary in sections 334 and 382 unless the definition of purchase contained in 
those sections were revised by employing a reference to general relationship 
provisions-a change that would seem eminently proper. 
698 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [VoL 45 
of an option should be regarded as owning the stock subject to the 
option, and it should make no difference whether the stock sub-
ject to the option is treasury stock, unissued stock, or stock pres-
ently outstanding in the hands of shareholders. Nor should it 
matter whether the optiqn is held against the issuer of the stock 
subject to the option or against another or whether the option is 
a separate security or a part of a larger security (as in the case of 
a convertible debenture). 
On the other hand, options that do not represent a significant 
present economic interest in the corporation should not form the 
basis for attribution of stock. In particular, when there are sub-
stantial conditions on the exercise of the option that are not cer-
tain to occur, the factual premise for attribution-that the option 
is the substantial equivalent of stock-does not exist, and attri-
bution would be improper. 
What constitutes a substantial condition for this purpose 
would best be left to case law development; nevertheless, some 
principles seem clear. Consistent with section 544(b), time alone 
(which is certain to pass) should not be regarded as a substantial 
contingency. Thus, that the option is not immediately exercis-
able should not itself prevent attribution. One who has a right 
to increase his interest in a corporation at a future date pos-
sesses, by virtue of that right, a substantial economic interest 
in the corporation. However, if an individual has an option to 
acquire stock held by another only if the holder of the option 
survives the stockholder, there should be no attribution to the 
holder of the option until the death of the stockholder. While the 
holder of such an option may have an economic interest in the 
corporation by virtue of his option, the interest is speculative. 
Thus, the relationship between the holder and the corporate is-
suer of the stock subject to the option is not sufficient to justify 
treating the holder of the option as a present stockholder. The 
adoption of such a limitation on the option rule would make it 
clear that stock that may be acquired by a shareholder of a corpo-
ration pursuant to a standard "buy-out" agreement would not 
be attributed to the shareholder during the lifetime of other 
shareholders. 214 On the other hand, when the contingency is 
294. Such agreements normally provide that upon the death of a share-
holder, his stock must be sold, or at least offered, to the corporation or other 
shareholders. If such an agreement formed the basis for attribution, it would 
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within the control of the holder of the option, such as the pay-
ment of a certain price in connection with the exercise of the 
option, the contingency should not be a bar to attribution.2i5 
In the case of an option to acquire unissued stock, it is ob-
vious that the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion, determined after attribution, should be computed by as-
suming that the stock subject to option was outstanding in the 
same manner as computations under section 544(b) are presently 
made. 
The more difficult question is whether options held by per-
sons other than the person to whom stock is being attributed 
should be regarded as also having been exercised for the purpose 
of enlarging the denominator of the fraction representing that 
person's proportionate interest in the corporation, generally to 
the benefit of the taxpayer. This question only arises when the 
option is to acquire unissued stock and ultimately involves a 
prediction concerning a question of fact. Since the prediction 
cannot be made with certainty, it would be. appropriate to provide 
assistance in the form of conclusive presumptions contained in 
operating rules, similar to those applicable to section 544(b). For 
example, it might be provided that attribution should be made 
only with respect to options that would increase the stock owner-
ship of the individual in question, regardless of whether such 
cause wholly inappropriate results. For example, it might be impossible for any 
shareholder of the corporation to cause his stock to be redeemed at capital gains 
rates under the substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b)(2). 
Attribution under such agreements would pose the further problem of deter-
mining the number of shares to be attributed to the holder of the option if the 
corporation had more than two shareholders. Such agreements typically permit 
the surviving shareholders to purchase the stock of the deceased shareholder in 
proportion to the survivors' interests in the corporation. However, if some survi-
vors do nat exercise their rights, the stock is reoffered to those stockholders that 
do. Thus, each shareholder has an option (albeit doubly contingent) to acquire 
all of the stock of each of the other shareholders. 
295. There are certain situations in which the mere requirement that a 
price be paid for the stock under option might be regarded as sufficient to 
prevent attribution. If at the time attribution is to be made the option is worth· 
less in that the exercise price is so high that it would be economic~lly irrational 
to exercise the option, the option might be ignored. Also, where an option may 
only be exercised upon the payment of a price for the stock subject to option 
equal to the fair market value of the stock determined at the time the option is 
exercised, the holder of the option does not have a present economic interest in 
the corporation. 
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options are held by him or by another whose stock would be 
attributed to him-subject to specified exceptions. Those excep-
tions might include a rule attributing stock to all options held by 
other persons if stock is attributed to the individual in question 
by virtue of the option rule and the options held by others are 
substantially identical to such option with respect to their terms 
and conditions. Further, an option held by another should be 
regarded as exercised if the option in question may not be exer-
cised unless such other option is also exercised. Clearly the rule 
should be sufficiently flexible to permit case law development of 
the exceptions. 
XV. CONCLUSION 
The process of producing tax legislation has always been 
complex and frequently subject to intense pressure. Perhaps, it 
is not surprising that supplementary material like the affinity 
provisions is inserted in an arbitrary, inconsistent, and some-
times clearly erroneous fashion. However, the substantive provi-
sions of the Code are sufficiently complex, and it can no longer 
be acceptable for such secondary material to contribute its own 
needless confusion. 
By the time of the adoption of the 1976 Act, complexity was 
no longer just the object of complaints by practitioners unable to 
charge for their time. It had become publicly acknowledged as a 
serious problem. Nevertheless, the draftsmen of that Act seemed 
particularly prone to use the worst techniques of drafting that 
had appeared in the pre-1976 Code. There is no question that the 
attribution provisions added in 1976 are less consistent, more 
difficult to use, and contain more drafting errors than the pre-
1976 provisions. The trend alone is disturbing; in light of the 
acknowledged necessity for simplification, it is no less than outra-
geous. 
Under the current priorities, each piece of tax reform legisla-
tion pushes the Code further from human comprehension. Unless 
Congress is willing to devote a greater portion of its reform ener-
gies to mechanical simplification-and the affinity provisions are 
merely illustrative of the need-the time will soon arise (if it has 
not already) when experienced tax specialists can no longer have 
confidence in their ability to understand and apply the tax law. 
And, if these practitioners cannot perform confidently, surely nei-
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ther they nor the public at large will have confidence that the 
Internal Revenue agent in the field, or his superiors in Washing-
ton, can understand or fairly apply the law. At that point, our 
voluntary compliance system collapses. It has been suggested 
here that such a crisis of complexity can be avoided without 
foregoing the equitable fine tuning that ·necessarily complicates 
the substance of the Code. But the need to rationalize legisla-
tively the affinity provisions is urgent for the task becomes pro-
gressively more difficult each year. 
